THE VALUE OF EFFORT: HOW DO WE MAKE DECISIONS WHEN EFFORT IS INVOLVED? by LUDWICZAK, AGATA
THE VALUE OF EFFORT: HOW DO WE MAKE DECISIONS WHEN
EFFORT IS INVOLVED?
LUDWICZAK, AGATA
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/12900
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
1 
 
 
 
THE VALUE OF EFFORT: HOW DO WE MAKE DECISIONS 
WHEN EFFORT IS INVOLVED? 
 
AGATA LUDWICZAK 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 
 
 
August, 2015 
 
Queen Mary University of London 
Biological and Experimental Psychology 
School of Biological and Chemical Sciences 
 
 
 
2 
 
STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY 
 
I, Agata Ludwiczak, confirm that the research included within this thesis is my own work or 
that where it has been carried out in collaboration with, or supported by others, that this is 
duly acknowledged below and my contribution indicated. Previously published material is 
also acknowledged below. 
I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not 
to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third party’s copyright or other 
Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential material. 
I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection software to check the 
electronic version of the thesis. 
I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree by this 
or any other university. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information 
derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author. 
 
Signature:  
Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
Effort-based decision-making is an instance of value-based decision-making in which effort 
is the main cost associated with obtaining rewards. Despite the fact that we engage in this 
process on a daily basis, many assumptions regarding effort-based decision-making have not 
been tested yet. Furthermore, no comprehensive model of this type of decision-making has 
been proposed. Therefore, the main aim of this thesis was to introduce a novel Value-Effort 
Decision-Making (V-E-D-M) model of effort-based decision-making. The proposed model 
consisted of six processing stages: Representation, Valuation, Action Selection, Action 
Execution, Outcome Evaluation and Learning. Assumptions of this model were investigated 
in this thesis to verify their validity. More specifically, six areas relating to the V-E-D-M 
model were explored: the effects of manipulating 1) reward characteristics and 2) effort type 
on effort-based decision-making, 3) importance of effort/reward during different stages of 
effort-based decision-making, 4) importance of outcome feedback during effort-based 
decision-making, 5) effects of delaying Action Execution on effort-based decision-making, 
and 6) neural underpinnings of the effort-based decision-making process.  These topics were 
explored in six experimental studies utilising a novel effort-based decision-making task 
developed for the purpose of this thesis. The results of these investigations showed that: 1) 
the effects of reward magnitude on effort-based decision-making depend on the stage of the 
process, as rewards seem to affect behaviour mainly during Action Selection, and less so 
during Action Execution; 2) changing reward valence affects effort-based decision-making, 
as people become more risk averse when losses are at stake, 3) reward reliability can 
potentially affect effort-based decision-making, but only when participants believe they can 
increase their chances of obtaining rewards through exerting effort, 4) reward values drive 
behaviour during Action Selection, whereas effort requirements determine behaviour during 
Action Execution, 5) increasing the informative value of outcome feedback does not affect 
effort-based decision making, and 6) delaying Action Execution affects effort exertion during 
this stage. The final V-E-D-M model incorporates these results. 
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CHAPTER 1: General Introduction 
Effort-based decision-making is an instance of value-based decision-making in which effort 
is the main cost associated with obtaining a reward. We face this type of decision-making 
whenever we deliberate if it is worth getting up from the couch to go to the gym, or when we 
decide whether we should put in the effort and resources to study for a university degree. 
Whenever we think about prospective effortful actions we need to analyse the options that are 
available to us by taking into account the costs and benefits associated with each option. 
From this we are then able to choose an action that is the most beneficial in the given 
circumstances (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). There are several basic assumptions 
that appear to be commonly accepted in the literature focused on effort-based decision-
making which will be covered in detail in this chapter.  
Many researchers investigating effort-based decision-making processes tend to assume that:  
1) Effort is aversive and given a choice we should normally prefer an option which requires 
less effort;  
2) The aversive effects of effort can be overcome if high enough reward is at stake (in fact, 
some might go as far as to say that all effort we expend is driven by, and proportional to, 
rewards that are available);  
3) Mental and physical effort tasks are likely to be underpinned by the same underlying 
decision-making processes and so behaviour during tasks that are mental or physical should 
be similar;  
4) Decisions concerning effort are based on estimated costs and benefits, which might differ 
from the actual experienced costs and benefits of the outcome.  
Investigations examining these four assumptions conducted so far, however, paint a much 
more complicated picture of the rules guiding effort-based decision-making than has 
generally been assumed (e.g. Brehm & Self, 1989; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). Therefore, the 
general aim of this thesis is to investigate the assumptions regarding the decision-making 
process when effort is involved in order to verify their accuracy in different circumstances. 
The key goal is to examine the effects of manipulating the reward structure of a decision-
making scenario on effort-based choice and effort execution. Potential differences between 
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mental and physical effort processing, as well as the differences in behaviour during choice 
and execution are also investigated.  
Broadly, the structure and content of the thesis is as follows: the first chapter of this work 
provides an overview of value-based decision-making models used to represent effort-based 
choice and effort exertion in animals and humans. It also discusses the prevailing claims 
about the driving forces behind effort-based decision-making. Why does this chapter take this 
focus? The key reason is that decision-making is a process of interest in many disciplines, 
including psychology, neuroscience, economics, political science and computer science. In 
essence, this thesis focuses on the development of our understanding of this process derived 
primarily from psychology and neuroscience, with some mention of studies from the 
economics domain, in the view that this work is likely to inform literatures beyond just 
psychology.  
Chapter 2 describes the rationale behind the specific manipulations included in a series of six 
experiments examining effort-based decision-making forming the empirical part of this 
thesis. In Chapter 3 the methodology behind the experimental task design and data analysis is 
discussed. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 describe the results of experimental investigations along with 
their implications. Finally, in Chapter 7 the findings are discussed in the wider context of 
value-based decision-making. In addition, the limitations of the design used throughout are 
addressed and future directions for research on effort-based decision-making are suggested.  
The remaining part of this chapter will be structured in the following way: first, a brief 
overview of effort-based decision-making and the brain networks involved in this process 
will be provided. This will be followed by a discussion of the existing models of decision-
making and their components, which will end with a presentation of a new, updated model of 
effort-based decision-making: the Value-Effort Decision-Making (V-E-D-M) model. From 
this, there will be a review of studies dedicated to examining processing of effort during 
decision-making in the context of the V-E-D-M model. Here the discussion will highlight the 
issues that need to be addressed to increase the predictive value of the new model. The 
implications of these studies will be considered, and a rationale for the new set of 
experiments will be outlined.  
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1.1 Effort-based decision-making 
In everyday life obtaining rewards can be seen as overcoming obstacles, which often requires 
expenditure of effort. Decision-making in such situations can be described as effort-based. 
On the most basic level, effort-based decision-making characterizes the processes employed 
when we face a choice between engaging in effortful actions to obtain rewards versus 
remaining idle and not obtaining rewards. It also describes situations in which we are 
required to choose between options associated with different amounts of reward and effort.  
Most generally, in such scenarios effort can be described as the energetic cost associated with 
performing mental or physical actions (Navon & Gopher, 1979; Robert & Hockey, 1997). 
Physical effort has been defined as the energetic cost of physical movement (Navon & 
Gopher, 1979), whereas mental effort has been characterized as allocation of mental 
resources (Jansma, Ramsey, de Zwart, van Gelderen, & Duyn, 2007), or the demand for 
controlled information processing  (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010). Some 
researchers suggest that mental and physical effort are processed in the same way by the 
same neural systems (e.g. Boksem & Tops, 2008; Botvinick & Rosen, 2009; Eisenberger, 
1992), although contradicting evidence exists (e.g. Hosking, Cocker, & Winstanley, 2014; 
Schmidt, Lebreton, Clery-Melin, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 2012). Therefore, there appears 
to be some confusion about whether the underpinning mechanisms that support mentally 
effortful processes and physically effortful processes are fundamentally the same or not. This 
point will be revisited again later in the chapter. 
Some studies suggest that in certain circumstances effort might be rewarding in and of itself 
(Kim & Labroo, 2011; Kivetz, 2003). That is to say, we may enjoy the act of putting in effort 
because we like to challenge ourselves, and that becomes a rewarding experience. However, 
generally, effort is considered to be aversive. The fact that we have to perform effortful 
actions tends to reduce our willingness to engage in an activity. This is often because the 
effort that the action entails generates negative affect towards it, and is therefore treated as a 
cost both in humans and in animals (Brosnan & De Waal, 2003; Garbarino & Edell, 1997; 
Kool et al., 2010; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Robert & Hockey, 1997). The Law of Least Effort 
(Hull, 1943) has been a useful formulation to understand the negative associations with 
having to perform a potentially effortful action. This law stipulates that given two actions 
leading to similar rewards, the one requiring less effort will be chosen. One of the 
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implications of this formulation is that effort is an important factor that is taken into account 
when making decisions. 
Indeed, a large set of studies suggests that effort influences decision-making by changing the 
value we attach to options (e.g. Bonnelle et al., 2014; Chong et al., 2015; Day, Jones, & 
Carelli, 2011; Day, Jones, Wightman, & Carelli, 2010; Hartmann, Hager, Tobler, & Kaiser, 
2013; Minamimoto, Hori, & Richmond, 2012). More specifically, it has been proposed that 
there is an inverse relationship between the value of reward and the amount of effort needed 
to obtain it during decision-making. That is, the value of rewards is thought to decrease as 
effort associated with obtaining them increases – a phenomenon called effort discounting 
(e.g. Botvinick, Huffstetler, & McGuire, 2009; Hartmann et al., 2013). The extent to which 
the value of rewards is discounted depends on such characteristics of effort as duration and 
intensity (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). Interestingly, while there is speculation regarding effort 
discounting and its’ application to both physical and mental effort, direct tests of the extent to 
which effort discounting pertains to both mental and physical effort has not be carried out. 
Turning to evidence from pharmacological research, brain imaging, and clinical studies there 
is support for the view that effort is an important dimension that should be accounted for 
when studying decision-making. For example Croxson, Walton, O'Reilly, Behrens, and 
Rushworth (2009) investigated the neuronal correlates of effort-based cost/benefit 
calculations in humans using the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technique. 
They observed activation in the ventral striatum (part of the basal ganglia) and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) in response to reward- and effort-predicting stimuli; this activation 
depended on the amount of effort required to obtain the reward. Croxson et al. (2009) have 
taken these results to suggest that ACC and striatum regions might be important for 
processing of effort during decision-making. In line with this conclusion, other studies have 
found that ACC and the striatum activate in response to choices involving effort, even in the 
absence of extrinsic rewards (Boehler et al., 2011; Botvinick et al., 2009; Schouppe, 
Demanet, Boehler, Ridderinkhof, & Notebaert, 2014). In general, structures identified as 
important for effort processing during effort-based decision-making in humans include ACC, 
parts of the basal ganglia (particularly the striatum), as well as other parts of the brain such as 
the basolateral amygdala (BLA), supplementary motor area (SMA) and insula (e.g. Bijleveld 
et al., 2014; Botvinick et al., 2009; Burke, Brunger, Kahnt, Park, & Tobler, 2013; Croxson et 
al., 2009; Gepshtein et al., 2014; Kroemer et al., 2014; Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, Dayan, & 
Dolan, 2013; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Meyniel, Sergent, Rigoux, Daunizeau, & Pessiglione, 
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2013; Prevost, Pessiglione, Metereau, Clery-Melin, & Dreher, 2010; Schmidt et al., 2009; 
Schmidt et al., 2008; Treadway et al., 2012). Overall, this suggests that there are neurological 
mechanisms that are activated when making a decision that involves choosing between 
options associated with different levels of effort exertion.  
In addition to identifying parts of the brain responsible for effort processing, 
pharmacological, brain imaging, and clinical studies also point to an important role for the 
neurotransmitter dopamine during effort-based decision-making. To start with, there are 
several lines of evidence which suggest that the dopamine system supports the ability of 
organisms to compare the different options available to them, by guiding choice towards the 
most optimal outcome (e.g. Assadi, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009; Gepshtein et al., 2014; Krebs, 
Boehler, Roberts, Song, & Woldorff, 2012; Kroemer et al., 2014; Schmidt et al., 2008). In 
conjunction, evidence for the important role of dopamine in effort processing in humans also 
comes from studies investigating effort-based choice and effort exertion in Parkinson’s 
disease (PD) patients. PD is a neurodegenerative disorder affecting dopamine-producing cells 
in the substantia nigra pars compacta, part of the basal ganglia. It leads to reduced midbrain 
dopaminergic transmission. Studies suggest that one of the consequences of the reduction of 
dopamine levels in the brain of PD patients is a shift in cost/benefit analysis. This means that 
during effort-based decision-making, costs are weighted even higher than gains, which leads 
to a decreased willingness to exert effort (e.g. Baraduc, Thobois, Gan, Broussolle, & 
Desmurget, 2013; Chong et al., 2015; Gepshtein et al., 2014; Kojovic et al., 2014; Mazzoni, 
Hristova, & Krakauer, 2007). Nevertheless, the existing studies on effort-based decision-
making in PD concentrate mainly on investigating physical effort exertion, and so provide 
little information about the effects of dopamine depletion on decisions regarding mentally 
effortful tasks. Existing studies do contribute, however, to the general claim that effort-based 
decisions recruit brain systems that involve the neurotransmitter dopamine. 
To summarise, even though effort is generally thought to be aversive, people still often 
engage in effortful activities, on condition that the effort spent leads to attractive rewards. 
During the decision-making process the value of rewards is discounted by the amount of 
effort needed to obtain them. This process is thought to rely on several different brain 
structures, particularly ACC and the basal ganglia, and the neurotransmitter dopamine.  
The next section of this chapter describes value-based decision-making models which can be 
used to characterize the precise mechanisms involved in effort-based decision-making. These 
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models are useful because the way in which we process values while making decisions is an 
important factor that needs to be considered when assessing whether to perform an effortful 
action or not. The next section will end with a proposed version of the models which focuses 
specifically on processing of values when effort is required. 
1.2 Value-based decision-making models in the context of effort-based decision-making 
Value-based decision-making is a general term used to describe decision-making in situations 
in which we face a choice between options associated with different rewards and costs (e.g.  
effort). It is a process by which we compare different options and choose the one associated 
with ‘the best possible outcome’ (largest reward/least cost). These ‘best possible outcomes’ 
can be associated with primary rewards, such as food or ensuring safety (shelter), or 
secondary rewards, such as money. In this section six decision-making models (by: Rangel et 
al. (2008), Doya (2008), Kable and Glimcher (2009), Assadi et al. (2009) , Ernst and Paulus 
(2005), and Rigoux and Guigon (2012)) describing the components of value-based decision-
making are characterized, their limitations are discussed, and a new, effort specific, value-
based decision-making model is proposed based on the components of the previous models.  
Within psychology and neuroeconomics, value-based decision-making is conceptualised in 
various different ways. Most commonly it is assumed to consist of several interdependent 
processing steps. However, the steps considered to be important for this process differ 
depending on the flavour of the model being proposed (see Table 1). Rangel et al. (2008) 
suggest that value-based decision-making is formed of five consecutive steps, relying on 
separate, although partly overlapping brain structures: 1) Representation, 2) Valuation, 3) 
Action Selection, 4) Outcome Evaluation and 5) Learning. Representation involves an 
analysis of the external state of the environment, the internal state of the decision-maker, and 
the attributes of the available courses of action (see also: Regan, 2014). During the Valuation 
stage attributes of available options (i.e. costs and benefits associated with them) are 
combined to form a subjective value of each option. During the Action Selection stage these 
subjective values are compared and the action which leads to an outcome of the highest value 
is selected. The Outcome Evaluation stage then follows, which involves assessing the 
desirability of an outcome. At this stage the discrepancy between the predicted and the 
experienced outcome is established. The difference between the two (i.e. expected and actual 
outcome) serves as a basis on which Learning occurs. As a consequence of Learning, 
decision-makers can update the action-outcome associations. This allows them, during the 
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next similar decision-making scenario, to decide what to do based on a more accurate 
estimate of the outcome. The value-based decision-making model by Rangel et al. (2008) was 
motivated by the results of animal and human studies investigating the neurobiological basis 
of the decision-making process, as well as studies investigating different computational 
models of decision-making.  
Table 1. Summary of stages included in different value-based decision-making models 
 
Similarly, Doya (2008) also based his model of value-based decision making on the results of 
neurobiological and computational studies. He suggested, however, that decision-making 
consists of four steps, rather than five: 1) Representation: recognizing the present situation, 
2) Evaluation: evaluation of options in terms of rewards and punishments they would bring, 
3) Selection: selecting an action in reference to one’s needs, and 4) Re-evaluation: re-
evaluating an action based on the outcome. These steps are broadly consistent with what 
Rangel et al. (2008) suggested. Although Doya (2008) does not include an explicit Learning 
stage, the re-evaluation stage could be broadly considered as a Learning type stage in which 
some form of updating occurs. 
As with Doya (2008) and Rangel et al. (2008), Kable and Glimcher (2009) formulated their 
decision-making model based on neurophysiological studies in humans and non-human 
primates, but also on theoretical models in economics. They identified two critical steps in 
value-based decision-making: 1) Valuation, and 2) Choice. During the Valuation stage 
decision-makers integrate different dimensions (probability, effort, rewards, time) of each 
available option into a subjective value. This subjective value is thought to depend on the 
learned values of actions taken in the past, although Learning is not defined as a separate 
decision-making stage in this model. During the Choice stage the subjective values of 
different options are compared, and the option with the highest value is chosen. The action 
associated with this option is then passed on to the motor system. The two decision-making 
steps described in this model are roughly equivalent to the Valuation and Action Selection 
Model
Representation Valuation
Action 
Selection
Action 
Execution
Outcome 
Evaluation Learning
Assadi et al. 2009  +  +  +
Doya 2008  +  +  +  +
Ernst et al. 2005  +  +  +  +
Kable et al. 2009  +  +
Rangel et al. 2008  +  +  +  +  +
Rigoux et al. 2012  +  +  +
Stage
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stages of Rangel et al. (2008) model and Evaluation and Selection stages of Doya (2008) 
model. It is worth pointing out that Kable and Glimcher (2009) do not explicitly distinguish 
steps such as Representation, Outcome Evaluation, or Learning. Even though these stages are 
implied in their model, it does suggest that their model is limited with respect to detailing in 
full all the potential stages required in a decision-making process.  
In line with Kable and Glimcher (2009), Assadi et al. (2009), as well as Ernst and Paulus 
(2005) presented a simple stage model of decision-making. Assadi et al. (2009) suggested, 
based on the studies investigating the role of the neurotransmitter dopamine during decision-
making, that value-based decision-making consists of two stages: 1) Evaluation, and 2) 
Execution. Evaluation is based on the analysis of costs and benefits associated with different 
options, and the outcome of this analysis leads to an overall preference towards one of the 
options. Execution, on the other hand, relies on motivation (i.e. mobilization of energetic 
resources) and planning a sequence of actions to achieve the goal.  In this model Outcome 
Evaluation and Learning are not specifically mentioned, although the role of dopamine in 
these processes is discussed. This suggests that the authors consider them to be part of 
decision-making as well but without any explicit detailed description of them. Contrary to the 
conceptualization by Rangel et al. (2008) the Representation stage is not included in this 
model.  
Furthermore, Ernst and Paulus (2005), in their attempt to create a framework integrating 
findings from decision-making research in psychology, neuropsychology, brain lesions 
studies, and functional neuroimaging studies, divided decision-making into three steps: 1) 
Valuation: forming preferences among options, based on costs and benefits associated with 
them, 2) Selection and Execution: selecting and executing an action based on the 
preferences formed during Valuation, and 3) Evaluation: evaluating the outcome. Again, 
Ernst and Paulus (2005) do not explicitly mention Learning as part of the decision-making 
process, although they do discuss it, suggesting that they consider it to be important. In 
addition, they also neglect to outline a representational stage in their decision-making model. 
The most recent model of value-based decision-making to be proposed is by Rigoux and 
Guigon (2012). Their decision-making model, in which they focus on processes crucial for 
action execution, is primarily based on reinforcement learning approach, much like Rangel et 
al. (2008) model. Rigoux and Guigon (2012) model takes into account not only the processes 
underlying choice, but also the translation of choice into action and online monitoring of 
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costs and benefits while actions are executed. They suggest that decision-making consists of 
the following three stages: 1) Choice: during which choices are made based on the estimates 
of costs and benefits associated with available options, 2) Execution: during which selected 
actions are translated into movements, and 3) Updating: during which behaviour is adjusted 
if change in the environment is detected. Therefore, this model includes steps equivalent to 
the Valuation and Action Selection stages in Rangel et al. (2008) model, but it does not 
include the Representation, Outcome Evaluation or Learning stages. 
The reason why different value-based decision-making models described above do not 
include the same processes, even though they rely on a similar subset of neurobiological and 
computational studies, is not entirely clear. It seems that many of these models have been 
primarily created to define the scope of interest for literature reviews, which clearly varied 
(i.e. ranging from neurobiology of decision-making in animals and humans, neuroimaging, 
computational models etc.). Also, it is likely that the exact decision-making steps presented in 
each model depend on the brain structures and mechanisms that were of interest to the 
authors, which is potentially a problem because the models may not be comprehensive. 
Nevertheless, despite their differences, all of the models described above seem in agreement 
that effort-based decision-making includes a Valuation stage (see Table 1), during which the 
costs and benefits of each option are assessed and combined into a subjective value. Most of 
the models described above also include an Action Selection stage, during which the option 
with the highest subjective value is chosen. Despite the fact that Outcome Evaluation and 
Learning are not explicitly included as separate stages in most of the models, each theorist 
still discusses these processes in the context of their models. Similarly, even though 
Representation forms part of only two out of the six models described above, it is implicitly 
assumed to take place before the Valuation stage in all of the models, as the descriptions of 
the models make reference to this. In light of this, the model that seems to be the most 
comprehensive is the value-based decision-making model by Rangel et al. (2008), as it 
explicitly mentions all of the stages described above. However, this model does not include 
one important stage present in the other models: the Action Execution stage, and this appears 
to be a major omission. 
Assadi et al. (2009), Ernst and Paulus (2005) and Rigoux and Guigon (2012) all state that the 
processes involved in Action Execution are a crucial component of decision-making. First of 
all, initial considerations of effort and rewards, taking place during the Valuation stage, may 
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be rather different from the considerations one engages in when one is about to execute an 
action. Just as one is about to execute an action one may revisit the value attached to the 
action as the potential costs become more salient. This might have consequences for the 
effort exerted during the task and the outcomes achieved. 
Second of all, since what happens during the Action Execution stage determines the 
outcomes that are achieved, Action Execution has important consequences for Outcome 
Evaluation and Learning. This is especially true in situations in which effort is the most 
salient cost. In such cases the decision-maker needs to take into account during the Outcome 
Evaluation stage not only the rewards obtained, but also the amount of effort that was 
actually expended to obtain them. Only then the outcome of the decision-making scenario can 
be assessed in relation to the predictions from the Valuation stage and serve as a basis for 
learning. For these reasons, Action Execution seems to be an integral part of decision-
making, at least in situations in which effort is the cost, which means that it should be 
included in any comprehensive model of effort-based decision-making.   
Taking this into account, a new framework describing effort-based decision-making is 
proposed here under the name of Value-Effort Decision-Making (V-E-D-M) model. Within 
this new framework effort-based decision-making is conceptualized as a process consisting of 
six consecutive and interdependent steps: Representation, Valuation, Action Selection, 
Action Execution, Outcome Evaluation and Learning (see Figure 1). The following 
section describes the proposed steps of V-E-D-M model in more detail, listing the studies 
supporting the model assumptions and considering the issues that arise from the proposed 
model. 
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Figure 1.Value-Effort Decision-Making model 
Representation and Valuation: In the proposed V-E-D-M model the Representation stage 
is involved in identifying: 1) the potential courses of action that are available in the decision-
making scenario, 2) the internal state of the decision-maker, and 3) the external state of the 
environment. The Representation stage forms the basis on which valuation occurs at the 
Valuation stage. During the Valuation stage the costs (i.e. effort) and benefits (i.e. rewards) 
associated with each option identified during representation stage are estimated and 
integrated into a subjective value of an option. When assessing the benefits associated with 
different options factors such as the quality and quantity of a reward (Green & Myerson, 
2004; Kacelnik & Bateson, 1997), as well as the valence (positive/negative) and salience 
(intensity, magnitude) of a reward (Ernst & Paulus, 2005) are taken into account. When 
assessing the cost of effort, factors such as intensity and duration are important (Burke et al., 
2013; Choi, Vaswani, & Shadmehr, 2014; Gepshtein et al., 2014; E. D. Klein, Bhatt, & 
Zentall, 2005; Le Bouc & Pessiglione, 2013). The V-E-D-M model also assumes that during 
the valuation stage the values assigned to rewards associated with different options are 
discounted by effort costs to form subjective values. The subjective value of each option is 
abstract (it is a subjective construct that indicates the general positive or negative property 
overall of each option) – it is a form of common currency which drives choice during the 
Action Selection stage (Brosch & Sander, 2013). The subjective value of an option is also 
thought to be context dependent, i.e. the value assignment depends on the external 
Representation 
Valuation 
Action 
Selection 
Action 
Execution 
Outcome 
Evaluation 
Learning 
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environment (e.g. reliability of reward predicting cues), as well as internal factors (e.g. 
motivation or learning history of similar past situations the decision-maker has faced) (Doya, 
2008).  
Evidence in support: In line with the proposed Representation stage of the V-E-D-M model, 
animal neuronal recording studies and human fMRI studies show that the presence of stimuli 
predicting different levels of effort and reward produces anticipatory signals in the brain. 
These signals reflect the amount of effort to be exerted and the amount of reward associated 
with these stimuli (Hosokawa, Kennerley, Sloan, & Wallis, 2013; Kroemer et al., 2014; 
Kurniawan et al., 2013; Pasquereau & Turner, 2013).  
Furthermore, the V-E-D-M model assumes that during the Valuation stage the values 
assigned to rewards associated with different options are discounted by effort costs. Results 
of human and animal studies support this assumption, as humans and animals have indeed 
been found to weigh the value of potential rewards against the amount of effort that is 
required to obtain them (effort discounting) (e.g. Day et al., 2011; Day et al., 2010; 
Kurniawan et al., 2010; Prevost et al., 2010). In general, it has been observed that as effort 
increases, the desirability of  the reward decreases (Bonnelle et al., 2014).  
Another assumption regarding the Valuation stage of the V-E-D-M model states that the 
subjective value generated during this stage is context dependent, which means that it 
depends on the internal state of the decision-maker, as well as the external state of the 
environment. This assumption is supported by the results of studies which found that the 
effect of rewards on behaviour is mediated by external factors (e.g. task complexity, reward 
reliability, feedback, time pressure, personal wealth), as well as internal factors (e.g. 
motivation, personality, ability) (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Doya, 
2008; Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013).  
As far as the external factors are concerned, task environment is thought to have a profound 
influence on effort-based decision-making (N. M. Klein & Yadav, 1989; Le Bouc & 
Pessiglione, 2013; Samuels & Whitecotton, 2011). For example, task complexity has been 
shown to affect the attractiveness of available rewards, with the reward seen as the most 
attractive when the task is hard, but less attractive when the task is easy or impossible (Brehm 
& Self, 1989). Environmental factors, such as the presence of an observer, have also been 
found to influence effort exertion during a task. Findings show that this can lead to increases 
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in cardiovascular markers of effort, as well as greater effort expenditure (Gendolla & Richter, 
2006; R. A. Wright, Dill, Geen, & Anderson, 1998). 
Internal factors have also been found to play an important part in the Valuation processes, in 
line with the assumption of the V-E-D-M model. For instance, personality traits, such as 
‘need for cognition’ (i.e. tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavours) 
have been found to influence preferences regarding cognitive effort (Cacioppo, Petty, 
Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Westbrook et al., 2013). Participants with higher ‘need for 
condition’ show greater willingness to exert mental effort. Also,  skill has been shown to 
determine the extent to which available rewards influence effort exertion: when people lack 
the skills necessary to complete the task, no amount of additional effort can improve 
performance and increase chances of success (Awasthi & Pratt, 1990; Bonner, Hastie, 
Sprinkle, & Young, 2000). Furthermore, emotional arousal has been found to increase effort 
exertion and decrease subjective experience of effort, regardless of monetary rewards 
(Schmidt et al., 2009). Finally, mood has also been found to influence the appraisal of effort, 
with task difficulty perceived to be higher in negative mood states (e.g. Gendolla & 
Brinkmann, 2005; Richter & Gendolla, 2006).  
Outstanding issues: The V-E-D-M model assumes that during the valuation stage reward 
values are discounted by the amount of effort that is required to obtain them, and that the 
internal state of the decision-maker, as well as the external state of the environment can have 
an impact on this process, for which there is empirical support. However, the model also 
assumes that factors such as reward magnitude, valence, and reliability can have an impact on 
the Valuation stage. Nevertheless, what this impact might be is less certain, as it has not been 
directly examined so far. The question, therefore, is: what effect does changing reward 
magnitude, valence or reliability have on effort-based decision making? This question has yet 
to be explored in any systematic way in the literature on effort-based decision-making thus 
far.  
Moreover, the model assumes that certain characteristics of effort (e.g. duration or intensity) 
have an impact on valuation, but it does not discuss the effects different types of effort (i.e. 
mental or physical) have during the Valuation stage. This is an empirical question that still 
needs to be addressed. Therefore, to increase the validity of the model two issues need to be 
addressed: 1) the impact of changing the reward magnitude, valence, and reliability on effort-
based decision-making, and 2) the potential differences in the effects of conceptually similar 
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but in practice very different costs such as mental and physical effort. This thesis aims to 
address these issues. 
Action Selection and Action Execution: According to the V-E-D-M model, Action 
Selection relies on subjective values of options computed during the Valuation stage. During 
Action Selection these subjective values are compared and the option with the highest value 
is chosen (Koopmans, 1960; Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; 
Rachlin, Battalio, Kagel, & Green, 1981). During Action Execution the preferences of the 
decision-maker expressed through choice are translated into actual actions. In the models that 
have included this stage (Assadi et al., 2009; Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Rigoux & Guigon, 2012), 
effort during execution is thought to be driven by reward values (Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 
2009, 2010, 2011; Bijleveld et al., 2014). However, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
execution of an action is not driven by rewards per se. The challenges come from studies 
investigating the Theory of Motivation by Brehm and Self (1989). According to Brehm and 
Self (1989) behaviour is driven by the resource conservation principle. Their Theory of 
Motivation (1989) assumes that effort associated with an action is of primary concern to the 
decision-maker, and that rewards are only used as a benchmark to assess if a particular 
amount of effort is worth incurring.  
Evidence in support: Many decision-making models (e.g. Assadi et al., 2009; Ernst & Paulus, 
2005; Rigoux & Guigon, 2012) assume that reward values drive Action Selection and Action 
Execution. However, others (e.g. Brehm & Self, 1989) claim that what actually influences 
behaviour (at least during Action Execution) are the effort requirements of a task, and that 
rewards serve only as a benchmark determining the maximum level of effort decision-maker 
is willing to exert. Evidence from studies examining effort-based decision-making supports 
both of these claims.  
Several studies suggest that effort requirements drive effort exertion. For example, people 
have been found to modulate their effort exertion in accordance with task demands, in the 
presence as well as absence of reward (Brehm & Self, 1989; Eubanks, Wright, & Williams, 
2002; Gendolla, Wright, & Richter, 2012; R. A. Wright, 2008). Various studies have also 
shown that people invest the most effort on tasks of medium difficulty, and less effort when 
the tasks are very easy or very difficult to complete, and that this effect is independent of the 
rewards associated with these tasks (e.g. Gendolla et al., 2012; Richter, Friedrich, & 
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Gendolla, 2008; Richter & Gendolla, 2006; Smith, Baldwin, & Christensen, 1990; e.g.R. A. 
Wright, 1984; R. A. Wright, 1996; R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001). 
At the same time, another literature shows that rewards have an energizing effect on goal-
directed behaviour. In a variety of tasks involving both mental and physical effort, humans 
and animals have been found to increase their effort expenditure when the rewards at stake 
are high (Bijleveld et al., 2009, 2010, 2011; Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2012; Endepols et 
al., 2010; Krebs et al., 2012; Meyniel et al., 2013; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 
2009; Schmidt et al., 2012; Treadway, Buckholtz, Schwartzman, Lambert, & Zald, 2009; 
Veling & Aarts, 2011; Watanabe, 2007).  
Outstanding issues: The implicit assumption of many decision-making models is that both 
Action Selection and Action Execution are driven by rewards (albeit discounted by costs in 
the case of Action Selection). However, this assumption has never been tested directly, even 
though there is evidence to suggest that performance (during Action Execution at least) might 
be determined by task demands. Therefore, the main question regarding the Action Selection 
and Action Execution stages is: what drives behaviour during these stages? Is it the subjective 
value of reward, or is it the amount of effort that needs to be put in? To answer this question, 
a direct comparison of the effects of effort requirements and rewards on behaviour during 
Action Selection and Execution would need to be conducted. One of the aims of this thesis is 
to perform such a comparison. 
Outcome Evaluation and Learning: According to the V-E-D-M model, during the 
Outcome Evaluation stage desirability of the experienced outcome is assessed and 
compared to the predictions made during the Valuation stage. The discrepancy between the 
predicted and experienced outcome is thought to serve as a basis for updating the action-
outcome associations in the brain, triggering Learning (Rangel et al., 2008). Reward 
feedback and effort exerted during a task are thought to be the main factors taken into 
account during the Outcome Evaluation and Learning stages of the V-E-D-M model. 
Evidence in support: In line with the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model, effort exerted 
during a task has been found to influence the Outcome Evaluation stage, by increasing 
sensitivity to rewards. For example, both humans and animals were found to show a greater 
preference for rewards that follow greater effort (Alessandri, Darcheville, Delevoye-Turrell, 
& Zentall, 2008; Clement, Feltus, Kaiser, & Zentall, 2000; Johnson & Gallagher, 2011; 
Kacelnik & Marsh, 2002; E. D. Klein et al., 2005; Lewis, 1964). It has also been shown that 
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people are more sensitive to rewards when the task requires high effort expenditure (Bijleveld 
et al., 2012; Hernandez Lallement et al., 2014). This suggests that even though effort might 
decrease the subjective value of rewards during the Valuation stage, it can also increase 
sensitivity to these rewards in the Outcome Evaluation stage.  
As far as the Learning stage is concerned, there seems to be plenty of evidence showing that 
learning is driven by a discrepancy between the actual and predicted reward. Midbrain 
dopaminergic transmission is thought to be crucial for this process. It has been shown that 
dopaminergic neurons in the brain react strongly to unpredicted outcomes, encoding reward 
prediction errors. This dopaminergic signal becomes less and less pronounced with 
experience of certain outcomes within a particular context, which is thought to reflect 
learning (Schultz, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2007; Schultz, Apicella, & Ljungberg, 1993; Schultz, 
Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). There is, however, no evidence that 
similar prediction errors signals regarding effort are encoded in the brain. In fact, one study 
shows that humans are actually poor at predicting the amount of effort that a task is going to 
involve. Fennema and Kleinmuntz (1995) asked participants to estimate effort and accuracy 
associated with performing tasks which differed in terms of information display organization 
and number of alternatives. Their estimations were found to be considerably off the mark, 
even after they have had a chance to interact with the task and experience feedback. Another 
study showed that effort feedback had no effect on performance (Creyer, Bettman, & Payne, 
1990), suggesting that learning about effort is different from learning about rewards. 
Outstanding issues: Even though reward feedback is thought to be an important factor during 
the Outcome Evaluation and Learning stage, the exact effects of different types of reward 
feedback on effort-based decision-making have not been examined. Therefore, any proposals 
regarding the effects of reward feedback on various stages of effort-based decision-making 
are currently speculative.  
Furthermore, the V-E-D-M model assumes that learning from previous outcomes is the main 
factor influencing representations in situations in which we face similar decision-making 
scenarios repeatedly (particularly when sequential learning from repeated decisions is 
required). Since representations guiding choice are updated each time we experience an 
outcome of a decision-process, there should be differences between situations in which we 
repeatedly make choices and experience outcomes after each choice, from situations during 
which the experiences of outcomes are postponed until all choices are made first. 
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Nevertheless, how decision-making in these two situations might be different has never been 
investigated directly. Therefore, it remains an empirical question if the distinctions made in 
the model bear out in the evidence. Consequently two issues regarding Outcome Evaluation 
and Learning require experimental support: 1) the effects of different types of outcome 
feedback on effort-based decision-making, as well as 2) the differences in decision-making 
when learning can and cannot take place. These issues will be examined in this thesis. 
Summary of the models of value-based decision-making  
There are various models describing how decisions are made which are applicable to 
situations in which we face a choice between options that involve different levels of effort 
and reward. They conceptualize decision-making as a process consisting of several steps, 
although they differ in terms of what steps they include. The model that seems to be the most 
comprehensive, by Rangel et al. (2008), divides the decision-making process into five steps: 
Representation, Valuation, Action Selection, Outcome Evaluation and Learning. However, 
this model does not include one important step which plays a crucial role in other models 
(Assadi et al., 2009; Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Rigoux & Guigon, 2012) – the Action Execution 
stage. For this reason, in this thesis a novel model including all of the relevant stages 
mentioned above, the V-E-D-M model, is proposed. The V-E-D-M model concentrates 
specifically on effort-based decision-making, and assumes that this process consists of six 
consecutive steps: Representation, Valuation, Action Selection, Action Execution, Outcome 
Evaluation and Learning. Furthermore, it makes certain assumptions about what happens 
during these stages. However, some of these assumptions have not been explicitly tested so 
far. For example, the model assumes that during the Valuation stage costs and benefits 
associated with different options are combined into subjective values. Nevertheless, the exact 
effects of manipulating reward valence/magnitude/reliability or important cost characteristics 
(such as whether effort is mental or physical) on the cost/benefit analysis during this stage 
have not been investigated yet. Furthermore, the model assumes that feedback-driven 
learning is an important part of the decision-making process, however, the exact importance 
of reward feedback or the effects of learning on decision-making have not been investigated 
so far. The aim of this thesis is to test the assumptions listed above to improve on the 
predictive value of the new value-effort decision-making model and to increase our 
understanding of the effort-based decision-making process.  
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1.3 Summary of work on value-based decision-making and effort-based decision-
making 
Effort-based decision-making describes a process by which animals and humans choose 
between options associated with different levels of effort and reward. It is a process mediated 
by brain structures such as the ACC and the basal ganglia, and the neurotransmitter 
dopamine. Although many models that can be used to describe effort-based decision-making 
exist, all of them seem to be missing some important components of this process. Therefore, 
in this chapter a novel framework for investigating effort-based decision-making, the V-E-D-
M model, was proposed. The evidence from effort-based decision-making studies seems to 
provide initial support for this new model. Human and animal studies conducted so far 
suggest that people form representations of options available to them during effort-based 
decision-making tasks. They also show that people engage in the calculations of subjective 
values of options and that these calculations drive the choices people make. In addition, some 
studies suggest that rewards serve as a benchmark for effort investment, whereas other 
studies suggest that effort exerted is driven by, and proportional to, available rewards. They 
also confirm an important role for Outcome Evaluation and Learning during decision-
making. 
Despite the strong support for the V-E-D-M model, some assumptions made by the model 
have never actually been tested. To add credence to the assumptions, the following empirical 
questions are raised:  
1) What are the effects of manipulating reward magnitude/valence/reliability on effort-based 
decision-making? 
2)  Does the impact of mental and physical effort on decision-making differ?  
3)  Which factor, reward value or effort requirement, drives Action Selection and Action 
Execution? 
4)  What is the effect of reward feedback on effort-based decision-making? 
5)  To what extent does learning influence effort-based decision-making?  
The main aim of this thesis is to address each of these questions and to test the assumptions 
of the proposed model. Furthermore, an additional question that this thesis will also attempt 
to answer relates to the role of neurotransmitter dopamine during effort-based decision-
making. The key reason for this is that the scope of the studies investigating the role of this 
neurotransmitter during effort-based decision-making is usually limited to investigating 
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physical effort and not mental effort. Also, the role of dopamine in effort based-decision-
making is still unclear and so additional empirical work would illuminate key issues that 
would inform research on effort-based decision-making. Chapter 2 provides a further 
rationale for investigating these questions, and lists specific hypotheses derived from these 
questions to be explored in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: Aims and Hypotheses 
V-E-D-M model provides a useful framework for investigating effort-based decision-making, 
as evidenced by the results of previous studies described in Chapter 1. However, the model 
also makes certain assumptions which still need to be examined.  
1) Reward manipulations: The V-E-D-M model  assumes that manipulating reward 
magnitude, reward valence, and reward reliability should have an impact on the 
Valuation stage, and therefore potentially on the whole decision-making process. 
However, the impact of changing these reward characteristics has not been directly 
investigated in the context of effort-based decision-making.  
2) Effort manipulations: The V-E-D-M model assumes that manipulating important 
effort characteristics, such as effort type (i.e. whether it is mental or physical) should 
have an influence on the Valuation stage. However, there have been few direct 
comparisons of mental against physical effort when examining effort-based decision-
making. 
3) Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection and Action Execution: The 
V-E-D-M model assumes that Action Selection and Action Execution are driven by 
the subjective values assigned to options during the Valuation stage. These subjective 
values depend on the reward values and effort requirements associated with different 
options. However, which one of these factors plays a more important role during 
Action Selection and Action Execution is less clear. 
4) Outcome feedback: The V-E-D-M model assumes that feedback following Action 
Execution plays an important role during effort-based decision-making because it 
serves as a basis for updating the representations on which the Valuation stage is 
based. Nevertheless, how different types of feedback affect this process has thus far 
remained unexplored.   
5) Delayed Action Execution: According to the V-E-D-M model the discrepancy 
between expected outcome and actual outcome (i.e. prediction error) forms the basis 
of learning and updating representations of the decision problem. This influences 
future decisions made in similar situations. This means that if decisions are taken in 
the absence of regular outcome feedback, (e.g. all effort-based decisions are made in 
advance of receiving outcome feedback), then this should lead to differences in 
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updating relative to situations in which outcome feedback is received directly after 
each effort-based choice is made. However, this assumption has not been tested yet.  
6) Neural underpinnings: The V-E-D-M model has been informed by models based on 
neuropsychological and neurobiological studies investigating effort-based decision-
making. Thus, it follows that the brain structures (e.g. basal ganglia) and 
neurotransmitters (e.g. dopamine) identified as important for processing of effort 
during different stages of decision-making in these models also play a role in effort 
processing during the stages of V-E-D-M. However, this assumption needs to be 
verified, especially as far as the role of dopamine is concerned, since most of the 
studies on this neurotransmitter in humans have only looked at the role of dopamine 
during physical effort exertion, and not extended this work to mental effort exertion.  
In the remainder of this chapter various studies relevant to the areas described above will be 
reviewed, and based on these studies testable hypotheses will be formulated to be 
investigated in the empirical chapters of this thesis.  
The following chapter is structured as follows: first studies examining the effects of 
manipulating reward magnitude, valence, and reliability, as well as the effort type (mental or 
physical) on effort-based decision-making are discussed. Second, studies investigating the 
factors driving behaviour during Action Selection and Action Execution are described. This 
is followed by an evaluation of studies scrutinizing the effects of feedback and learning on 
effort based decision-making. Finally, the role of dopamine during different stages of 
decision-making, as defined by V-E-D-M, is discussed. 
2.1. Reward manipulations 
2.1.1 Magnitude 
According to the V-E-D-M model, manipulating reward magnitude should have an effect on 
the Valuation stage of effort based decision-making. More specifically, increasing reward 
values should lead to increased subjective values of different options, leading to increased 
willingness to choose and execute effort. Evidence gathered so far seems to provide strong 
support for this assumption. Studies investigating effort-based decision-making have 
generally found that higher rewards increase participants’ willingness to choose effortful 
options and exert effort (Bijleveld et al., 2012; Bijleveld et al., 2014; Bonnelle et al., 2014; 
Burke et al., 2013; Capa, Bustin, Cleeremans, & Hansenne, 2011; Chong et al., 2015; 
Croxson et al., 2009; Hartmann et al., 2013; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Krebs et al., 2012; 
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Kurniawan et al., 2013; Le Bouc & Pessiglione, 2013; Marien, Aarts, & Custers, 2014; Pas, 
Custers, Bijleveld, & Vink, 2014; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Treadway et al., 2009; Zedelius, 
Veling, & Aarts, 2011). The effect of rewards on effort processing is thought to be 
pronounced, to the point that reward cues are thought to increase effort expenditure even 
when they are presented below the threshold of awareness (subliminally) (Aarts, Custers, & 
Veltkamp, 2008; Bijleveld et al., 2009, 2010, 2011; Custers & Aarts, 2010; Pas et al., 2014; 
Pessiglione et al., 2007; Zedelius et al., 2011).  
A straightforward interpretation of the findings presented above would be that increasing the 
amount of rewards available in a decision-making scenario leads to an increased willingness 
to exert effort at the time of Action Selection and Action Execution. However, the problem 
with this interpretation is that all of the studies investigating the effect of reward magnitude 
on effort-based decision-making looked at the relative, rather than absolute values of rewards. 
In such a set-up it is impossible to disentangle the effect of absolute reward magnitude from 
the effect of relative reward magnitude – as participants can base their decision either on the 
absolute monetary value (‘I choose option A over option B because it is associated with a 
monetary reward of 15p, rather than 5p’) or the relative monetary value (‘I choose option A 
over option B, because it is associated with a reward that is three times higher’). This is an 
important distinction, as in certain circumstances different behaviour during Action Selection 
and Action Execution would be expected depending on which aspect of the reward 
participants concentrate on. If absolute reward values matter, increasing the monetary values 
of rewards within a task should lead to an increased willingness to execute effort on this task. 
If, however, it is the relative value of reward that matters, proportional increase of all the 
reward values available in the task (e.g. multiplying the reward values by two) would have no 
effect on participants’ willingness to exert effort in this task. Therefore, the influence of 
reward magnitude on the final value generated during the valuation stage still needs to be 
investigated. 
In the standard effort-based decision-making studies conducted to date the potential impact of 
relative and absolute reward values on Action Selection and Action Execution cannot be 
determined, because these studies utilise a within-subject design. At the same time 
comparisons between separate studies employing different reward magnitudes are also not 
possible due to methodological differences between the studies. Ideally, what is needed is an 
experimental set-up in which effort-related behaviour of one group that performs an effort-
based task for smaller rewards (Small Reward group) is compared with a group that performs 
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the exact same task for larger rewards (Large Reward group). If the absolute reward 
magnitude matters in such circumstances, then we would expect participants in the Large 
Reward group to be more willing to choose effortful options and put in effort, as compared to 
participants in the Small Reward group. If, however, processing during the Valuation stage 
relies on the relative values of rewards, then we should not see any differences between the 
Small Reward group and Large Reward group, providing that the difference between rewards 
is proportional between the tasks. 
Therefore, in this thesis choice and execution of effortful actions (mental and physical) will 
be examined in two groups of participants: one experiencing large rewards, and one 
experiencing small rewards. In accordance with the basic interpretation of the results of the 
studies conducted so far, it is hypothesised that participants in the Large Rewards group will 
show greater willingness to choose and execute effortful actions than participants in the 
Small Rewards group.  
2.1.2 Valence 
According to the V-E-D-M model, reward magnitude is not the only reward characteristic 
with the potential to influence effort-based decision-making. Valence of reward, i.e. whether 
it is positive or negative, should also affect the Valuation stage and other stages that follow. 
Therefore, according to the V-E-D-M model we should expect decision-making in situations 
where we need to put in effort to gain monetary rewards to be different from situations in 
which we need to exert effort to avoid losing monetary rewards. Unfortunately, the evidence 
from studies examining the effects of gains and losses on effort-based decision-making is 
scarce, and so this assumption requires further investigations. However, there is substantial 
work examining the impact of gains and losses on decision-making in general, to which this 
review can look to in order to generate predictions. 
Typically, people are thought to be more sensitive to losses than they are to gains, and 
therefore more risk-averse in the face of losses as compared to gains, at least when they make 
risk-based decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). 
This suggests that gains and losses might be processed differently. Further evidence for this 
claim comes from studies investigating brain activations in response to gains and losses 
(Elliott, Friston, & Dolan, 2000; Ino, Nakai, Azuma, Kimura, & Fukuyama, 2010; Litt, 
Eliasmith, & Thagard, 2008; Yacubian et al., 2006). For example, Ino et al. (2010) in their 
fMRI study found that gains compared to losses produced greater activation in the right 
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putamen and nucleus accumbens. Yacubian et al. (2006), using the same brain imaging 
technique, observed reward-associated signals during outcome anticipation and evaluation in 
the ventral striatum, whereas losses were found to be represented in the amygdala. 
Furthermore, Hernandez Lallement et al. (2014) observed activation in the anterior insula that 
was specific to losses incurred after exerting mental effort, whereas the ACC and nucleus 
accumbens were activated during effort exertion for monetary rewards. The insula has also 
been found to be important for encoding worse-than-expected outcomes in an experiment 
where participants had to exert physical effort to obtain monetary rewards or avoid losing 
money (Kurniawan et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, other studies suggest that situations in which we want to obtain a reward and 
the situations in which we want to avoid losses are processed in the same way and rely on the 
same brain networks (e.g. Boksem & Tops, 2008). For example, the mesocorticolimbic 
dopamine system, and ventral striatum in particular, are thought to be responsible for 
encoding relative values of expected outcomes, regardless of whether they are appetitive or 
aversive (Brooks & Berns, 2013; Brooks et al., 2010). Tom et al. (2007) in their fMRI study 
showed increased brain activity for gains and decreased activity for losses in a set of brain 
structures including the dorsal and ventral striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) during risk-based decision-making, suggesting that gains and losses might in fact 
be processed within the same brain structures. 
Regardless of the plethora of findings regarding processing of gains and losses from brain 
imaging studies described above, the investigations of behavioural differences between 
gaining and losing money are scarce, especially in the context of effort-based decision-
making. Therefore, not enough evidence exists to support the assumption of the V-E-D-M 
model which states that reward valence impacts the valuation stage of decision-making. 
Consequently, one of the aims of this thesis is to examine the impact of gains and losses on 
effort-based behaviour. In line with the assumption of the model, it is hypothesised that there 
will be differences between effort processing in response to gains and losses, however the 
direction of the effect is hard to determine. If indeed losses are more psychologically salient 
than gains, people experiencing losses should select options associated with less effort 
because they are associated with a lower risk of failure. At the same time, during Action 
Execution people should exert more effort and attempt to be more accurate in order to 
minimize the risk of losses. 
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2.1.3 Reliability 
According to the V-E-D-M model, in addition to reward magnitude and valence, the 
reliability with which reward-associated cues predict the rewarding outcome is thought to be 
an important factor influencing the Valuation stage. However, the effects of reward reliability 
have not yet been investigated in the context of effort-based decision-making.  
Nevertheless, some studies of this process have employed a reward structure in which 
acquisition of rewards after effort expenditure was not guaranteed (i.e. there was a 
probabilistic relationship between performance and reward). Even though the main aim of 
these studies was not to investigate the effects of reward reliability on effort-based decision-
making, they can still provide some useful insights into the impact that this factor is likely to 
have on effort-based decision-making.  
For example, in their physical effort task, Kurniawan et al. (2013) awarded one group of 
participants with rewards on 80% of successful trials, and compared their performance with 
that of a group which received rewards 20% of the time. They found that participants were 
faster to respond and faster to reach the target force level when the probability of obtaining a 
reward was high. Treadway et al. (2009) also presented participants with trials during which 
acquisition of reward after effort exertion was not guaranteed. There were three possible 
probability levels of obtaining reward: 88%, 50%, and 12%. Participants were found to select 
more high effort trials when the probability of obtaining rewards was the highest. However, 
in this experiment participants were informed in advance of the probability of obtaining a 
reward, so the study was investigating decision-making under risk, rather than uncertainty. 
Studies described above provide some, although very limited, insight into the effects of 
manipulating reward reliability on effort-based decision making. They suggest that increasing 
the probability of obtaining rewards increases the willingness to select and execute effortful 
actions. However, in the absence of a larger number of studies manipulating reward 
reliability when effort is required, it is impossible to assess the validity of the assumption 
made by the V-E-D-M regarding the effects of reward reliability on effort-based decision-
making. One of the aims of this thesis is to address this issue. In accordance with the 
assumptions of the V-E-D-M model and previous findings it is predicted that there will be a 
positive relationship between the probability of obtaining rewards and the willingness to 
choose and execute effort. More specifically, it is expected that greater probability of 
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attaining a reward will be associated with greater willingness to choose high effort options 
that are associated with this reward. 
2.2 Effort manipulations 
According to the V-E-D-M model, not only reward manipulations but also changes in effort 
requirements should have an impact on the Valuation stage. While there is substantial 
evidence to suggest that this is indeed the case as far as effort duration and intensity are 
concerned (e.g. Gendolla & Richter, 2006; Hartmann et al., 2013; Kool et al., 2010; McGuire 
& Botvinick, 2010; Meyniel, Safra, & Pessiglione, 2014; Porat, Hassin-Baer, Cohen, Markus, 
& Tomer, 2014; Sugiwaka & Okouchi, 2004), there is very little discussion about the effects 
of the type of effort (mental or physical) on effort-based decision-making. This is particularly 
problematic as across the studies examining effort-based decision-making there is an implicit 
assumption that mental and physical effort are processed in a similar way. Also there is an 
assumption that mechanisms associated with one type of effort will be observed when the 
other type of effort is examined as well (e.g. Anzak, Tan, Pogosyan, & Brown, 2011; Boksem 
& Tops, 2008; Botvinick et al., 2009; Eisenberger, 1992). Without direct comparisons of 
effort-based decision-making when effort required is either mental or physical this 
assumption still remains an empirical question. 
Looking to the existing literature, the general picture is mixed. For example, mental and 
physical effort have been found to work in an additive way, whereby expending one type of 
effort reduces the resources available for the other type of effort. Marcora, Staiano, and 
Manning (2009) showed that when participants were asked to cycle to exhaustion 90 minutes 
after a cognitively demanding task, they took less time to reach the exhaustion point 
compared to participants who were asked to cycle after watching an emotionally neutral 
movie. The authors interpret this difference as resulting from greater perception of effort in 
the cognitive demand group, suggesting that mental and physical effort might be processed in 
an additive way, so that expending one type of effort has consequences for the other type of 
effort. Nevertheless, it is hard to know whether a different physical task following an earlier 
cognitive task would generate the same effects. 
In contrast, reward discounting in response to mental and physical effort have been found to 
be well described by similar mathematical models. Ostaszewski, Bąbel, and Swebodziński 
(2013) investigated mental and physical effort discounting process using a self-report 
questionnaire. They found that both mental and physical effort discounting were best 
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described by a hyperbolic model, where high rewards were discounted less steeply than small 
rewards. The steepness of mental and physical effort discounting curves was positively 
correlated in this study. Nevertheless, Ostaszewski et al. (2013) used hypothetical effort 
scenarios and hypothetical monetary rewards; this limits the generalizability of their findings 
to genuine situations of effort with real rewards, such as the studies included in this thesis.  
Moreover, Pas et al. (2014) examined the markers of striatal dopaminergic functioning (error-
related negativity and eye-blink rate) during mental and physical effort in the presence of 
subliminal and supraliminal rewards. They found a correlation between mental effort and 
error-related negativity and physical effort and eye-blink rate during subliminal reward trials.  
They have taken these findings to suggest that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a role in 
the processing of both mental and physical effort. However, as different markers were used 
for mental and physical effort, the two tasks could not be compared directly, and therefore the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the study are limited.   
In contrast, there are some studies that suggest that mental and physical effort processing 
might differ, since these two types of effort are processed by distinct brain circuitries 
(Hosking et al., 2014; Schmidt et al., 2012). For example, Schmidt et al. (2012) tested 
participants on a task which required detecting numerically greater number within pairs 
(mental effort) which would determine the hand with which to squeeze a joystick (physical 
effort). Using fMRI, they observed differential brain activation for mental and physical effort 
during effort exertion. However, they also found activation in the ventral striatum which 
drove behaviour during both types of effort, suggesting a role for this structure as a common 
motivational centre for mental and physical effort. 
Therefore, despite the widespread assumption that mental and physical effort is processed 
similarly, direct comparisons of behaviour during exertion of these two types of effort are 
rare. Furthermore, of the evidence that exists, the story is rather mixed. To increase our 
understanding of the effects of mental and physical effort on the Valuation stage, and 
consequently on effort-based choice and execution, in this thesis performance on mental and 
physical effort trials will be directly compared empirically. Based on the assumptions of 
previous effort-based decision-making models, it is hypothesised that mental and physical 
effort will have the same effect on choice and execution across studies. 
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2.3 Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection and Action Execution 
The V-E-D-M model also makes assumptions about the influence of effort and reward on the 
Action Selection and Action Execution stages. Many of the decision-making models 
described in the previous chapter assume that both the Action Selection and Action Execution 
stages of decision-making are driven by the value of expected rewards. Indeed, substantial 
evidence exists to suggest that rewards do influence the choices that people make (e.g. 
Bonnelle et al., 2014; Hartmann et al., 2013; Kool et al., 2010; Treadway et al., 2009) as well 
as how much effort people exert when trying to obtain a reward (Bijleveld et al., 2009, 2010, 
2011, 2012; Bijleveld et al., 2014; Krebs et al., 2012; Le Bouc & Pessiglione, 2013; Marien 
et al., 2014; Pas et al., 2014; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Zedelius et al., 2011). Nevertheless, 
alternative conceptualizations of forces driving effort exertion, such as the Theory of 
Motivation by Brehm and Self (1989), suggest that behaviour during effort-based decision-
making might not be driven by rewards, but rather by task demands, for which there is 
empirical support (e.g. Gendolla et al., 2012; Richter et al., 2008; Richter & Gendolla, 2006; 
Smith et al., 1990; R. A. Wright, 1984, 1996; R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001). Therefore, the 
question as to whether Action Selection and Action Execution are driven by reward or effort 
is still an open one. 
Evidence showing that rewards have a strong impact on effort-based choice and execution is 
abundant. In general, when people are faced with a task in which they have to decide if they 
want to put in a particular level of effort for a particular reward, increasing the monetary 
reward leads to an increase in the level of effort participants are willing to exert (Bonnelle et 
al., 2014; Hartmann et al., 2013; Kool et al., 2010; Treadway et al., 2009). Rewards are also 
thought to have a strong effect on effort exertion during Action Execution, as people have 
been shown to put in more effort (e.g. respond faster or move more vigorously) when the 
reward they want to obtain is high as compared to low (Bijleveld et al., 2009, 2010, 2011, 
2012; Bijleveld et al., 2014; Krebs et al., 2012; Le Bouc & Pessiglione, 2013; Marien et al., 
2014; Pas et al., 2014; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Zedelius et al., 2011). 
However, in spite of the large number of studies supporting the claim that rewards drive 
effort-based choice and execution, some evidence exists to suggest that the relationship 
between effort and reward is not as straightforward. For example, effort has been found to 
drive choices independently of reward, with participants in most studies preferring the low 
effort options, regardless of the value of reward associated with them (e.g. Burke et al., 2013; 
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Kurniawan et al., 2010; Waugh & Gotlib, 2008). Similarly, people have been found to be 
willing to modulate their effort exertion in response to task requirements in the absence of 
rewards (e.g. Barnes, Bullmore, & Suckling, 2009; Boehler et al., 2011; Fu et al., 2002; Kool 
et al., 2010). The results of these studies suggest that rewards might not necessarily drive 
effort-based choice and execution in all circumstances. These findings are in line with the 
Theory of Motivation by Brehm and Self (1989), which suggests that effort exertion during a 
task is guided by task demands, rather than the value of rewards. 
Theory of Motivation by Brehm and Self (1989) states that effort exerted during a task should 
be proportional to task difficulty, rather than rewards at stake, as long as success is possible 
and reward is deemed to be worth the effort required (see also Gendolla et al., 2012). At the 
same time, effort should be low if success is impossible or the task is perceived to be too 
demanding given the rewards it provides. Brehm and Self (1989) acknowledge that rewards 
have a capacity to influence effort, but they suggest that in most cases reward affects exertion 
of effort indirectly via setting the maximum amount of effort that should be exerted for a 
particular reward – the potential motivation. One exception is a situation in which a reward is 
proportional to effort exertion (i.e. the more effort is put in, the higher the reward that is 
obtained), where effort exerted should increase in line with the value of reward, up to a 
highest effort level that is possible and justified. 
Strong support for this theory comes from studies which use cardiovascular activity (e.g. 
systolic blood pressure) as a measure of  effort exertion (e.g. Gendolla et al., 2012; Richter et 
al., 2008; Richter & Gendolla, 2006; Smith et al., 1990; R. A. Wright, 1984, 1996; R. A. 
Wright & Kirby, 2001). For example, Richter et al. (2008) asked participants to perform 
memory tasks of different levels of difficulty while their heart rate and blood pressure were 
being assessed. They found that cardiovascular reactivity of participants increased with task 
difficulty but dropped when the task was impossible to complete. R. A. Wright et al. (1998) 
made a similar observation when they asked participants to perform five cognitive tasks of 
different levels of difficulty. They found that cardiovascular reactivity increased with task 
difficulty for the first three levels of difficulty, and then dropped for the two highest levels of 
difficulty.   
Studies using other measures of effort exertion also provide support for Brehm and Self 
(1989) Theory of Motivation. For example, Roets, Van Hiel, Cornelis, and Soetens (2008) 
asked participants to identify a number presented on a screen for variable amounts of time. 
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Participants could view the number repeatedly by pressing a button on a keyboard. It was 
found that button pressing (effort) increased as the presentation time decreased, up to a point 
when observing the number was deemed to be impossible, at which point button pressing 
decreased. Furthermore, when Prevost et al. (2010) examined willingness to exert effort to 
view pleasurable erotic stimuli, they found that the value of rewards strongly influenced the 
choice for costly rewarding options at the intermediate, but not high, levels of effort. Waugh 
and Gotlib (2008), used a task in which participants had to choose between more and less 
rewarding options requiring different levels of effort. They demonstrated that, as the effort 
requirement increased, participants’ preference for the reward no longer predicted their 
choice to work for the reward. The authors have taken this evidence to suggest that as effort 
increased participants increasingly made their choices based on the level of effort required 
rather than the rewards at stake.  
Considering the strong support for the theory of motivation by Brehm and Self (1989), it is 
possible that behaviour during Action Selection and Action Execution is mostly driven by 
assessment of effort requirements. However, there are also many studies which show that 
behaviour during Action Selection and Action Execution might be driven by rewards. 
Therefore, it is difficult to determine what actually drives behaviour during these two stages 
based on the evidence currently available. One of the aims of this thesis is to investigate 
whether there are potential differences in the effects of reward and effort on the Action 
Selection and Action Execution stages. If effort-based choices and effort exertion are driven 
by rewards, reward values should predict participants’ behaviour during Action Selection and 
Action Execution. If, however, they are driven by task demands, behaviour during Action 
Selection and Action Execution should depend mostly on the effort level required.  
2.4 Outcome feedback 
The V-E-D-M model assumes that outcome feedback plays an important role when assessing 
the effects of effort exertion, but this assumption is yet to be verified. Participants of the 
studies investigating effort-based decision-making conducted so far typically received one of 
three different types of information at the end of a trial, depending on the study: 1) accuracy 
feedback (simple outcome feedback, e.g. Kool et al., 2010; Negrotti, Secchi, & Gentilucci, 
2005), 2) accuracy feedback + information about reward achieved on a particular trial 
(discreet feedback, e.g. Capa et al., 2011; Zenon, Sidibe, & Olivier, 2014), or 3) accuracy 
feedback + reward achieved on a particular trial + cumulative rewards obtained so far 
42 
 
(cumulative feedback, e.g. Bijleveld et al., 2009; Bijleveld et al., 2014). Even though the type 
of feedback used was not discussed in these studies, suggesting that it was not assumed to 
influence behaviour, these three types of feedback have previously been found to have 
differing influences on task performance in other tasks, such as complex decision making 
tasks (Osman, 2011). It is possible that presenting cumulative feedback (accuracy feedback + 
reward achieved on a particular trial + cumulative rewards) is more motivating than the other 
two types of feedback. It might lead people to select more effortful options because they are 
working towards maximizing their gains, which they can see more easily through full 
feedback information than simple trial by trial information. It is, therefore, important to 
investigate whether presenting different types of feedback has differing effects on effort-
based decision-making behaviour. Consequently, one of the objectives of this thesis is to 
empirically examine if there are any differences between the effects of simple, discreet, and 
cumulative feedback on effort-based task performance. In line with the assumptions of the V-
E-D-M model it is hypothesised that some differences will be observed.  Full cumulative 
reward feedback is predicted to lead to an increased willingness to choose and execute 
effortful options, compared to the less comprehensive discreet feedback. The lowest 
preference for highly effortful options is expected in the simple feedback condition, when no 
reward information is provided. 
2.5 Delayed Action Execution 
According to the V-E-D-M model, after the outcome of performed action is evaluated, the 
discrepancy between the predicted and the actual outcome is used to update the 
representations of the option that was chosen. The process of learning from the outcome is 
thought to have a substantial influence on future decisions. One of the implications of this 
assumption is that preventing people from learning about the outcomes of their decisions 
should have an impact on their subsequent choices and the amount of effort they exert during 
a task. However, this assumption has not yet been verified, possibly because investigating 
this assumption is not as straightforward as it might seem when effort based decision-making 
is concerned. This is mainly because part of the outcome evaluation during effort-based 
decision-making involves assessing actual effort exerted during the task, and how this is 
related to the effort that was anticipated before the task was executed. For this reason simply 
removing reward feedback from the end of each trial, after effort has been exerted, would not 
prevent Outcome Evaluation and Learning from happening, as participants would still be 
updating their effort representations. Therefore, in order to investigate the effect of learning 
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on effort-based decision-making it is necessary to separate choice from the execution stage. 
This was done in a study by Soman (1998), who examined behaviour in situations in which 
people had to evaluate options associated with delayed rewards contingent on future effort 
exertion. He observed that when there was a delay between choice and effort execution, effort 
required was systematically underweighted, which lead to increased attractiveness of options 
associated with delayed effort exertion. This means that making decisions in situations in 
which Action Execution is delayed should lead to underweighting of effort and therefore 
increased preferences for high effort trials. Nevertheless, further investigations are needed to 
confirm if this is indeed the case. Therefore, in the present thesis, one of the aims is to 
investigate effort-based decision-making when execution of the choice is immediate and 
when it is delayed. Based on the results of the previous studies, it is hypothesised that 
immediate experience of outcomes will have an influence on effort-based choices and 
execution, increasing participants’ willingness to choose effortful actions. 
2.6 Neural underpinnings 
Another issue that needs to be explored in the context of V-E-D-M model is the role of 
dopamine during different stages of effort-based decision-making. The V-E-D-M model is 
based on the work from neuropsychological and neurobiological studies investigating effort 
processing in humans and animals. These studies point to an important role for the ACC, the 
basal ganglia, and the neurotransmitter dopamine in effort-based decision-making (e.g. 
Bardgett, Depenbrock, Downs, Points, & Green, 2009; Botvinick et al., 2009; Cousins, 
Atherton, Turner, & Salamone, 1996; Cousins & Salamone, 1994; Croxson et al., 2009; 
Endepols et al., 2010; Gepshtein et al., 2014; Kroemer et al., 2014; Kurniawan et al., 2013; 
Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, & Dolan, 2011; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Ostlund, Wassum, 
Murphy, Balleine, & Maidment, 2011; Porat et al., 2014; Treadway et al., 2012). Based on 
the results of these studies, the V-E-D-M model assumes that dopamine plays a role in effort 
processing during all of the stages identified in the model. However, this assumption still 
needs to be further verified in humans. 
Studies examining effort-based decision-making in humans and animals suggest that the 
neurotransmitter dopamine plays an important role in decision-making. Midbrain dopamine 
has been shown to be involved in a) encoding stimuli associated with potential future rewards 
and losses during representation (e.g. Brooks & Berns, 2013; Phillips, Walton, & Jhou, 2007; 
Salamone & Correa, 2012), b) representing the reward value discounted by effort costs 
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during the valuation stage (e.g. Prevost et al., 2010), c) overcoming the response costs and 
energizing ongoing actions during Action Execution (e.g. Berridge & Robinson, 1998; 
Kurniawan et al., 2013; Niv, Daw, Joel, & Dayan, 2007; Pasquereau & Turner, 2013; 
Salamone & Correa, 2002; Salamone, Correa, Farrar, & Mingote, 2007), and d) encoding 
reward prediction error during Outcome Evaluation (e.g. Kable & Glimcher, 2009; Schultz, 
1998, 2000, 2002, 2007, 2010; Schultz et al., 1993; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz & Dickinson, 
2000). Most of the information about the role of dopamine in effort-based decision-making in 
humans comes from studies investigating effort processing in PD patients, which show 
depletion of dopamine in the midbrain regions. 
Studies comparing performance of PD patients and healthy controls (HCs) on effort-based 
tasks suggest that dopamine is indeed crucial for this process. For example, Mazzoni et al. 
(2007) examined cost/benefit analysis in PD by comparing arm reaching movements of PD 
patients and HCs on a speed-accuracy trade-off task. Participants were required to make 
movements to a target until they reached the criterion of 20 accurate movements within the 
required speed range. PD patients were found to be as accurate as HCs on this task, however, 
they took significantly longer to reach criterion on trials that required greater effort (i.e. 
greater accuracy and faster speed of movement). Mazzoni et al. (2007) hypothesised that this 
was due to a shift in the cost/benefit analysis in PD patients, which lead them to perceive 
movements as more effortful.  
Further support for this hypothesis comes from a recent study by Chong et al. (2015). They 
examined the willingness to exert effort for rewards in 26 PD patients ON and OFF 
dopaminergic medication. This manipulation is of obvious interest because it allows for 
examination of the contribution of restored dopamine levels to effort-based decision-making. 
In their task participants were required to put in physical effort (squeeze a hand-grip device) 
to maximize rewards obtained. Before each trial participants were presented with information 
about the amount of effort required (as defined by the percentage of their maximum grip 
strength) and the amount of potential reward available. They had to decide whether to engage 
in the task or not. The study found that PD patients were less willing to exert effort than 
healthy controls when the rewards were low, regardless of their medication status. 
Nevertheless, dopamine was found to have a motivating effect on behaviour, as PD patients 
chose to invest more effort for a given reward when they were ON dopaminergic medication, 
as compared to when they were OFF medication.  
45 
 
Other PD studies suggest that dopamine is not only important for cost/benefit analysis during 
valuation, but also for invigorating effort exertion during Action Execution. Support for this 
hypothesis comes from a study by Negrotti et al. (2005) which compared the kinematics of 
reaching movements in PD patients at the early stage and at the later stage of the disease, and 
in HCs. Negrotti et al. (2005) observed slowing of the velocity parameter of movement in PD 
patients at the more advanced stages of the disease, but not early in the disease, suggesting an 
important role of dopamine in determining effort put in a task. Furthermore, Porat et al. 
(2014) found reduced effort on a task which required PD patients OFF medication to exert 
physical effort to increase their gain or to avoid loss. This reduction in effort correlated with 
the degree of dopamine depletion indexed by the severity of the motor symptoms, confirming 
an important role of dopamine in overcoming effort cost. 
Detrimental effects of altered dopamine transmission on effort-based decision-making have 
been observed in PD patients both when they were tested ON dopaminergic medication (e.g. 
Majsak, Kaminski, Gentile, & Flanagan, 1998; Mazzoni et al., 2007; Moisello et al., 2011; 
Negrotti et al., 2005), and when they were tested OFF medication (e.g. Baraduc et al., 2013; 
Gepshtein et al., 2014; Jokinen et al., 2013; Negrotti et al., 2005; Schneider, 2007; 
Weingartner, Burns, Diebel, & LeWitt, 1984), suggesting that even a small imbalance in 
dopamine levels can lead to altered effort processing during effort-based decision-making.  
Taken together, the results of the experiments described above suggest that patients with PD 
are more sensitive to effort requirements and consequently show higher effort discounting 
during the valuation stage (Mazzoni et al., 2007), which leads to reduced willingness to 
choose effortful actions. They also suggest that reduced movement speed in PD patients is a 
product of reduced ability to energize behaviour, which affects the Action Execution stage 
(e.g. Clery-Melin et al., 2011). Therefore, it seems that investigating effort-based decision-
making in PD patients can provide important information about the role of dopamine during 
different stages of decision making as defined by V-E-D-M model. Consequently, another 
aim of the empirical work in this thesis is to compare performance of PD patients and HCs on 
an effort-based decision-making task in order to investigate the effects of altered dopamine 
transmission on this process. 
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2.7 Summary 
V-E-D-M model makes certain assumptions about effort-based decision-making. It assumes 
that:  
1) Manipulating reward magnitude, reward valence, and reward reliability has an impact on 
the Valuation stage, and therefore potentially on the whole decision-making process; 
2) Manipulating effort type (i.e. whether it is mental or physical) also influences the 
Valuation stage;  
3) Action Selection and Action Execution can be driven either by the rewards available 
during a decision-making scenario, or by the effort required to obtain them;  
4) Feedback following Action Execution plays an important role in Outcome Evaluation; 
5) Delaying Action Execution affects effort-based decision-making;  
6) Dopamine plays an important role during effort-based decision-making.  
The main issue regarding these assumptions is that no evidence is available to support them. 
Based on the studies conducted so far it is impossible to establish if manipulating different 
characteristics of effort, reward, and task structure has any effects on the stages of the effort-
based decision-making, and what these effects might be. Since V-E-D-M makes certain 
assumptions regarding these manipulations, the validity of this model cannot be established 
without investigating these topics first. Thus, to investigate the validity of the V-E-D-M 
model this thesis concentrated on examining the following hypotheses, based on the studies 
conducted so far: 
H1: Increasing relative as well as absolute reward magnitudes should increase willingness to 
choose and execute effort on an effort-based decision-making task. 
H2: Participants experiencing losses should be less likely to choose effortful trials during the 
Action Selection stage, and more likely to exert effort during the Action Execution stage. 
H3: There should be a positive relationship between the probability of obtaining rewards and 
the willingness to choose and exert effort. 
H4: Mental and physical effort should be processed in the same way during effort-based 
decision-making. 
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H5: If behaviour during Action Selection and Action Execution is driven by reward values, it 
is anticipated that participants’ choices and effort exerted should depend primarily on the 
reward values. If, however, they are driven by effort requirements, we expect choices and 
effort expenditure to depend mostly on the effort level.  
H6: Type of feedback present during a task should have an influence on effort-based choices 
and actions. Cumulative reward feedback should lead to an increased willingness to choose 
and execute effortful options, compared to the less comprehensive discreet feedback. The 
lowest preference for effortful options is expected in the simple feedback condition, when no 
reward information is provided. 
H7: Delayed experience of outcomes should have an influence on effort-based choices. 
Participants experiencing delayed execution should show increased willingness to choose 
effortful options compared to participants executing actions immediately after choice. 
H8: Depletion of dopamine levels in PD should be associated with decreased willingness to 
choose and execute effort. 
In this thesis, the hypotheses described above are investigated using a novel effort-based 
decision-making task. Chapter 3 focuses on the design of this task as well as the methods 
used to analyse the data obtained from this task. 
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CHAPTER 3: General Methods 
The V-E-D-M model makes several assumptions regarding six proposed stages of effort-
based decision-making, including assumptions about the effects of manipulating aspects of 
effort and reward on Valuation, Action Selection, Action Execution, Outcome Evaluation and 
Learning. In Chapter 2 evidence was reviewed, but there are gaps in the literature which 
suggest that many of the assumptions the V-E-D-M model may still need empirical 
qualification. This is because there is no existing work to support or challenge them, either 
way. In an attempt to address this, the six experiments that were set up as part of this thesis 
were designed to test the following eight hypotheses: 
H1: Participants should show greater willingness to choose and execute effort when rewards 
are high. 
H2: Participants experiencing losses should be less likely to choose effortful trials during the 
Action Selection stage, and more likely to exert effort during the Action Execution stage. 
H3: There should be a positive relationship between the probability of obtaining rewards and 
the willingness to choose and exert effort. 
H4: Mental and physical effort should be processed in the same way during effort-based 
decision-making. 
H5: If behaviour during Action Selection and Action Execution is driven by reward values, it 
is anticipated that participants’ choices and effort exerted should depend primarily on the 
reward values. If, however, they are driven by task demands, we expect choices and effort 
expenditure to depend mostly on the effort level required.  
H6: Type of feedback present during a task should influence effort-based choices and actions. 
Full cumulative reward feedback should lead to an increased willingness to choose and 
execute effortful options compared to the less comprehensive discreet feedback. The lowest 
preference for effortful options is expected in the simple feedback condition, when no reward 
information is provided. 
H7: Delayed experience of outcomes should have an influence on effort-based choices. 
Participants experiencing delayed execution should show increased willingness to choose 
effortful options compared to participants executing actions immediately after choice. 
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H8: Depletion of dopamine levels in PD should be associated with decreased willingness to 
choose and execute effort in this group. 
The present chapter is divided into three sections. The first one describes the methods used in 
previous studies of effort-based decision-making, which served as the basis for the design of 
the experimental procedures used in the six experiments of this thesis. The second section 
describes in detail the actual experimental procedure that was used. The final section 
describes the types of analyses that were conducted on the data obtained from the 
experiments presented in this thesis. In the following Chapters 4, 5 and 6 the results of the 
experimental manipulations described in this chapter are reported. This format of presentation 
(i.e. chapter describing the general methods used, followed by three chapters concentrating 
purely on results) was chosen to achieve maximum clarity as to what the findings of each 
individual study mean in the context of the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model. Since the 
model separates the Action Selection and Action Execution stages, in this thesis the results 
relating to these two stages are presented separately. In Chapter 4 the results from the Choice 
phase (representing Action Selection) of each experiment are discussed. In Chapters 5 and 6 
the results from the Execution phase (representing Action Execution) are described. Chapter 
5 concentrates on effort exertion during Action Execution, whereas Chapter 6 describes 
results relating to the accuracy of performance during this stage. 
3.1 Methods used to investigate effort-based decision-making 
Effort-based decision-making has been examined using a variety of methods. Studies 
investigating the effect of effort on choice and execution focused on identifying brain 
networks involved in effort processing and investigating the consequences of disruption to 
these networks (e.g. Croxson et al., 2009; Kroemer et al., 2014; Kurniawan et al., 2013; 
Kurniawan et al., 2010; Le Bouc & Pessiglione, 2013), as well as investigating the effects of 
effort and reward on effort-based decision-making (e.g. Anzak et al., 2011; Bijleveld et al., 
2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Bonnelle et al., 2014; Hartmann et al., 2013; Meyniel et al., 2014). 
The next section of this chapter provides an overview of different methodologies used in 
these studies, which served as a basis for devising the task used in the investigation of the V-
E-D-M model proposed in this thesis. Investigations of mental and physical effort have used 
different methodologies, and for that reason they are described in separate subsections. 
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3.1.1 Mental effort 
Mental effort has most commonly been investigated using tasks which require increased 
concentration and sustained attention, and/or put a great load on working memory. An 
example of a task requiring sustained attention is a parity judgement task. In this task 
participants need to assess if a number appearing on a computer screen is odd/even, or if it is 
bigger or smaller than another specified number. Effort in this task is manipulated by 
changing the number of times participants need to switch from assessing parity to assessing 
magnitude, and it is measured using response times and accuracy of responding. The more 
switches are required, the more effortful the task is considered to be, which is indexed by 
measuring response times (which increase) and accuracy (which decreases) (Botvinick et al., 
2009; Botvinick & Rosen, 2009; Kool et al., 2010; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010).  
Another popular paradigm used in the investigations of mental effort is the n-back working 
memory task. In this task participants are presented with series of stimuli appearing on a 
screen one by one, and are required to recall if they saw a particular stimulus n presentations 
previously (e.g. Barnes et al., 2009; Eubanks et al., 2002; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Otto, 
Zijlstra, & Goebel, 2014; Satterthwaite et al., 2012; Westbrook et al., 2013). In this case 
effortfulness is determined by n, and can be measured using cardiovascular responses (e.g. 
Eubanks et al., 2002), accuracy of responding (e.g. Kool & Botvinick, 2014), or self-report 
measures of effort (e.g. Otto et al., 2014). The higher the n number is, the more effortful the 
task is considered to be. In turn, this is associated with increased cardiovascular activations, 
decreased accuracy, and increased subjective ratings of effort.  
Alternatively, many studies investigating mental effort present participants with maths 
problems. Typically, they involve solving equations appearing on a computer screen (e.g. 
Bijleveld et al., 2010; Hernandez Lallement et al., 2014; Jokinen et al., 2013). Here 
effortfulness is determined by the number of equations that need to be solved under a 
deadline or by their difficulty, and is measured by response times and accuracy. In general, in 
the tasks that used this method, response times increased and accuracy decreased in line with 
increasing effort requirements.  
An important feature of the paradigms described above is that for each one effort can be 
measured using multiple and varied methods, and this depends on the research questions 
being asked in the studies. Mental effort has been assessed using measures that include self-
report and questionnaires (e.g. Efklides, Kourkoulou, Mitsiou, & Ziliaskopoulou, 2006; 
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Ostaszewski et al., 2013; Roets et al., 2008), response times (e.g. Jokinen et al., 2013; Kool et 
al., 2010; Marien et al., 2014; Pas et al., 2014), pupil dilation (e.g. Bijleveld et al., 2009; 
Boehler et al., 2011), and cardiovascular responses (e.g. Eubanks et al., 2002; Gendolla & 
Krüsken, 2001, 2002; Gendolla & Richter, 2005; Richter et al., 2008; Smith et al., 1990; 
Smith, Nealey, Kircher, & Limon, 1997; R. A. Wright, 1984, 1996). What this suggests is 
that currently there is no accepted or standardized measure of mental effort exertion. This 
makes it harder to assess across studies what types of mental effort tasks have greater impact 
on mental effort exertion. It also makes it hard to assess how mental effort impacts different 
stages of the effort-decision-making process. Only broad conclusions can be drawn which 
suggest that when the difficulty of a mental task is manipulated, or the time available to 
complete it is manipulated, then accuracy is affected, along with other measures. However, 
there is no way of knowing which measure is the most appropriate for gauging mental effort. 
3.1.2 Physical effort 
The situation seems to be a bit better with regard to examining physical effort. This is 
because tasks used to elicit physical effort typically adopt the same paradigm, which involves 
a hand grip device. These tasks measure the grip strength with which participants squeeze a 
joystick in response to stimuli presented on a computer screen (e.g. Anzak et al., 2011; Anzak 
et al., 2012; Bonnelle et al., 2014; Burke et al., 2013; Chong et al., 2015; Hartmann et al., 
2013; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Meyniel et al., 2014; Meyniel et al., 
2013; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Prevost et al., 2010; Schmidt et al., 2009; Schmidt et al., 2008; 
Zenon et al., 2014). Thus, across all these studies grip strength is considered to be the index 
of effort exertion such that the stronger the grip, the more effort is presumed to be exerted.  
Outside of the typical hand grip paradigm, several studies have measured physical effort 
using other hand movements, such as reaching movements. For example, in some studies 
participants were required to move their hand to a target with a particular speed and accuracy 
in response to external stimuli (Baraduc et al., 2013; Majsak et al., 1998; Mazzoni et al., 
2007; Moisello et al., 2011; Montgomery & Nuessen, 1990; Negrotti et al., 2005). The higher 
the speed and accuracy requirements, the more effortful the task was considered to be. In 
these tasks effort exerted was thought to be reflected by the speed of movement that was 
performed (Baraduc et al., 2013; Majsak et al., 1998; Moisello et al., 2011; Montgomery & 
Nuessen, 1990), and/or its accuracy (Majsak et al., 1998; Montgomery & Nuessen, 1990). In 
addition, physical effort has been measured more simply by examining button presses on a 
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computer keyboard (most often with the little finger), or clicking a computer mouse in 
response to stimuli presented on screen (Bijleveld et al., 2012; E. D. Klein et al., 2005; 
Kroemer et al., 2014; Pas et al., 2014; Porat et al., 2014; Treadway et al., 2012; Treadway et 
al., 2009; Wardle, Treadway, & de Wit, 2012; Wardle, Treadway, Mayo, Zald, & de Wit, 
2011). Here, effort was shown to increase as indexed by the number of button presses (i.e. 
finger tapping speed) (Bijleveld et al., 2012; Pas et al., 2014), or the number of mouse clicks 
(Kroemer et al., 2014; Porat et al., 2014).  
As with mental effort, in physical effort tasks effort has been measured using a variety of 
methods. While the hand grip paradigm is the most popular, certainly in most recent research 
history on physical effort, the methods by which effort is measured are broad. Methods of 
measurement of effort can include self-report questionnaires (e.g. Sugiwaka & Okouchi, 
2004), pupil dilation (e.g. Zenon et al., 2014), duration of movement (e.g. Samuels & 
Whitecotton, 2011; Sprinkle, 2000), speed of movement (e.g. Ballanger et al., 2006; Baraduc 
et al., 2013; Croxson et al., 2009; Pas et al., 2014), movement velocity (e.g. Majsak et al., 
1998; Moisello et al., 2011), reaction time (e.g. Kojovic et al., 2014; Kurniawan et al., 2013), 
grip strength (e.g. Anzak et al., 2011; Anzak et al., 2012; Bonnelle et al., 2014; Burke et al., 
2013; Chong et al., 2015), and number of responses (e.g. button presses) (Porat et al., 2014; 
Venugopalan et al., 2011). Many of the issues that were raised regarding mental effort also 
apply to the study of physical effort. There is no agreed measure of physical effort, and no 
way to align the different ways in which physical effort is manipulated and measured in order 
to assess which physical effort tasks are most effortful, and how that impacts on decision-
making behaviour.  
3.1.3 Mental and physical effort 
Of concern to a number of literatures is the assumption that the underlying basis on which 
mental and physical effort based decisions are made is in fact the same. However, this 
assumption is hard to validate empirically because so few studies actually directly compare 
the two. Of the work reviewed the only measure that seems to have been used consistently to 
examine effort exertion in both mental and physical effort tasks is accuracy. It is generally 
assumed that increased effort exertion should translate into increased task performance, as 
reflected by improved accuracy. This indeed has been observed in several studies examining 
mental as well as physical effort (e.g. Bijleveld et al., 2010; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Pas et al., 
2014; Schmidt et al., 2012). Of course, these studies use different incentive schemes in which 
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the rewards are presented in different ways, with different feedback, and as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the interaction between rewards and effort exertion is not straightforward. 
Nevertheless, in the literature reviewed, it does appear that when people commit to greater 
effort exertion this usually corresponds to increases in performance accuracy.  
As discussed, different methodologies used to examine effort-based decision-making 
described above limit the extent to which inferences can be drawn about the types of tasks 
that lead to greater effort. Furthermore, inconsistencies in the designs across the different 
studies reviewed also mean that the results of these studies are difficult to compare, and 
potential differences between them are difficult to interpret. This is particularly problematic 
when mental and physical effort are concerned, as there is an implicit assumption that these 
two types of effort are processed in the same way. Vast discrepancies between the tasks used 
to investigate mental and physical effort mean that this assumption cannot really be 
supported. Therefore, it seems that this area of research would strongly benefit from a more 
consistent approach in terms of the methodologies used. This would allow for direct 
comparisons between tasks, which should lead to a better understanding of effort-based 
decision-making in mental and physical tasks.  
3.1.4 Present experimental paradigm 
The present experimental set up used in the six experiments presented in this thesis is novel. 
However, attempts were made so that it was compatible with the designs of previous studies 
investigating mental and physical effort–based decision-making. In each of the six 
experiments mental effort was measured using a mental arithmetic task, where difficulty was 
determined by the number of equations appearing on the screen and measured by recording 
response times as well as accuracy. Increased effort exertion  in this task was indexed by an 
elevation in response times and increased accuracy. For physical effort the hand grip 
paradigm was used. Grip strength and accuracy were used as the indicators of effort exertion, 
in line with previous studies of this type. Additionally, the choices participants made 
regarding the amount of effort they were willing to exert for different levels of reward were 
also recorded for both mental and physical effort. The goal of designing this task was to 
investigate the eight hypotheses described at the beginning of this chapter, to establish the 
validity of the assumptions made by the V-E-D-M model. These hypotheses were 
investigated in six experiments. The exact hypotheses investigated in each experiment are 
presented in Table 2.  
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In all six experiments the same effort-based decision-making task was used and three types of 
measures were recorded: 1) choices made, 2) behavioural measures of effort exertion (i.e. 
grip strength for physical effort and response times for mental effort), and 3) accuracy of 
performance. These three types of measures were investigated in relation to the eight 
hypotheses described above. For the clarity of presentation and interpretation in terms of the 
assumptions of the model, the results of the six experiments are presented together for each 
type of dependent measure in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The remaining part of this chapter 
describes the methods of data collection and data analysis in the six experiments described 
above. 
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3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
In total, 222 participants were recruited for the six experiments. Participants in Experiments 
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 were recruited using a research volunteers’ contact list from Queen Mary 
University of London. Participants for Experiment 6 were recruited from the movement 
disorders clinic at the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery. 
1) Forty two participants (23 males) were recruited for Experiment 1 (Gains). As one 
participant was found to be unable to complete the mental effort trials, their data were 
removed from the analysis. The mean age of the remaining participants was 20.56 (SD=2.46). 
Participants were assigned randomly to each of the feedback conditions: Cumulative (N=13), 
Discreet (N=14), and Simple (N=14).  
2) Forty five participants (12 males) were recruited for Experiment 2 (Losses). Mean age of 
the participants was 20.58 (SD=1.08). Participants were assigned randomly to each of the 
feedback conditions: Cumulative (N=15), Discreet (N=15), and Simple (N=15).  
3) Forty two participants (7 males) were recruited for Experiment 3 (Reliability). Mean age 
of the participants was 22.07 (SD=5.37). Participants were assigned randomly to each of the 
reward reliability conditions: Deterministic (N=15), Probabilistic (N=14), and Random 
(N=13).  
4) Thirty participants (4 males) were recruited for Experiment 4 (Increased Incentives). 
Mean age of the participants was 21.77 (SD=7.54). Participants were assigned randomly to 
each of the reward reliability conditions: Deterministic (N=10), Probabilistic (N=10), and 
Random (N=10).  
5) Thirty two participants (5 males) were recruited for Experiment 5 (Immediate 
Execution). Mean age of the participants was 20.78 (SD=3.73). Participants were assigned 
randomly to each of the feedback conditions: Cumulative (N=11), Discreet (N=11), and 
Simple (N=10).  
6) Thirty one participants were recruited for Experiment 6 (PD study). Two participants 
(one PD patient and one HC) were not able to complete mental effort trials, and had to be 
removed from the analysis. Data from 15 PD patients (12 males), aged between 42 and 79 
(M=64.73, SD=10.29), and 14 HCs (6 males) aged between 37 and 83 (M=71.43, SD=11.32) 
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was included in the analysis. Mean duration of illness in the PD group was 6 years 
(SD=5.15). All patients were non-demented, as demonstrated by scores above 24 on the 
Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE) (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). Screening 
for depression using the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) revealed 4 PD patients scored in the depressed range (score >18). One patient had a 
clinical diagnosis of depression and was taking antidepressant medication at the time of the 
study. However, removing their data from the analysis was not found to significantly change 
the results and therefore it was included in the final analysis. Stage of illness was assessed 
using the Hoehn and Yahr scale (Hoehn & Yahr, 1998). Disability was assessed with the 
Schwab and England Activities of Daily Living scale (Schwab & England, 1969). All 
patients where in the mild to moderate stages of the disease with scores on the Hoehn and 
Yahr scale ranging from 1 to 4 (M=1.98, SD=0.90). On the Schwab and England scale scores 
ranged from 5 to 9 (M=7.84, SD=1.02). All patients were examined while on dopaminergic 
medication. Mean levodopa equivalent dose was 566.50 mg (SD=327.30). Levodopa 
equivalent dose, duration of illness, and disease severity as measured by Hoehn and Yahr 
(1998) were not correlated with participants’ performance during the task. 
3.2.2 Materials 
Participants in all six experiments completed a version of a newly developed computerized 
effort-based decision-making task designed specifically for this thesis. The task was 
programed using Matlab 2012a with Psychtoolbox 3 extension and presented to participants 
on a 19’’ monitor using an IBM computer. Participants’ role during the task was to exert 
mental effort (solve simple mathematical equations) and physical effort (squeeze a hand grip 
device) to obtain small monetary rewards. The amount of effort required (High or Low) and 
the amount reward to be won (High or Low) differed between trials. The exact structure of 
the task differed between experiments, depending on the manipulations they included. The 
summary of different manipulations introduced in the six experiments is presented in Table 3 
and described in sections 3.2.2.1 – 3.2.2.4 of this chapter. Participants’ responses were 
recorded using a standard keyboard (mental effort) and a grip force transducer (physical 
effort) forming a part of fORP 932 Subject Response Package, developed by Cambridge 
Research Systems. The maximum grip strength measured by the transducer was 100N on a 
scale from 0 to 35000. The task consisted of three stages: Training phase, Choice phase and 
Execution phase. The Training phase was formed of 16 trials, and Choice and Execution 
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phases consisted of 48 trials (Experiments 1-5) or 60 trials (Experiment 6). The visual layout 
of each phase is presented in Figure 2.  
On each Training and Execution trial a thermometer was presented in the centre of the screen, 
with the reward information displayed on top. The thermometer was divided into three 
sections by three horizontal lines in equal distance from each other. Other elements presented 
on the screen depended on the Effort Type (Mental vs. Physical), Effort Level (High vs. 
Low), and Reward Level (High vs. Low) on a particular trial. Duration of each trial was 4.5s 
(Experiments 1-5) or 6s (Experiment 6). After each trial participants received feedback which 
included information about the financial outcome of this trial. This feedback depended on the 
Feedback condition participants were assigned to (Cumulative/Discreet/Simple in 
Experiments 1-3, Deterministic/Probabilistic/Random in Experiments 4-5, Discreet in 
Experiment 6). The following section describes Effort Type, Effort Level, Reward Level, and 
Feedback manipulations in more detail. 
 
Figure 2. Visual layout of the novel effort-based decision-making task 
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3.2.2.1 Effort Type manipulation 
Mental Effort 
During the mental effort trials simple mathematical equations (e.g. 2+4=6 or 5+3=7) 
appeared on the left hand side of the thermometer next to the dividing lines. Participants’ role 
was to indicate if an equation was solved correctly or not by pressing an appropriate button 
(Experiments 1-5: ‘z’ and ‘m’; Experiment 6: ‘n’ and ‘m’ respectively) on the keyboard. 
Participants had to solve all the equations appearing on the screen to successfully complete a 
trial. Each equation consisted of three one digit numbers forming either an addition, 
subtraction or a multiplication which were already solved. Half of the total number of 
equations presented to participants during the experiment was solved incorrectly. Difference 
between the correct answer and the incorrect answer presented on the screen was within the 
±3 range. Correct and incorrect equations were distributed randomly between trials.  
Physical Effort 
During the physical effort trials signs indicating the level of effort to be achieved (e.g. ‘Level 
1’, ‘Level 3’) appeared on the left hand side of the thermometer. Participants had to squeeze 
the joystick with an appropriate strength to successfully complete a trial.  
3.2.2.2 Effort Level manipulation 
High Effort (HE) 
During the high mental effort trials participants had to solve three equations appearing on the 
screen. In Experiments 1-5 during the high physical effort trials participants had to squeeze 
the joystick with the strength above 75% of maximum grip strength that could reliably be 
measured by the transducer, which represents the force of 75 Newtons. All participants were 
capable of achieving this force. In Experiment 6 participants had to squeeze the joystick with 
the strength above 60% of their maximum grip strength; this was measured before the actual 
experiment began. 
Low Effort (LE) 
During the low mental effort trials participants had to solve one equation. During the low 
physical effort trials participants had to squeeze the joystick with the strength above 15% of 
the maximum grip strength that could reliably be measured by the transducer (Experiments 1-
5), which represented the force of 15 Newtons. In Experiment 6 participants had to squeeze 
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the joystick with the strength above 15% of maximum grip strength, as measured before the 
experiment started. 
In Experiments 1-5 participants had to solve all of the equations appearing on the screen 
within 4.5s or maintain their grip above the threshold level for 4.5s to successfully complete 
both High and Low Effort trials. Each trial terminated after 4.5s, regardless of whether it was 
successful or not. In Experiment 6 the length of each trial was extended to 6s, to 
accommodate for potentially longer response times in PD patients. 
3.2.2.3 Reward Level manipulation 
On the High Reward (HR) trials the amount of reward presented on top of the thermometer 
was 15p. On the Low Reward (LR) trials the amount of reward presented was 5p 
(Experiments 1, 3, 5 and 6). In Experiment 2 (Losses), participants were first endowed with 
£6.40, which coincided with the maximum amount that could be won in Experiment 1. Their 
goal was to avoid losing this money. In this experiment, the amount presented on High Stake 
(HS) trials was -15p, and the amount presented on Low Stake (LS) trials was -5p. In 
Experiment 4 (Increased Incentives) these rewards were doubled, so that participants were 
presented with 30p on High Reward trials and 10p on Low Reward trials. 
3.2.2.4 Reward Feedback manipulation 
After each trial participants received general performance feedback and reward information 
which differed depending on the condition they were assigned to (Cumulative, Discreet, or 
Simple in Experiments 1, 2 and 5; Deterministic, Probabilistic, Random in Experiments 3-4). 
3.2.2.4.1 Experiments 1, 2 and 5 
Cumulative condition 
In the Cumulative condition participants received information about whether they had 
successfully completed the trial (‘Good job’/’Not this time’), how much money they would 
have won (Training) or actually won (Execution) on this particular trial, and how much 
money they have accumulated so far. 
Discreet condition 
In the Discreet condition participants received information about whether they had 
successfully completed the trial (‘Good job’/’Not this time’), and how much money they 
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would have won (Training) or actually won (Execution) on this particular trial. This was also 
the only type of feedback available for participants in Experiment 6. 
Simple condition 
In the Simple condition participants received information only about whether they had 
successfully completed a trial (‘Good job’/’Not this time’). No information about rewards 
was presented. 
3.2.2.4.2 Experiments 3 and 4 
After each trial participants received feedback, which informed them if they had successfully 
obtained the reward (‘Good job’ vs. ‘Not this time’) and how much money they would have 
won (Training phase) or actually won (Execution phase) on this particular trial. 
Deterministic condition 
In the Deterministic condition, successful completion of a trial resulted in positive feedback 
(‘Good job’) and acquisition of reward. Unsuccessful trial received ‘Not this time’ feedback. 
Probabilistic condition 
In the Probabilistic condition, successful completion of a trial resulted in positive feedback 
(‘Good job’) and acquisition of reward on approximately 75% of the trials. Unsuccessful 
trials would result in positive feedback and acquisition of reward on 25% of the trials, 
otherwise the rest of the time an unsuccessful trial received ‘Not this time’ feedback. 
Unreliable condition 
In the Unreliable condition, each trial was associated with a 50% probability of experiencing 
positive feedback (‘Good job’) and obtaining a reward, regardless of whether it was 
completed successfully or not, otherwise the rest of the time a trial received ‘Not this time’ 
feedback. 
3.2.3 Procedure 
The visual layout of the screen, cover story and instructions were identical for Experiments 1-
6. Participants were informed that they would be required to exert mental and physical effort 
to obtain small monetary rewards (Experiments 1 and 3-6) or to avoid losing money that was 
given to them at the beginning of the experiment (Experiment 2). They were also told that 
they would be able to choose between different combinations of effort and reward before they 
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would be required to put in effort. The exact phases participants were asked to go through are 
presented in Figure 3. 
The experiment began with a short demonstration during which participants had a chance to 
familiarize themselves with the visual characteristics of the task and practice using the 
joystick. Since the maximum grip strength that could be measured by the joystick (i.e. 100N) 
was greatly below average maximum grip strength for males (approx. 420N) and females 
(approx. 240N) as reported by Mathiowetz et al. (1985), no calibration of the device was 
conducted, as it was assumed that all participants were capable of achieving the grip strength 
thresholds required in this task. This assumption was confirmed by the experimenter for each 
participant on an individual basis during the short initial demonstration. In Experiment 6, 
calibration of the joystick was conducted, however, to account for the weaker grip strength 
observed in the older people, and PD patients in particular (Bohannon, Bear-Lehman, 
Desrosiers, Massy-Westropp, & Mathiowetz, 2007; Corcos, Chen, Quinn, McAuley, & 
Rothwell, 1996). Calibration was done through asking participants to squeeze the joystick as 
hard as they could three times in a row. The highest measurement was taken to represent 
participants’ maximum grip strength. Demonstration/calibration was followed by the 
Training phase, consisting of 16 trials, during which participants experienced different levels 
of effort and reward.  
Training phase was designed to familiarize participants with the effort demands and the 
reward structure of the task. No monetary rewards were awarded at this stage. Each training 
trial started with a screen informing participants about the type of effort required. Participants 
saw either a picture of the joystick which indicated physical effort, or a picture of a keyboard 
which indicated mental effort. Below the picture there was an information about the level of 
effort required and about the level of associated reward (even though no actual rewards were 
handed out at this stage) on the following trial. There were four possible effort/reward 
combinations: high effort high reward (HEHR), high effort low reward (HELR), low effort 
high reward (LEHR) and low effort low reward (LELR). This information appeared on the 
screen for 3s. Next, a thermometer was presented in the centre of the screen, with the reward 
information displayed on top.  
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On mental effort trials, after each successful response the level of the mercury in the 
thermometer would go up. After an incorrect response the trial would terminate. On physical 
effort trials maintaining the squeeze caused the level of the mercury in the thermometer to go 
up. Loosening the grip strength below a predefined threshold level resulted in a termination 
of the trial. Each type of effort/reward combination (HEHR, HELR, LEHR, LELR) appeared 
twice during the training phase for each effort type (Mental vs. Physical). The order of 
presentation was randomized. 
Training phase was followed by the Choice phase, during which participants had to 
repeatedly choose between two options presented on the screen by pressing an appropriate 
button on the keyboard. Mental and physical effort options were presented in an alternate 
manner. Choice phase was designed to investigate the choices participants made when 
deciding about exerting effort for rewards. In this phase on each consecutive trial participants 
saw a picture of a keyboard or a picture of a joystick appearing on the screen, representing 
mental or physical effort respectively. Underneath the picture two options were displayed. 
The two options differed in terms of the level of effort required, level of reward to be 
obtained, or both.  Each combination of possible options (HEHR vs HELR vs LEHR vs 
LELR) appeared on the screen four times in a random order. Participants made their choice 
by pressing an appropriate button on the keyboard, after which the chosen option would be 
highlighted in green and the trial would terminate. Participants had an unlimited time to make 
their decision. Participants’ choices determined what trials participants’ encountered in the 
Execution phase. The Choice phase consisted of 48 (Experiments 1-5) or 60 (Experiment 6) 
trials. In Experiment 3 (Immediate Execution) each choice was immediately followed by an 
execution trial. In the other experiments participants made 48/60 choices first, one after 
another, and only after all the choices were made they were transferred to the Execution 
phase 
In the Execution phase (Experiments 1-4 and 6) participants were first reminded of their 
choice and then they had to execute it by either squeezing the joystick or solving the 
equations appearing on the screen. Each successfully completed trial increased participant’s 
final win. Execution trials were presented in the same order as the choice trials. In 
Experiment 5 (Immediate Execution) there was no need to remind participants about their 
choice before the trial started, as execution trials followed choice trials straight away. 
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3.3 Data analysis 
Statistical package R v. 3.1.1 (R Core Team, 2014) was used to analyse the data. Grip 
strength and response times measurements from both correct and incorrect trials were 
averaged for the four different types of trials (HEHR, HELR, LEHR, LELR). Response times 
were trimmed: those shorter than 150ms (Experiments 1-5) or 200ms (Experiment 6) and 
longer than 4.5s (Experiments 1-5) or 6s (Experiment 6) were excluded from the analysis, so 
that the data analysed would be contained in the middle 95% of the distribution, in line with 
the methods commonly used to deal with reaction time outliers, as described by Ratcliff 
(1993) and Whelan (2010). 
As the Training phase was used only to familiarise participants with the task environment, 
and consisted of only two trials of each type (i.e. 2x HEHR, 2x HELR, 2x LEHR, 2x LELR) 
data from this phase was not included in the analyses described in the following sections. 
Preliminary analyses of the choice, effort exertion, and accuracy data gathered in the six 
experiments revealed that the number of observations (available data points) was not even 
across conditions and experiments. Furthermore, diagnostic procedures forming part of initial 
mixed ANOVA analysis of the effort execution data showed that in some instances the 
residuals (i.e. the differences between observed values and the values estimated by the 
ANOVA model) were not normally distributed. These factors, in addition to the fact that 
choice and accuracy data was categorical, meant that mixed ANOVA design was not an 
appropriate method of data analysis. For that reason linear mixed models (LMMs) and 
generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs), appropriate for dealing with unbalanced designs 
(Bolker et al., 2009; Faraway, 2005, 2014) were used to analyse the data. Package ‘lme4’ was 
used for the modelling purposes (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). 
Experiment 1 (Gains) was used as a baseline for Experiments 2 (Losses) and 5 (Immediate 
Execution). Similarly, Experiment 3 (Reliability) was used as a baseline to which Experiment 
4 (Increased Incentives) was compared. Experiment 6 (PD study) was analysed separately, as 
the design of this experiment differed slightly from the other five.   
3.3.1 Model specification 
Fixed and random factors included in the models used for the analysis of the data from the six 
experiments are presented in Table 4. 
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Dependent variables analysed in this thesis were: Choice, Grip Strength (physical effort 
only), Response Times (mental effort only), and Accuracy. Choice represented the number of 
times each option was chosen when it was available. Grip strength was the measurement 
obtained from the hand grip device. Response times represented the time it took participants 
to solve all of the equations appearing on the screen within the 4.5s (or 6s in the case of 
Experiment 6) deadline. Accuracy reflected the number of trials completed successfully by 
participants.  
In Experiment 2 during Choice analysis ‘Attractiveness’ (High vs. Low) of an option was 
entered as a factor into the analysis instead of Reward. Options involving high reward (+15p) 
or low loss (-5p) were coded as High in attractiveness, whereas options involving low reward 
(+5p) or high loss (-15p) were coded as Low in attractiveness. In the same experiment, during 
the analysis of behavioural measures and accuracy ‘Stake’ (High vs. Low) was entered into 
the analysis instead of Reward. High Stake represented trials during which participant could 
win or lose 15p, whereas Low Stake represented trials during which participants could win or 
lose 5p. 
Analyses of physical and mental effort data were conducted separately, due to the differences 
in methods used to elicit mental and physical effort. In addition, choices made during 
physical and mental effort trials, as well as accuracy on mental and physical effort trials were 
compared in separate analyses for each experiment. These analyses included Effort Type, as 
well as the main experimental manipulations described in Table 4 as fixed factors, and 
Subject ID as a random factor.  
For post hoc analyses Tukey HSD test was used as a method of adjusting p values for 
multiple comparisons. 
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Choice and Accuracy were categorical variables, and so were investigated using GLMMs 
assuming binomial distribution, appropriate for the analysis of counts data (Bolker et al., 
2009). Grip strength and RT data was examined using LMMs, appropriate for the analysis of 
continuous data, assuming that residuals are normally distributed (Bolker et al., 2009). As the 
residuals in the case of RT data were found not to be normally distributed, and no data 
transformation alleviated this problem, GLMMs assuming gamma distribution with 
logarithmic or inverse link were used to analyse this data (Bolker et al., 2009) 
Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different complexity. 
Information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the models with the highest estimated 
predictive power (Bolker et al., 2009). Based on this criterion the final models were selected 
in each Experiment. The exact models selected in each experiment are described in Appendix 
A. 
3.3.2 Model diagnostics, parameter estimation and model selection 
For LMMs, the assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance were examined by 
visual inspection of residual plots and by using Shapiro-Wilk test of normality (Faraway, 
2014). If these assumptions were violated, data was transformed to normality using 
appropriate transformations. In the case of grip strength data, square root transformations of 
reversed scores were typically used (see Appendix A). As far as response times are 
concerned, this data could not be transformed to normality using standard transformations, 
and so GLMMs assuming gamma or inverse distributions were used for the analysis (see 
Appendix A).  
For GLMMs assuming gamma or inverse distributions residual plots were examined to make 
sure the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated (Faraway, 2005). No 
residual plots indicated violation of this assumption. 
For GLMMs assuming binomial distribution the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson 
residuals and the residual degrees of freedom was analysed to check for overdispertion 
(Faraway, 2005). When this assumption was violated a random factor for each observation 
was included in the model.  
Maximum Likelihood method was used to estimate the parameters of each model. Likelihood 
ratio test was used to test fixed effects (Bolker et al., 2009). 
The exact details of how each model was created can be found in Appendix A. 
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3.4 Summary 
In previous investigations of effort-based decision-making described in Chapters 1 and 2 
various methods of effort measurement were used. Among these measures response times, 
grip strength and accuracy proved to be the most popular. Therefore, to achieve consistency 
with previous investigations, these three methods of effort measurement were used in a newly 
developed effort-based decision-making task designed to investigate the eight hypotheses 
derived from the V-E-D-M, described in Chapter 2. The task consisted of three phases: 
Training phase, Choice phase, and Execution Phase. During the Training and Execution 
phases participants were required to squeeze a hand grip device (physical effort) or solve 
simple mathematical equations appearing on the screen (mental effort) to obtain small 
monetary rewards. During the Choice phase participants were required to choose between 
options associated with different levels of effort and reward. Different aspects of this task 
were manipulated in the six experiments designed to investigate the hypotheses forming the 
focus of this thesis. Data gathered during these experiments was then analysed using LMMs 
and GLMMs. The results of these analyses are presented in the next three chapters, 
describing the effects of experimental manipulations on the choices people made (Chapter 4), 
effort they exerted (Chapter 5), and accuracy they achieved (Chapter 6). Such format was 
chosen to achieve maximum clarity regarding the implications of the findings from the six 
experiments for the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model. 
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CHAPTER 4: Experimental Studies - Choice 
The V-E-D-M model makes various assumptions regarding effort and reward processing 
during six different stages of effort-based decision-making. For example, it assumes that 
manipulating reward magnitude/valence/reliability or effort type should affect choices people 
make during an effort-based decision-making task. Moreover, it stipulates that changing the 
feedback structure or preventing learning during decision-making should also have an impact 
on choices. These assumptions have not been verified, however. Therefore, in this chapter the 
effects of manipulating the aspects of the decision-making problem described above on the 
choices participants made in a newly developed effort-based decision-making task were 
investigated. The specific areas covered by these investigations were: 1) Reward 
manipulations, 2) Effort manipulations, 3) Importance of effort/reward during Action 
Selection and Action Execution, 4) Outcome feedback, 5) Delayed Action Execution, and 
6) Neural underpinnings, as specified in Chapter 2. 
As far as Reward manipulations are concerned, in this chapter the effects of a) increasing 
relative as well as absolute reward values, b) changing reward valence (from gain to loss), 
and c) changing reward reliability on participants’ choices were examined. Furthermore, 
participants’ choices on mental and physical effort trials wer compared, to investigate the 
effects of Effort manipulations. Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection 
was also explored through investigating participants’ preferences when options associated 
with different levels of effort and reward were available. The effects of different types of 
Outcome feedback, as well as the effects of Delaying Action Execution on participants’ 
choices were examined as well. Finally, the role of dopamine during Action Selection stage 
was investigated, in an effort to explore the Neural underpinnings of effort-based decision-
making. 
These topics were investigated in six studies which used the novel effort-based decision-
making task described in Chapter 3. This task consisted of three phases: Training phase, 
Choice phase, and Execution phase (see Figure 3). This chapter focuses specifically on 
participants’ performance during the Choice phase. During this phase participants were 
repeatedly presented with two out of four possible options associated with different levels of 
effort and reward (HEHR vs. HELR vs. LEHR vs. LELR) and were required to choose the 
option that they wanted to execute (see Figure 4). Participants’ choices were analysed using 
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binomial GLMM. The results of these analyses are presented in this chapter. 
 
Figure 4. Example of choices participants faced during the effort-based decision-making task 
Eight specific hypotheses regarding the effects of manipulating effort, reward, and feedback 
structure on the choices people make were investigated: 
H1: Increasing incentives available in a task should increase participants’ willingness to 
choose high effort options. 
H2: Participants trying to avoid losing monetary rewards should choose low effort options 
more often than participants trying to win monetary rewards. 
H3: Positive relationship between the probability of obtaining rewards and the willingness to 
choose high effort options should be observed. 
H4: Choices on mental effort trials should not be different from choices on physical effort 
trials. 
H5: If behaviour during Action Selection is driven by reward values, participants should 
mainly choose high reward options. If, however, it is driven by effort requirements, they 
should mainly choose low effort options. 
H6: Type of feedback present during a task should have an effect on the choices people 
make. Cumulative reward feedback should lead to an increased willingness to choose high 
effort options compared to discreet feedback. The lowest preference for high effort options is 
expected in the simple feedback condition, when no reward information is provided. 
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H7: Participants experiencing delayed Action Execution should show increased willingness 
to choose effortful options. 
H8: Depletion of dopamine levels in the brain associated with PD should lead to reduced 
willingness to choose high effort options. 
In Chapter 4 the effects of different experimental manipulations on the choices participants 
made during the task are described and interpreted in the context of the eight hypotheses 
presented above. Summary of the findings of different experiments is presented in Table 5. 
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4.1 Results 
In each of the following sections the experimental design is briefly described first, followed 
by the results from the physical effort trials, mental effort trials, and the comparison of the 
two types of trials. At the end of each section the findings are discussed in the context of the 
experimental hypotheses. 
Table showing how often each option (HEHR, HELR, LEHR, LELR) was chosen when it 
was available is included in Appendix B. 
4.1.1 Experiment 1 (Gains) 
Experiment 1 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 3 (Reward Feedback: Cumulative vs. Discreet vs. 
Simple) design. The critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort 
and high vs. low reward on choices associated with either mental or physical effort. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three Reward Feedback groups: 
Cumulative (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular trial + reward accumulated 
so far), Discreet (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular trial), or Simple 
(accuracy feedback). 
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
3) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Selection,  
4) H6, which concerns the effects of different types of feedback on choice. 
Participants’ preferences on mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 1 are presented in 
Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Percentage of times each option was chosen when it was available during mental 
and physical effort trials in Experiment 1. 
Physical Effort 
Analysis of choices participants made during physical effort trials revealed significant main 
effects of Effort Level (χ2(2)=111.23, p<.001) and Reward Level (χ2(2)=259.97, p<.001), as 
well as an interaction between Effort Level and Reward Level (χ2(1)=13.38, p<.001).  
Confirming the pattern indicated in Figure 5, there was an overall preference for Low Effort 
over High Effort options (β=1.63, SE=.15, z=10.65, p<.001), an overall preference for High 
Reward over Low Reward options (β=3.29, SE=.16, z=20.48, p<.001), but also an interaction 
between Effort Level and Reward Level. 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test showed that participants were more likely to 
choose LEHR trials over HEHR (β=1.08, SE=.19, z=5.59, p<.001), LELR (β=2.73, SE=.19, 
z=14.05, p<.001), and HELR trials (β=4.92, SE=.27, z=18.41, p<.001). Furthermore, 
participants were found to have a preference for HEHR trials over LELR (β=1.65, SE=.16, 
z=10.05, p<.001) and HELR trials (β=3.84, SE=.24, z=15.78, p<.001). They were also found 
to choose LELR over HELR trials (β=2.18, SE=.23, z=9.30, p<.001), as indicated by Figure 
5. 
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Mental Effort 
Analysis of choices people made during mental effort trials revealed significant main effects 
of Effort Level (χ2(2)=175.28, p<.001) and Reward Level (χ2(2)=258.78, p<.001).  
As suggested by Figure 5, there was an overall preference for Low Effort over High Effort 
options (β=2.34, SE=.17, z=14.02, p<.001), and an overall preference for High Reward over 
Low Reward options (β=3.30, SE=.17, z=19.33, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test showed that participants were more likely to 
choose LEHR trials over HEHR (β=2.09, SE=.21, z=9.53, p<.001), LELR (β=3.05, SE=.22, 
z=13.73, p<.001), and HELR trials (β=5.67, SE=.30, z=18.88, p<.001). Furthermore, 
participants were found to have a preference for HEHR trials over LELR (β=.96, SE=.16, 
z=6.13, p<.001) and HELR trials (β=3.58, SE=.25, z=14.32, p<.001). They were also more 
likely to choose LELR over HELR trials (β=2.61, SE=.25, z=10.58, p<.001), as demonstrated 
in Figure 5. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
Comparison of choices made on mental and physical effort trials revealed a significant main 
effect of Effort Type (χ2(2)=13.91, p<.001), as well as a significant interaction between Effort 
Type and Effort Level (χ2(1)=13.89, p<.001).  
Further analyses using Tukey HSD test revealed that participants were less likely to choose 
High Effort trials (β=-.38, SE=.14, z=2.69, p=.04) when effort required was mental, rather 
than physical. Participants were also more likely to choose Low Effort trials (β=.35, SE=.13, 
z=2.64, p=.04) when effort required was mental, as indicated by Figure 5. 
Discussion 
In general, results of Experiment 1 suggest that: 1) increased reward values lead to increased 
willingness to choose effortful options, 2) mental and physical effort are processed 
differently, 3) choices are driven by reward values, and 4) feedback does not have a strong 
influence on the choices people make. 
More specifically, Experiment 1 was designed to investigate four hypotheses derived from 
the V-E-D-M model: H1, H4, H5 and H6. In line with H1, which predicts that increasing 
relative reward values should lead to increased willingness to choose effortful options, 
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participants were found to be more likely to choose high effort trials if they were associated 
with high rewards. 
Contrary to H4, which asserts that mental and physical effort should be processed in a similar 
way, the findings also suggest that mental and physical effort might be processed differently 
during the choice phase, as participants were found to choose low effort options more often 
on mental effort trials than on physical effort trials. It is, however, hard to determine precisely 
what is the basis for this difference. Alternative explanations are considered in more detail in 
the general discussion in Chapter 7. 
Another hypothesis examined in this experiment was H5, which predicts that if Action 
Selection is driven by reward values participants should primarily select trials associated with 
high rewards. In line with this hypothesis participants were found to have a strong preference 
towards options associated with high rewards, regardless of whether these options required 
high or low effort. At the same time participants were found to take effort into account as 
well, showing a preference for low over high effort options. Nevertheless, effort 
considerations were found to be less important than reward considerations in this experiment. 
Finally, contrary to H6, which states that different types of outcome feedback should affect 
Action Selection differently, no differences in the choice behaviour were observed between 
groups receiving different types of feedback, suggesting that feedback might not be as 
important during choice as assumed by the V-E-D-M model. 
4.1.2 Experiment 2 (Losses) 
Experiment 2 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Attractiveness Level: High vs. Low) 
x 2 (Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Reward Valence: Gain vs. Loss) x 3 (Reward 
Feedback: Cumulative vs. Discreet vs. Simple) design. The critical manipulation was 
comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low attractiveness on choices 
associated with either mental or physical effort in two groups of participants: one trying to 
win monetary rewards (Gain group: participants from Experiment 1) and one trying to avoid 
losing them (Loss group). In contrast to Experiment 1, where options associated with high 
and low rewards were compared, in this experiment the influence of option attractiveness was 
investigated. In the Gain group High Attractiveness (HA) trials were associated with an 
opportunity to win 15p and Low Attractiveness (LA) trials with an opportunity to win 5p. In 
the Loss group HA trials were associated with potential loss of 5p, whereas LA trials were 
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associated with potential loss of 15p. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
Reward Feedback groups: Cumulative (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular 
trial + reward accumulated so far), Discreet (accuracy feedback + reward received on a 
particular trial), or Simple (accuracy feedback).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H2, which concerns the effects of gains and losses  
3) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
4) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Selection,  
5) H6, which concerns the effects of different types of feedback on choice. 
Preliminary inspection of the data revealed that participants in the Cumulative feedback 
condition did not choose the HELA trials at all, and for this reason feedback had to be 
removed from the analyses, as otherwise the model would not converge due to zero cell 
counts for categorical predictors. 
Participants’ preferences on mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 2 are presented in 
Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Percentage of times each option was chosen when it was available on mental and 
physical effort trials in Experiment 2. 
Physical effort 
Analysis of choices participants made during physical effort trials revealed significant main 
effects of Effort Level (χ2(3)=362.82, p<.001), Attractiveness (χ2(3)=470.4, p<.001) and 
Reward Valence (χ2(3)=55.57, p<.001). Interactions between Reward Valence and Effort 
Level (χ2(1)=44.30, p<.001), and Effort Level and Attractiveness (χ2(1)=11.23, p<.001) were 
also significant.  
In general participants were found to have a preference towards Low Effort trials over High 
Effort trials (β=2.54, SE=.13, z=18.94, p<.001). Participants were also found to prefer High 
Attractiveness trials over Low Attractiveness trials across experiments (β=3.32, SE=.14, 
z=24.27, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants in the Loss group 
were significantly less likely to choose High Effort trials compared to participants from the 
Gain group (β=-.85, SE=.18, z=-4.78, p<.001). At the same time, participants in the Loss 
group were significantly more likely to choose the Low Effort trials (β=.85, SE=.16, z=5.24, 
p<.001). Participants in both Gain (β=1.69, SE=.17, z=9.84, p<.001) and Loss (β=3.39, 
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SE=.20, z=17.18, p<.001) groups were shown to prefer Low Effort trials over High Effort 
trials. 
Participants were also found to be more likely to choose LEHA trials over HEHA (β=2.11, 
SE=.17, z=12.30, p<.001), LELA (β=2.89, SE=.17, z=16.76, p<.001), and HELA trials 
(β=5.86, SE=.24, z=24.82, p<.001). Furthermore, participants were found to have a 
preference for HEHA trials over LELA (β=.78, SE=.13, z=5.89, p<.001) and HELA trials 
(β=3.75, SE=.20, z=18.75, p<.001). They were also more likely to choose LELA over HELA 
trials (β=2.96, SE=.20, z=15.05, p<.001), as indicated by Figure 6.  
Mental Effort 
Analysis of choices made by participants on mental effort trials revealed significant main 
effects of Effort Level (χ2(3)=463.51, p<.001), Attractiveness (χ2(3)=505.37, p<.001), and 
Reward Valence (χ2(3)=36.23, p<.001). Interaction between Reward Valence and Effort 
Level (χ2(1)=25.24, p<.001) was also significant.  
In general participants were found to have a preference towards Low Effort trials over High 
Effort trials (β=3.04, SE=.14, z=22.12, p<.001). Participants in both Gain and Loss groups 
were also found to prefer High Attractiveness trials over Low Attractiveness trials (β=3.36, 
SE=.14, z=24.32, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants in the Loss group 
were less likely to choose High Effort trials (β=-.70, SE=.17, z=-4.03, p<.001) and more 
likely to choose Low Effort trials (β=.60, SE=.16, z=3.71, p=.001) compared to participants 
in the Gain group. Participants in both Gain (β=2.39, SE=.17, z=13.77, p<0.001) and Loss 
(β=3.69, SE=.20, z=18.05, p<.001) groups showed a preference for Low Effort trials over 
High Effort trials. 
Participants were also found to be more likely to choose LEHA trials over HEHA (β=2.84, 
SE=.18, z=15.90, p<.001), LELA (β=3.16, SE=.18, z=17.63, p<.001), and HELA trials 
(β=6.40, SE=.25, z=25.68, p<.001). Furthermore, participants were found to have a 
preference for HEHA over LELA (β=.32, SE=.12, z=2.73, p=.03) and HELA trials (β=3.56, 
SE=.20, z=17.84, p<.001). They were also more likely to choose LELA over HELA trials 
(β=3.24, SE=.20, z=16.27, p<.001), as indicated by Figure 6. 
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Physical vs. Mental effort 
Comparison of the choices made on mental and physical effort trials revealed a significant 
main effect of Effort Type (χ2(8)=105.12, p<.001), as well as significant interactions between 
Effort Type and Effort Level (χ2(4)=104.4, p<.001), Effort Type and Valence (χ2(4)=93.23, 
p<.001), and Effort Type, Valence and Effort Level (χ2(2)=93.00, p<.001). Further analyses, 
however, revealed no significant differences between choices on mental and physical effort 
trials, as indicated by Figure 6. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that: 1) increased rewards and/or reduced 
losses lead to increased willingness to choose effortful options, 2) when losses are a 
possibility, willingness to choose effortful options is reduced 3) mental and physical effort 
are processed in the same way, 4) choices are driven by monetary outcomes. 
More specifically, Experiment 2 was designed to test four hypotheses derived from the V-E-
D-M model and prior literature: H1, H2, H4 and H5. In line with H1, which states that 
increasing relative reward values should increase participants’ willingness to choose effortful 
options, participants were found to be more likely to choose high effort trials if they were 
associated with attractive monetary outcomes. This suggests that increasing the financial 
attractiveness of an effortful option, through increasing the reward or decreasing the loss 
associated with it, leads to increased likelihood that this option will be chosen. 
In accordance with H2, which asserts that participants should be more risk averse in the face 
of losses, this experiment also showed that participants from the Loss group were more likely 
to choose low effort options compared to participants from the Gain group, suggesting that 
effort is processed differently when there is a gain or loss framing.  
As far as H4 is concerned, which states that mental and physical effort should be processed in 
a similar manner, participants’ preferences were found to be the same across mental and 
physical effort trials, in line with this hypothesis. 
Furthermore, participants were found to be most likely to choose options characterized by 
high attractiveness of the monetary outcome, regardless of the amount of effort associated 
with these options. Therefore, Experiment 2 provides support for H5, which states that 
reward values, rather than effort requirements, drive choices during Action Selection. 
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4.1.3 Experiment 3 (Reliability) 
Experiment 3 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 3 (Reward Reliability: Deterministic vs. Probabilistic vs. 
Unreliable) design. The critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort 
and high vs. low reward on choices associated with either mental or physical effort in three 
groups: Deterministic (reward present on 100% of successful trials), Probabilistic (reward 
present on 75% of successful trials and 25% of unsuccessful trials), or Unreliable (reward 
present on 50% of the trials, regardless of whether they were successful or not).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H3, which concerns the effects of reward reliability  
3) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
4) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Selection. 
Participants’ preferences on mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 3 are presented in 
Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Percentage of times each option was chosen when it was available on mental and 
physical effort trials in Experiment 3. 
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Physical effort 
Analysis of the choices participants made on physical effort trials revealed significant main 
effects of Effort Level (χ2(4)=63.50, p<.001), Reward Level (χ2(2)=175.25, p<.001), and  
Reward Reliability (χ2(4)=10.65, p=.03), as well as a significant interaction between Reward 
Reliability and Effort Level (χ2(2)=10.48, p=.005).  
In general participants were found to prefer Low Effort trials over High Effort trials (β=1.49, 
SE=.20, z=7.43, p<.001). Participants were also found to choose High Reward trials much 
more often than Low Reward trials (β=3.09, SE=.21, z=14.74, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants were more likely to 
choose Low Effort trials over High Effort trials in the Deterministic (β=1.88, SE=.32, z=5.74, 
p<.001) and Unreliable (β=1.98, SE=.36, z=5.53, p<.001) conditions, but not in the 
Probabilistic condition (p=.41).  
Participants were also found to be more likely to choose LEHR trials over HEHR (β=1.38, 
SE=.28, z=4.99, p<.001), LELR (β=2.98, SE=.28, z=10.61, p<.001), and HELR trials 
(β=4.59, SE=.33, z=14.06, p<.001). Furthermore, participants were found to have a 
preference for HEHR trials over LELR (β=1.60, SE=.25, z=6.43, p<.001) and HELR trials 
(β=3.21, SE=.29, z=11.02, p<.001). They were also more likely to choose LELR over HELR 
trials (β=1.60, SE=.28, z=5.67, p<.001), as indicated by Figure 7. 
Mental Effort 
Analysis of the choices participants made on the mental effort trials revealed significant main 
effects of Effort Level (χ2(4)=74.64, p<.001), Reward Level (χ2(2)=197.22, p<.001), and 
Reward Reliability (χ2(4)=13.42, p=.009) as well as a significant interaction between Effort 
Level and Reward Reliability (χ2(2)=13.40, p=.001).  
In general participants were found to prefer Low Effort trials over High Effort trials (β=1.55, 
SE=.20, z=7.86, p<.001). Participants were also found to choose High Reward trials much 
more often than Low Reward trials (β=3.29, SE=.21, z=16.00, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants were more likely to 
choose Low Effort trials over High Effort trials in the Deterministic (β=2.31, SE=.34, z=6.87, 
p<.001) and Unreliable (β=1.77, SE=.35, z=5.09, p=.03) conditions, but not in the 
Probabilistic (p=.38) condition.  
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Participants were also found to be more likely to choose LEHR trials over HEHR (β=1.34, 
SE=.26, z=5.07, p=<.001), LELR (β=3.07, SE=.27, z=11.40, p<.001), and HELR trials 
(β=4.86, SE=.32, z=15.02, p<.001). Furthermore, participants were found to have a 
preference for HEHR trials over LELR (β=1.74, SE=.24, z=7.38, p<.001) and HELR trials 
(β=3.52, SE=.29, z=12.25, p<.001). They were also more likely to choose LELR over HELR 
trials (β=1.78, SE=.28, z=6.35, p<.001), as indicated by Figure 7. 
Physical vs. Mental effort 
Comparison of choices during mental and physical effort trials revealed a significant main 
effect of Effort Type (χ2(12)=25.02, p=.01), as well as significant interactions between Effort 
Type and Effort Level (χ2(6)=24.76, p<.001), Effort Type and Reward Reliability 
(χ2(8)=23.93, p=.002), and Effort Type, Reward Reliability and Effort Level (χ2(4)=23.76, 
p<.001). However, further analyses revealed no significant differences between choices made 
on physical and mental effort trials, as indicated by Figure 7. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that: 1) increased rewards lead to increased 
willingness to choose effortful options, 2) reward reliability does affect choices, but only 
when rewards are probabilistic 3) mental and physical effort are processed in the same way, 
and 4) choices are driven by rewards. 
More specifically, in Experiment 3 four hypotheses derived from the V-E-D-M model were 
investigated: H1, H3, H4, and H5. In line with H1, the results of this experiment suggested 
that increased incentives lead to increased willingness to choose effortful actions, as 
participants were found to be more likely to choose high effort trials when they were 
associated with high rewards. 
Results of this experiment do not, however, support H3, which predicted positive relationship 
between the probability of obtaining rewards and the willingness to choose high effort 
options. Participants in Experiment 3 were found to be more likely to choose low effort trials 
over high effort trials when the reward-predicting cues experienced during the Training phase 
were deterministic, i.e. they reliably predicted the presence of a reward after a successful 
trial. Participants were also more likely to choose low effort trials compared to high effort 
trials when rewards experienced during the Training phase were unreliable. When acquisition 
of reward after effort exertion could not be predicted, however, but a link between effort 
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exertion and reward acquisition could be suspected (i.e. in the Probabilisitic condition where 
the reasoning might be as follows: ‘I am more likely to get a reward on a successful trial, and 
I am more likely to be successful when I invest more effort, and so it follows that I should be 
more likely to get a reward when I invest more effort’), participants were found to choose 
high and low effort trials equally often.  
No differences between choices regarding mental effort and choices regarding physical effort 
were observed in Experiment 3, in line with H4, which states that these two types of effort 
should be processed in a similar way. 
As far as the question of whether reward values or effort requirements drive Action Selection, 
(H5) is concerned, the results of this experiment suggest that reward values play a more 
important role, as participants were found to have a strong preference for high reward trials, 
regardless of the amount of effort they required. 
4.1.4 Experiment 4 (Increased Incentives) 
Experiment 4 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Reward Magnitude: Large Rewards vs. Small 
Rewards) x 3 (Reward Reliability: Deterministic vs. Probabilistic vs. Unreliable) design. The 
critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low 
reward on choices associated with either mental or physical effort in two groups: one exerting 
effort for small rewards (15p and 5p) (Small Rewards group: participants from Experiment 3) 
and one exerting effort for large rewards (30p and 15p) (Large Rewards group). Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the three groups: Deterministic (reward present on 100% of 
successful trials), Probabilistic (reward present on 75% of successful trials and 25% of 
unsuccessful trials), or Unreliable (reward present on 50% of the trials, regardless of whether 
they were successful or not).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative as well as absolute reward values 
and effort,  
2) H3, which concerns the effects of reward reliability,  
3) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
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4) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Selection. 
Participants’ preferences on mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 4 are presented in 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Percentage of times each option was chosen when it was available on mental and 
physical effort trials in Experiment 4. 
Physical effort 
Analysis of choices participants made on physical effort trials revealed significant main 
effects of Effort Level (χ2(4)=88.60, p<.001), Reward Level (χ2(4)=304.40, p<.001), and 
Reward Reliability (χ2(6)=16.75, p=.01). Interactions between Reward Reliability and Effort 
Level (χ2(2)=10.23, p=.006) and Reward Reliability and Reward Level (χ2(2)=8.11, p=.02) 
were also found to be significant. 
In general participants were found to prefer Low Effort trials over High Effort trials (β=1.35, 
SE=.15, z=8.88, p<.001). Participants were also found to choose High Reward trials much 
more often than Low Reward trials (β=3.13, SE=.16, z=19.60, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants in the Deterministic 
(β=3.24, SE=.26, z=12.38, p<.001), Probabilistic (β=2.56, SE=.25, z=10.19, p<.001), and 
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Random (β=3.58, SE=.28, z=12.93, p<.001) conditions were significantly more likely to 
choose the High Reward options over Low Reward options. Participants in the Deterministic 
(β=1.82, SE=.26, z=7.03, p<.001), Probabilistic (β=.72, SE=.25, z=2.94, p=.04), and Random 
(β=1.52, SE=.27, z=5.58, p<.001) conditions were also more likely to choose Low Effort 
trials over High Effort trials. 
Participants were also found to be more likely to choose LEHR trials over HEHR (β=1.19, 
SE=.21, z=5.67, p<.001), LELR (β=2.96, SE=.21, z=13.89, p<.001), and HELR trials 
(β=4.48, SE=.25, z=18.18, p<.001). Furthermore, participants were found to have a 
preference for HEHR trials over LELR (β=1.77, SE=.19, z=9.25, p<.001) and HELR trials 
(β=3.29, SE=.22, z=14.84, p<.001). They were also more likely to choose LELR over HELR 
trials (β=1.52, SE=.22, z=7.06, p<.001), as indicated by Figure 8. 
Mental effort 
Analysis of participants choices during mental effort trials revealed significant main effects 
of Effort Level (χ2(7)=156.62, p<.001), Reward Level (χ2(4)=330.39, p<.001), and Reward 
Reliability (χ2(6)=21.98, p=.001). Interactions between Reward Reliability and Effort Level 
(χ2(2)=18.63, p<.001) and Reward Reliability and Reward Level (χ2(2)=6.02, p=.05) were 
also significant.  
In general participants were found to prefer Low Effort trials over High Effort trials (β=1.85, 
SE=.15, z=12.11, p<.001). Participants were also found to choose High Reward trials much 
more often than Low Reward trials (β=3.26, SE=.16, z=20.51, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated participants in the Deterministic 
(β=3.33, SE=.27, z=12.56, p<.001), Probabilistic (β=2.80, SE=.25, z=11.38, p<.001), and 
Random (β=3.66, SE=.28, z=13.27, p<.001) conditions were significantly more likely to 
choose the High Reward options compared to Low Reward options. Participants in the 
Deterministic (β=2.46, SE=.26, z=9.31, p<.001), Probabilistic (β=1.00, SE=.24, z=4.16, 
p<.001), and Random (β=2.12, SE=.27, z=7.77, p<.001) conditions were also more likely to 
choose Low Effort trials over High Effort trials. Moreover, participants in the Probabilistic 
condition were significantly more likely to choose High Effort trials (β=.72, SE=.25, z=2.90, 
p=.04) and significantly less likely to choose Low Effort (β=-.74, SE=.24, z=3.07, p=.03) 
compared to participants in the Deterministic condition, but not the Unreliable condition. No 
significant differences in preferences between participants in the Deterministic and Random 
conditions were observed.  
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Participants were also found to be more likely to choose LEHR trials over HEHR (β=1.61, 
SE=.21, z=7.84, p<.001), LELR (β=3.02, SE=.21, z=14.40, p<.001), and HELR trials 
(β=5.12, SE=.26, z=20.00, p<.001). Furthermore, participants were found to have a 
preference for HEHR trials over LELR (β=1.41, SE=.18, z=7.84, p<.001) and HELR trials 
(β=3.51, SE=.22, z=15.69, p<.001). They were also more likely to choose LELR over HELR 
trials (β=2.10, SE=.22, z=9.59, p<.001), as indicated by Figure 8. 
Physical vs. Mental effort 
Comparison of the choices during mental and physical effort trials revealed a significant 
interaction between Effort Type and Effort Level (χ2(1)=5.44, p=.02). Further analyses 
revealed, however, no significant differences between mental and physical effort trials across 
effort levels, as indicated by Figure 8. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 4 suggest that: 1) increasing relative, but not absolute, 
reward values leads to increased willingness to choose effortful options, 2) reward reliability 
does affect choices, but only when rewards are probabilistic 3) mental and physical effort are 
processed in the same way, 4) choices are driven by rewards. 
More specifically, in Experiment 4 four hypotheses derived from the V-E-D-M model were 
investigated: H1, H3, H4, and H5. In line with H1, which suggests that increasing the relative 
as well as absolute values of rewards available within a task should lead to increased 
willingness to choose effortful options, participants were found to be more likely to choose 
high effort trials if they were associated with relatively high rewards. However, contrary to 
this hypothesis, results of Experiment 4 suggest that increasing the absolute values of rewards 
did not have the same effect. In general participants were found to make similar choices 
regardless of whether they experienced Small Rewards or Large Rewards during the task. 
This result, in turn, suggests that participants utilise the relative, rather than absolute values 
of rewards when deciding between options.  
As far as H3 is concerned, results of Experiment 4 show that reliability of rewards can 
potentially influence effort based decision-making process, although not in the way suggested 
by this hypothesis. H3 assumes that increasing reward reliability should lead to increased 
willingness to choose effortful options. In this experiment participants were found to be more 
likely to choose high effort trials when rewards were probabilistic compared to when they 
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were deterministic (albeit on mental effort trials only).  Therefore, probabilistic rewards were 
associated with a greater willingness to choose effortful options, contrary to H3. 
Furthermore, no significant differences between choices on mental and physical effort trials 
were observed, in line with H4, which states that processing of these two types of effort 
should be similar. 
Finally, in line with H5, which predicts that if Action Selection is driven by reward values 
participants should mainly choose trials associated with high rewards, participants in 
Experiment 4 showed a clear preference for high reward trials, regardless of the amount of 
effort they were associated with. This suggests that reward values were the most important 
factor in determining participants’ choices. 
4.1.5 Experiment 5 (Immediate Execution) 
Experiment 5 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Timing of Execution: Immediate Execution vs. 
Delayed Execution) x 3 (Reward Feedback: Cumulative vs. Discreet vs. Simple) design. The 
critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low 
reward on choices associated with either mental or physical effort in two groups of 
participants: one required to execute their choices immediately after they were made 
(Immediate Execution group), and one executing their choices after a delay (Delayed 
Execution group: participants from Experiment 1). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the three Reward Feedback groups: Cumulative (accuracy feedback + reward received 
on a particular trial + reward accumulated so far), Discreet (accuracy feedback + reward 
received on a particular trial), or Simple (accuracy feedback).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
3) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Selection,  
4) H6, which concerns the effects of different types of feedback on choice,  
5) H7, which concerns the effects of delaying Action Execution. 
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Participants’ preferences on mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 5 are presented in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Percentage of times each option was chosen when it was available during mental 
and physical effort trials in Experiment 5. 
Physical effort 
Analysis of choices made during physical effort trials in Experiment 2 revealed significant 
main effects of Effort Level (χ2(2)=170.17, p<.001), Reward Level (χ2(2)=462.22, p<.001), 
and an interaction between Effort Level and Reward Level (χ2(1)=14.42, p<.001).  
In line with the pattern indicated in Figure 9, there was an overall preference for Low Effort 
over High Effort options (β=1.59, SE=.12, z=13.13, p<.001), an overall preference for High 
Reward over Low Reward options (β=3.46, SE=.13, z=27.12, p<.001), but also an interaction 
between Effort Level and Reward Level. 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test showed that participants were more likely to 
choose LEHR trials over HEHR (β=1.14, SE=.16, z=7.21, p<.001), LELR (β=3.01, SE=.16, 
z=18.85, p<.001), and HELR trials (β=5.04, SE=.21, z=24.18, p<.001). Furthermore, 
participants were found to have a preference for HEHR trials over LELR (β=1.87, SE=.13, 
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z=13.89, p<.001) and HELR trials (β=3.91, SE=.19, z=20.78, p<.001). They were also more 
likely to choose LELR over HELR trials (β=2.04, SE=.18, z=11.27, p<.001), as indicated in 
Figure 9. There was no difference between the choices made when the execution was delayed 
and when it was immediate.   
Mental Effort 
Analysis of choices made on mental effort trials revealed significant main effects of Effort 
Level (χ2(2)=326.57, p<.001) and Reward Level (χ2(2)=491.55, p<.001).  
In line with the pattern indicated in Figure 9, there was an overall preference for Low Effort 
over High Effort options (β=2.36, SE=.12, z=19.25, p<.001), and an overall preference for 
High Reward over Low Reward options (β=3.40, SE=.13, z=27.12, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test found that participants were more likely to 
choose LEHR trials over HEHR (β=1.16, SE=.16, z=13.34, p<.001), LELR (β=3.20, SE=.16, 
z=19.49, p<.001), and HELR trials (β=5.76, SE=.22, z=25.86, p<.001). Furthermore, 
participants were found to have a preference for HEHR trials over LELR (β=1.04, SE=.11, 
z=9.53, p<.001) and HELR trials (β=3.59, SE=.18, z=19.61, p<.001). They were also more 
likely to choose LELR over HELR trials (β=2.56, SE=.18, z=14.08, p<.001), as demonstrated 
in Figure 9. There was no difference between the choices made when the execution was 
delayed and when it was immediate. 
Physical vs. Mental effort 
Comparison of the choices made on mental and physical effort trials revealed a significant 
main effect Effort Type (χ2(2)=30.52, p<.001), as well as a significant interaction between 
Effort Type and Effort Level (χ2(1)=30.52, p<.001).  
Further analyses using Tukey HSD revealed that participants were less likely to choose High 
Effort trials (β=-.44, SE=.11, z=-4.14, p<.001) and more likely to choose Low Effort trials 
(β=.38, SE=.10, z=3.76, p=.001) on mental effort trials compared to physical effort trials, as 
indicated by Figure 9. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 5 suggest that: 1) increased relative reward values lead 
to increased willingness to choose effortful options, 2) mental and physical effort are 
processed differently during Action Selection, 3) choices are driven by rewards, 4), feedback 
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does not influence the choices people make, and 5) delayed execution does not affect the 
choices people make. 
More specifically, in Experiment 5 five hypotheses derived from the V-E-D-M model were 
investigated: H1, H4, H5, H6, and H7. In line with the results of the previous studies 
described in this chapter, the findings from this experiment supported H1, which suggests 
that increasing reward values leads to increased willingness to choose effortful actions, as 
participants were found to be more likely to choose high effort trials if they were associated 
with high rewards.  
Contrary to H4, which declares that mental and physical effort should be processed in a 
similar way, differences between choices regarding mental and physical effort were observed 
in this experiment. Participants showed a greater preference for low effort trials when mental 
effort was involved. Nevertheless, it is hard to determine precisely what the basis for this 
difference is. Alternative explanations are considered in more detail in the general discussion 
in Chapter 7. 
As far as H5 is concerned, results of Experiment 5 supported the claim that during Action 
Selection choices are driven by reward values. Participants were found to have the strongest 
preference for the options associated with high rewards, regardless of the amount of effort 
required to obtain them.  
Type of feedback present during the task was shown not to have any effect on the choices 
people made during this experiment, contrary to H6, which predicts that different types of 
outcome feedback should affect Action Selection differently.  
Furthermore, no differences were found between choices of participants who experienced 
immediate and delayed Action Execution, contrary to H7, which states that delaying Action 
Execution should lead to increased willingness to choose effortful actions.  
4.1.6 Experiment 6 (PD study) 
Experiment 6 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Group: PD vs. HC) design. The critical manipulation 
was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low reward on choices 
associated with either mental or physical effort in PD patients and HCs.  
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These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
3) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Selection,  
4) H8, which concerns the effects of altered dopaminergic transmission on choice. 
Participants’ preferences on mental and physical effort trials are presented in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Percentage of times each option was chosen when it was available on mental and 
physical effort trials in Experiment 6. 
Physical effort 
Analysis of choices participants made on physical effort trials revealed significant main 
effects of Effort Level (χ2(3)=46.59, p<.001,) and Reward Level (χ2(2)=105.16, p<.001). 
Interactions between Effort Level and Reward Level (χ2(1)=9.60, p=.001) and between 
Group and Effort Level (χ2(1)=3.86, p=.05) were also significant.  
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In line with the pattern indicated in Figure 10, there was an overall preference for Low Effort 
over High Effort options (β=.82, SE=.13, z=6.54, p<.001), an overall preference for High 
Reward over Low Reward options (β=1.52, SE=.13, z=12.04, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants were more likely to 
choose LEHR  trials over LELR (β=1.12, SE=.17, z=6.64, p<.001) and HELR trials (β=2.33, 
SE=.19, z=12.54, p<.001), but not HEHR trials (p=.06). Furthermore, participants were found 
to have a preference for HEHR over LELR (β=.70, SE=.17, z=4.14, p<.001) and HELR trials 
(β=1.91, SE=.18, z=10.34, p<.001). They were also more likely to choose LELR over HELR 
trials (β=1.21, SE=.18, z=6.58, p<.001), as indicated by Figure 10. No significant differences 
between PD patients and HCs were observed. 
Mental Effort 
Analysis of choices made by participants during mental effort trials revealed significant main 
effects of Effort Level (χ2(2)=60.66, p<.001) and Reward Level (χ2(2)=99.89, p<.001). 
Interaction between Effort Level and Reward Level was also significant (χ2(1)=6.33, p=.01).  
In line with the pattern indicated in Figure 10, there was an overall preference for Low Effort 
over High Effort options (β=1.07, SE=.13, z=8.28, p<.001), and an overall preference for 
High Reward over Low Reward options (β=1.48, SE=.13, z=11.32, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants were more likely to 
choose LEHR trials over HEHR (β=.75, SE=.17, z=4.39, p<.001), LELR (β=1.16, SE=.17, 
z=6.66, p<.001), and HELR trials (β=2.56, SE=.20, z=12.90, p<.001). Furthermore, 
participants were found to have a preference for HEHR trials over HELR trials (β=1.81, 
SE=.19, z=9.52, p<.001), but not LELR trials (p=.06). They were also more likely to choose 
LELR over HELR (β=1.40, SE=.19, z=7.33, p<.001) trials, as indicated by Figure 10. 
Physical vs. Mental effort 
Additional analysis comparing choices of participants on mental and physical effort trials 
revealed no effect of Effort Type, indicating that there were no significant differences 
between choices made on mental and physical effort trials, in line with Figure 10. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 6 suggest that: 1) increased relative reward values lead 
to increased willingness to choose effortful options, 2) mental and physical effort are 
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processed in a similar way during Action Selection, 3) choices are driven by rewards, 4), 
dopamine might not be crucial for overcoming effort costs during Action Selection. 
More specifically, in Experiment 6 four hypotheses derived from the V-E-D-M model were 
investigated: H1, H4, H5, and H8. In line with the results of the previous studies described in 
this chapter, results of Experiment 6 supported H1, which states that increasing relative 
reward values should lead to increased willingness to choose effortful trials. Both PD patients 
and HCs were found to be more likely to choose high effort trials when they were associated 
with high rewards. Results of this experiment also supported H4, which predicts that mental 
and physical effort should be processed in a similar way, as no differences between choices 
made on mental and physical effort trials were found. 
Furthermore, results of Experiment 6 suggested that Action Selection during effort-based 
decision-making tasks is driven primarily by reward values, and not effort requirements (H5), 
as participants in Experiment 6 were found to have a strong preference for high reward 
options regardless of the amount of effort associated with them. 
In line with a large number of studies indicating an important role of dopamine for effort-
based decision-making, it has been assumed that decreased dopaminergic transmission 
associated with PD should lead to decreased willingness to choose effortful options in PD 
patients (H8). However, no differences between PD patients and HCs were observed in 
Experiment 6, suggesting that dopamine might not be crucial during Action Selection stage of 
effort-based decision-making. 
4.2 General Discussion 
The V-E-D-M model makes specific assumptions about how effort and rewards affect effort-
based decision-making. For example, it assumes that manipulating reward 
magnitude/valence/reliability, or the type of effort required has the potential to affect 
behaviour during Action Selection and Action Execution stages of decision-making. It also 
asserts that changing the type of feedback available or delaying the presentation of feedback 
impacts decision-making behaviours. One of the methods of establishing the validity of these 
assumptions is investigating the choices people make during effort-based decision-making 
process. Such investigations were the focus of the six experiments described in this chapter, 
providing an important insight into the effects of different manipulations on choices made 
during effort-based decision-making. Six areas of interest derived from the V-E-D-M model 
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were investigated in these experiments: 1) Reward manipulations, 2) Effort manipulations, 3) 
Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection and Action Execution, 4) Outcome 
feedback, 5) Delayed Action Execution, 6) Neural underpinnings. 
The rest of this chapter will survey the general pattern of findings across the six experiments 
with respect to the six areas of interest listed above, describing the implications of these 
findings for the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model. 
1) Reward manipulations 
a) Effects of manipulating reward magnitude on choice 
One of the implicit assumptions of the V-E-D-M model is that increasing reward magnitude 
should lead to increased willingness to choose effortful actions associated with higher 
rewards. This assumption was supported in all six experiments. However, this increased 
willingness to exert effort for rewards seemed to depend on the relative difference between 
rewards available within the task, rather than absolute monetary values of rewards. These 
findings suggest that, as far as the choice behaviour is concerned, increasing the relative, but 
not absolute, value of rewards leads to increased willingness to choose effortful options.  
b) Effects of manipulating reward valence on choice 
Another assumption which the V-E-D-M model makes is that manipulating reward valence 
should affect the choices people make during an effort-based decision-making task, reducing 
people’s willingness to choose effortful options in the face of losses. This assumption has 
largely been confirmed by the results of Experiment 2, which found that participants in the 
Loss group were more likely to choose low effort trials compared to participants in the Gain 
group.  
c) Effects of manipulating reward reliability on choice 
In addition to reward magnitude and valence, reward reliability is also supposed to have an 
impact on the choices people make, according to the V-E-D-M model. More specifically, the 
model assumes that willingness to exert effort should increase with reward reliability. This 
claim was investigated in Experiments 3 and 4. In general, the findings of these experiments 
do not support this hypothesis. They suggest that when rewards are deterministic or random, 
participants concentrate more on the amount of effort that is required to obtain them. When 
the rewards are probabilistic, however, participants seem to be less concerned with the effort 
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requirements. This is possibly because, having limited experience with the task, participants 
assume that the probability of obtaining a reward might be associated with the amount of 
effort put in during the task, and so are more willing to choose high effort options to 
maximize the rewards obtained.  
2) Effort manipulations 
The V-E-D-M model assumes that manipulating the type of effort (mental or physical) that is 
required during a task should not have a big impact on the choices people make, as mental 
and physical effort are processed in a similar manner throughout the stages of effort-based 
decision-making. This assumption was investigated in the six experiments described above. 
The findings of these experiments were inconclusive. Therefore, the question of whether 
mental and physical effort are processed in a similar way during effort-based decision-
making requires further investigations. 
3) Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection and Action Execution 
Another question regarding the influence of reward and effort on effort-based decision-
making is: which one of these two factors is more important when making choices between 
options? This issue was investigated in all of the experiments described in this chapter. In 
these experiments reward has been found to be the most important factor driving Action 
Selection, determining the choices participants made regardless of the circumstances. These 
results suggest that when people need to decide between options that require exerting effort 
for monetary rewards, the factor that will influence their choices the most is the reward value. 
4) Outcome feedback  
Another assumption that V-E-D-M model makes is that manipulating the type of feedback 
available at the end of each trial should have an effect on the effort-based decision-making 
process. This assumption has not been supported by the results of Experiments 1 and 5, 
which included feedback manipulations, as no effect of feedback was found in these 
experiments. Therefore, it seems that changing the amount of outcome information about 
rewards does not influence the choices people make, contrary to what has been assumed by 
the V-E-D-M model. 
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5) Delayed Action Execution 
According to the V-E-D-M model, experiencing the outcome of the decision-making process 
serves as a basis for updating representations on which future choices are based. Preventing 
the experience of an outcome after a choice is made should prevent learning, potentially 
influencing future choices. This assumption has been tested in Experiment 5, in which the 
choices of participants experiencing immediate or delayed Action Execution were compared. 
No differences between the two groups were found. Such result suggests that learning might 
not influence decision-making as strongly as assumed by the V-E-D-M model, at least within 
the limited learning experience available in this particular task. 
6) Neural underpinnings 
The V-E-D-M model assumes that neurotransmitter dopamine plays an important role during 
all stages of effort-based decision-making. Direct implication of this assumption is that in PD 
patients, in whom dopamine levels in the brain are depleted, all stages of decision-making 
should be affected. This assumption was tested in Experiment 6. No differences between 
choices made by PD patients and HCs were found, suggesting that dopamine might not be as 
important when making choices regarding effort as previously thought. It has to be noted, 
however, that PD patients in this particular experiment were tested on dopaminergic 
medication, which could potentially affect the results.  
4.3 Summary 
For the most part, results of the studies presented above support the key hypotheses of the V-
E-D-M model (for example regarding the effects of increasing relative reward values, 
changing reward valence, or manipulating effort type) which is encouraging. They also help 
to clarify certain assumptions of the model. However, these investigations do not provide the 
full picture, as they do not inform about the effects of manipulating reward, effort and 
feedback characteristics on effort exertion during Action Execution. Therefore, in the next 
two chapters the effects of changing reward magnitude, valence, and reliability, as well as the 
effort type and feedback on effort exertion during Action Execution will be examined, to 
provide further information regarding the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model. 
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CHAPTER 5: Experimental Studies - Effort Exertion 
According to the V-E-D-M model of effort-based decision-making, manipulating different 
aspects of reward and effort should potentially affect both the choices people make and the 
amount of effort they exert during a task. Examining people’s choices during a novel effort-
based decision-making task, as described in Chapter 4, provides partial support for this 
assumption. However, to get the full picture of how changing aspects of effort and reward 
affects decision-making, effort exertion during the task execution stage needs to be examined 
as well. Therefore, in this chapter the effects of manipulating reward, effort, and feedback on 
the amount of effort participants put in in a newly developed effort-based decision-making 
task were investigated. The specific areas covered by these investigations were: 1) Reward 
manipulations, 2) Effort manipulations, 3) Importance of effort/reward during Action 
Selection and Action Execution, 4) Outcome feedback, 5) Delayed Action Execution, 6) 
Neural underpinnings. 
As far as Reward manipulations are concerned, in this chapter the effects of a) increasing 
relative as well as absolute reward values, b) changing reward valence (from gain to loss), 
and c) changing reward reliability on participants’ grip strength (physical effort) and response 
times (mental effort) were examined. Furthermore, participants’ performance on mental and 
physical effort trials was compared, to investigate the effects of Effort manipulations. 
Importance of effort/reward during Action Execution was also examined through 
investigating participants’ effort exertion on trials associated with different levels of effort 
and reward. The effects of different types of Outcome feedback, as well as the effects of 
Delaying Action Execution on the amount of effort participants put in were explored as 
well. Finally, the role of dopamine during Action Execution stage is investigated, in an effort 
to explore the Neural underpinnings of effort-based decision-making. 
These topics were investigated in six studies which used the novel effort-based decision-
making task described in Chapter 3. The task consisted of three phases: Training phase, 
Choice phase, and Execution phase. This chapter focuses specifically on participants’ 
performance during the Execution phase. During this phase participants were asked to 
squeeze the hand grip device (physical effort) or to solve simple mathematical equations 
(mental effort) to obtain small monetary rewards (see Figure 11). The amount of effort and 
reward on each trial depended on the choices participants made during the Choice phase. On 
the physical effort trials effort exertion was measured through recording the grip strength of 
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participants, with stronger grips signifying higher effort exertion. On the mental effort trials 
participants’ response times were examined. Slower response times were assumed to be 
associated with higher effort exertion. Participants’ performance was analysed using LMMs 
(physical effort) and GLMMs assuming gamma or inverse distributions (mental effort). The 
results of these analyses are presented in this chapter.  
 
Figure 11. Example of trials participants had to complete during the Execution phase 
The specific hypotheses investigated were: 
H1: Increasing incentives available in a task should increase the amount of effort people exert 
through increasing the grip strength on physical effort trials and prolonging response times on 
mental effort trials. This increase should be observed for both the relative and absolute 
reward values. 
H2: Participants in the Loss group should exert more effort than participants in the Gain 
group, to avoid losing money. 
H3: Positive relationship between the probability of obtaining rewards and the amount of 
effort exerted should be observed. 
H4: Even though direct comparison of mental and physical effort during the Action 
Execution stage is not possible due to the use of different measures to examine these two 
102 
 
types of effort, the pattern of results observed for mental and physical effort should be 
similar. 
H5: If behaviour during Action Execution is driven by reward values, effort exerted by 
participants should be proportional to the reward value available during each trial. If, 
however, it is driven by effort requirements, effort exertion should be proportional to the 
effort level required. 
H6: Type of feedback present during a task should have an effect on the amount of effort 
people exert during a task, with participants exerting the most effort on cumulative feedback 
trials, followed by discreet and simple feedback trials. 
H7: Participants experiencing the outcome of their decisions immediately should invest 
different amount of effort compared to participants who experience the outcome after a delay. 
H8: Depletion of dopamine levels in PD should lead to reduced effort exertion (reduced grip 
strength and shortened response times) on mental and physical effort trials. 
In Chapter 5 the results of studies designed to investigate these hypotheses are examined and 
their implications are discussed in the context of the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model. 
Summary of the findings of different experiments is presented in Table 6. 
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5.1 Results 
In each of the following sections experimental design is described first, followed by the 
results from the physical effort trials, mental effort trials, and the comparison of the two types 
of trials. At the end of each section the findings are discussed in the context of the 
experimental hypotheses. 
Performance of participants on different types of trials (HEHR, HELR, LEHR, LELR) is 
presented separately for mental and physical effort in Appendix B. 
5.1.1 Experiment 1 (Gains) 
Experiment 1 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 3 (Reward Feedback: Cumulative vs. Discreet vs. 
Simple) design. The critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort 
and high vs. low reward on grip strength (physical effort) and response times (mental effort). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three Reward Feedback groups: 
Cumulative (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular trial + reward accumulated 
so far), Discreet (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular trial), or Simple 
(accuracy feedback).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
3) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution,  
4) H6, which concerns the effects of different types of feedback on effort exertion. 
Participants’ performance on physical and mental effort trials is presented in Figure 12. 
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a) Response times on mental effort trials b) Grip strength on physical effort trials 
Figure 12. Performance on mental (a) and physical (b) effort trials in Experiment 1.
Physical Effort 
Analysis of the grip strength during physical effort trials revealed a significant main effect of 
Effort Level (χ2(1)=98.12, p<.001), as participants were found to squeeze less hard when the 
effort was low (β=47.77, SE=3.65, t(99.33)=13.08, p<.001). 
Mental Effort 
Analysis of response times during mental effort trials revealed a significant main effect of 
Effort Level (χ2(1)=193.61, p<.001), as participants were found to be slower on High Effort 
trials (β=-.58, SE=.03, z=-20.06, p<.001). 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
The pattern of results during the execution of mental and physical effort was found to be 
similar, with participants found to exert less effort on Low Effort trials regardless of the type 
of effort required, as indicated by Figure 12. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that: 1) increased reward values do not 
translate into increased effort exertion, 2) mental and physical effort are processed in a 
similar way during Action Execution, 3) effort exertion is driven by effort requirements, and 
4) feedback does not have a strong influence on effort exertion. 
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More specifically, Experiment 1 was designed to investigate four hypotheses derived from 
the V-E-D-M model: H1, H4, H5 and H6. According to H1, increasing the incentive value 
should increase the amount of effort people exert, increasing the grip strength on physical 
effort trials and prolonging response times on mental effort trials. However, no such increase 
in effort exertion in response to high rewards was observed in Experiment 1. This suggests 
that reward values might not have as strong influence on effort exertion as assumed by the V-
E-D-M model. The same pattern of results was observed on mental and physical effort trials, 
suggesting that these two types of effort are processed in a similar way during effort exertion, 
in line with H4. 
Furthermore, according to H5, if behaviour during Action Execution is driven by reward 
values, effort exerted by participants in Experiment 1 should be proportional to the reward 
value available during each trial. However, no such effect was observed in this experiment. 
Instead, the results of Experiment 1 point to the dominant role of effort requirements in 
determining effort exertion, as participants were found to exert more effort on high effort 
trials, regardless of the amount of reward associated with them.  
Contrary to H6, which predicts that different types of feedback should affect effort exertion 
differently, the type of feedback present during the task was found not to have any effect on 
the effort exerted during the task. This suggests that the effects of feedback on effort-based 
decision-making might be less pronounced than assumed by the V-E-D-M model. 
5.1.2 Experiment 2 (Losses) 
Experiment 2 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Stakes Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs Physical) x 2 (Reward Valence: Gain vs. Loss) x 3 (Reward 
Feedback: Cumulative vs. Discreet vs. Simple) design. The critical manipulation was 
comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low stakes on grip strength (physical 
effort trials) and response times (mental effort trials) in two groups of participants: one trying 
to win monetary rewards (Gain group: participants from Experiment 1) and one trying to 
avoid losing them (Loss group). In contrast to Experiment 1, where options associated with 
high and low rewards were compared, in this experiment the influence of option stake was 
investigated. In the Gain group High Stake (HS) trials were associated with an opportunity to 
win 15p and Low Stakes (LS) trials with an opportunity to win 5p. In the Loss group HS 
trials were associated with potential loss of 15p, whereas LS trials were associated with 
potential loss of 5p. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three Reward 
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Feedback groups: Cumulative (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular trial + 
reward accumulated so far), Discreet (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular 
trial), or Simple (accuracy feedback).   
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H2, which concerns the effects of gains and losses,  
3) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
4) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution,  
5) H6, which concerns the effects of different types of feedback on effort exertion. 
Since participants in the Cumulative feedback condition did not choose the options associated 
with high effort and a potential loss of 15p at all, feedback had to be removed from the 
analyses, as otherwise the model would not converge due to zero cell counts for categorical 
predictors. 
Participants’ performance on physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 2 is presented in 
Figure 13. 
a) Response times on mental effort trials b) Grip strength on physical effort trials 
Figure 13. Performance on mental (a) and physical (b) effort trials in Experiment 2.
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Physical Effort 
Analysis of grip strength during physical effort trials revealed significant main effects of 
Effort Level (χ2(2)=234.44, p<.001) and Stakes Level (χ2(2)=14.43, p<.001). Interaction 
between Effort Level and Stakes Level was also significant (χ2(1)=9.96, p=.002).  
In general, participants were found to squeeze harder on High Effort trials compared to Low 
Effort trials (β=-43.38, SE=2.08, t(203.71)=-20.89, p=.001), and to squeeze harder on the 
High Stakes trials compared to Low Stakes trials (β=-6.34, SE=2.15, t(214.44)=-2.95, 
p=.004). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants squeezed harder on 
High Stakes compared to Low Stakes trials when effort was high (β=-13.14, SE=3.44, 
t(222.03)=-3.82, p=.001), but not low (p=.99). Participants also squeezed harder on High 
Effort trials compared to Low Effort trials when the stakes were high (β=-50.18, SE=3.06, 
t(210.43)=-16.37, p<.001) and when they were low (β=-36.58, SE=2.91, t(207.93)=-12.58, 
p<.001). 
Mental Effort 
Analysis of response times during mental effort trials revealed main effects of Effort Level 
(χ2(3)=369.41, p<.001), Stakes Level (χ2(3)=22.30, p<.001) and Reward Valence 
(χ2(3)=57.40, p<.001). Interactions between Effort Level and Stakes Level (χ2(1)=6.66, 
p=.01) and Reward Valence and Stakes Level (χ2(1)=3.96, p=.05) were also significant. 
In general, participants were found to respond slower on High Effort trials compared to Low 
Effort trials (β=0.84, SE=.03, z=28.35, p=.001), but to be equally fast on the High Stakes 
trials compared to Low Stakes trials (p=.09). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants were significantly 
slower on High Effort trials compared to Low Effort trials regardless of whether the stakes 
were high (β=.75, SE=.05, z=16.16, p<.001) or low (β=.92, SE=.04, z=21.28, p<.001). 
Participants were also found to be slower on High Stakes trials compared to Low Stakes trials 
when the effort required was low (β=.15, SE=.03, z=4.27, p<.001), but not high (p=.96). In 
addition, participants were found to be significantly slower in the Losses experiment, 
regardless of whether the stakes were high (β=.60, SE=.07, z=8.74, p<.001) or low (β=.48, 
SE=.07, z=7.19, p<.001). 
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Physical vs. Mental effort 
Participants were found to react differently to High Stakes trials when different types of effort 
were required, investing more effort on High Stakes than Low Stakes trials when effort was 
high on physical effort trials, but investing more effort on High Stakes compared to Low 
Stakes trials when effort was low on mental effort trials. Secondly, mental effort was found to 
be somewhat more sensitive to the valence manipulation than physical effort, as participants 
were found to put in more effort when they were facing losses, rather than wins on mental 
effort trials. No such effect was observed on the physical effort trials. Therefore, inspection 
of the pattern of effort exertion during physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 2 
indicates that these two types of effort might be processed differently during effort exertion. 
Discussion  
In general, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that: 1) increasing the monetary stakes can 
lead to increased effort exertion, 2) when losses are a possibility, effort exertion can increase, 
but only on mental effort trials 3) mental and physical effort seem to be processed in different 
ways, 4) effort exertion is driven primarily by effort requirements. 
More specifically, Experiment 2 was set up to investigate five hypotheses derived from the 
V-E-D-M model: H1, H2, H4, H5, and H6. As far as H1 is concerned, which assumes that 
increasing the amount of money at stake should lead to increased effort exertion, the results 
of this experiment were mixed. On the physical effort trials increasing the stakes led to 
increased effort exertion when effort required was high, but not low. On the mental effort 
trials, on the other hand, participants were found to put in more effort for high stakes when 
effort required was low, but not high. Possible explanations for such pattern of results will be 
discussed in the general discussion in Chapter 7. 
Furthermore, participants facing potential losses were found to put in more mental effort than 
participants facing potential gains. This result suggests that participants in the Loss group 
were more risk averse than participants in the Gain group, in line with H2, which states that 
participants in the Loss group should exert more effort to reduce the risk of failure. 
Nevertheless, this effect was limited to mental effort trials, which suggest that people 
experiencing losses might not be risk averse in all circumstances. 
Differences in the pattern of performance on the mental and physical effort trials observed in 
Experiment 2 suggest that mental and physical effort might be processed differently during 
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the Action Execution, contrary to H4, which states that these two types of effort should be 
processed in a similar way. Further consideration of this can be found in Chapter 7.  
As far as the role of reward level and effort requirements in driving effort exertion during 
Action Execution is concerned (H5), the results seem to suggest that effort requirements are 
the one consistent factor determining the amount of effort put in during the trials in different 
task set ups. Nevertheless, monetary outcomes also seem to play a role to some extent, as 
participants were found to increase their effort expenditure on high stakes trials in certain 
circumstances (e.g. on low mental effort trials and high physical effort trials).  
5.1.3 Experiment 3 (Reliability) 
Experiment 3 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 3 (Reward Reliability: Deterministic vs. Probabilistic vs. 
Unreliable) design. The critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort 
and high vs. low reward on grip strength (physical effort) and response times (mental effort) 
in three groups: Deterministic (reward present on 100% of successful trials), Probabilistic 
(reward present on 75% of successful trials and 25% of unsuccessful trials), or Unreliable 
(reward present on 50% of the trials, regardless of whether they were successful or not).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H3, which concerns the effects of reward reliability  
3) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
4) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution. 
Participants’ performance on physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 3 is presented in 
Figure 14. 
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a) Response times on mental effort trials 
 
b)  Grip strength on physical effort trials
Figure 14. Performance on mental (a) and physical (b) effort trials in Experiment 3.
Physical Effort 
Analysis of grip strength during physical effort trials revealed a significant main effect of 
Effort Level (χ2(1)=190.86, p<.001). Participants were found to squeeze harder on High 
Effort trials compared to Low Effort trials (β=-54.24, SE=2.34, t(106.85)=-23.22, p<.001).  
Mental Effort 
Analysis of response times during mental effort trials revealed a significant main effect of 
Effort Level (χ2(1)=287.18, p<.001). Participants were found to respond significantly slower 
on High Effort trials compared to Low Effort trials (β=-.68, SE=.02, z=-28.56, p<.001).  
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
The pattern of results during the execution of mental and physical effort was found to be 
similar, with participants exerting less effort on Low Effort trials regardless of the type of 
effort required, as indicated by Figure 14. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that: 1) increasing the monetary rewards does 
not influence effort exertion 2) reward reliability does not influence effort exertion 3) mental 
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and physical effort seem to be processed in a similar way during Action Execution, 4) effort 
exertion is driven primarily by effort requirements. 
More specifically, Experiment 3 was designed to investigate four hypotheses derived from 
the V-E-D-M model: H1, H3, H4, and H5. Contrary to H1, which states that higher reward 
values should be associated with increased effort expenditure, no effects of increasing 
incentive value on effort exertion were found in this experiment. Furthermore, no relationship 
between the reward reliability and effort exertion was observed, contrary to H3, which asserts 
that effort expenditure should increase in line with reward reliability. The same pattern of 
results was obtained on mental and physical effort trials, in line with H4, which predicts that 
these two types of effort should be processed in the same way during Action Execution. 
Furthermore, the fact that the level of effort was the only determinant of the amount of effort 
exerted during this experiment seems to suggest that effort requirements, rather than reward 
values drive effort exertion during Action Execution (H5). 
5.1.4 Experiment 4 (Increased Incentives) 
Experiment 4 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Reward Magnitude: Large Rewards vs. Small 
Rewards) x 3 (Reward Reliability: Deterministic vs. Probabilistic vs. Unreliable) design. The 
critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low 
reward on grip strength (physical effort) and response times (mental effort) in two groups: 
one exerting effort for small rewards (15p and 5p) (Small Rewards group: participants from 
Experiment 1) and one exerting effort for large rewards (30p and 15p) (Large Rewards 
group). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three groups: Deterministic 
(reward present on 100% of successful trials), Probabilistic (reward present on 75% of 
successful trials and 25% of unsuccessful trials), or Unreliable (reward present on 50% of the 
trials, regardless of whether they were successful or not).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative as well as absolute reward values 
and effort,  
2) H3, which concerns the effects of reward reliability,  
3) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
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4) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution. 
Participants’ performance on physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 4 is presented in 
Figure 15. 
 
a) Response times on mental effort trials 
 
b) Grip strength on physical effort trials 
Figure 15. Performance on physical (a) and mental (b) effort trials in Experiment 4
Physical Effort 
Analysis of grip strength during physical effort trials revealed a significant main effect of 
Effort Level (χ2(2)=338.63, p<.001), as participants were found to squeeze harder when effort 
required was high (β=-54.30, SE=1.73, t(183.6)=-31.43, p<.001).  
Mental Effort 
Analysis of response times during the mental effort trials revealed significant main effects of 
Effort Level (χ2(3)=428.63, p<.001) and Reward Magnitude (χ2(3)=99.89, p<.001). 
Interaction between Reward Magnitude and Effort Level was also found to be significant 
(χ2(1)=76.78, p<.001).  
In general, participants were found to respond slower on High Effort trials compared to Low 
Effort trials (β=.86, SE=.03, z=30.91, p<.001). Furthermore, participants experiencing Large 
Rewards were found to respond slower than participants experiencing Small Rewards (β=.29, 
SE=.06, z=4.86, p<.001) 
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Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants in the group 
experiencing Large Rewards were slower on Low Effort trials than participants from the 
group experiencing Small Rewards (β=.55, SE=.06, z=8.62, p<.001). No such effect was 
observed on High Effort trials (p=.82). Participants were also significantly slower on High 
Effort trials compared to Low Effort trials in the Large Rewards (β=.62, SE=.04, z=15.30, 
p<.001) and Small Rewards groups (β=1.11, SE=.04, z=31.42, p<.001). 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
The pattern of results observed during physical and mental effort trials seems to suggest that 
mental effort exertion is more sensitive to the absolute reward values than physical effort 
exertion, as participants in the Large Rewards group were found to put in more effort on Low 
Effort trials than participants in the Small Rewards group when mental effort was required. 
No such effect was observed on physical effort trials. Therefore, inspection of the pattern of 
performance during physical and mental effort trials suggests that these two types of effort 
might be processed differently. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 4 suggest that: 1) increasing absolute, but not relative, 
reward values leads to increased effort expenditure, but only on the low mental effort trials, 
2) reward reliability does not affect effort exertion, 3) mental and physical effort seem to be 
processed differently, 4) effort exertion is driven by effort requirements. 
More specifically, Experiment 4 was designed to investigate four hypotheses derived from 
the V-E-D-M model: H1, H3, H4, and H5. Contrary to H1, which predicts that participants 
should exert more effort on trials associated with higher relative, as well as absolute, rewards, 
the results of this experiment suggest that increasing relative reward values does not increase 
effort expenditure during Action Execution. Nevertheless, mental effort exertion seems to 
depend to some extent on the absolute reward values, as participants in the Large Rewards 
group were found to exert more effort on low mental effort trials than participants in the 
Small Rewards group.  No effect of reward reliability on effort exertion was observed in this 
experiment, contrary to H3, which states that effort exertion should increase in line with 
reward reliability.  
The fact that participants were found to respond differently to the absolute reward 
magnitudes during mental and physical effort trials suggests that mental and physical effort 
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might be processed differently during Action Execution, contrary to H4, which asserts that 
these two types of effort are processed in a similar way. 
Furthermore, the results of Experiment 4 suggest that during Action Execution effort 
requirements of a task, rather than reward values, drive effort exertion (H5), as participants 
were found to put in more effort on trials associated with high effort, but not on trials 
associated with high rewards.  
5.1.5 Experiment 5 (Immediate Execution) 
Experiment 5 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Timing of Execution: Immediate Execution vs. 
Delayed Execution) x 3 (Reward Feedback: Cumulative vs. Discreet vs. Simple) design. The 
critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low 
reward on grip strength (physical effort) and response times (mental effort) in two groups of 
participants: one required to execute their choices immediately after they were made 
(Immediate Execution group), and one executing their choices after a delay (Delayed 
Execution group: participants from Experiment 1). Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the three Reward Feedback groups: Cumulative (accuracy feedback + reward received 
on a particular trial + reward accumulated so far), Discreet (accuracy feedback + reward 
received on a particular trial), or Simple (accuracy feedback).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
3) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution,  
4) H6, which concerns the effects of different types of feedback on effort exertion,  
5) H7, which concerns the effects of delaying Action Execution. 
Participants’ performance on the physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 5 is 
presented in Figure 16. 
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a) Response times on mental effort trials b) Grip strength on physical effort trials 
Figure 16. Performance on mental (a) and physical (b) effort trials in Experiment 5. 
Physical Effort 
Analysis of grip strength during physical effort trials revealed significant main effects of 
Effort Level (χ2(3)=190.99, p<.001), Reward Level (χ2(2)=8.17, p=.02), and Timing of 
Execution (χ2(2)=7.30, p=.03).  
In general, it was found that participants squeezed harder on High Effort trials compared to 
Low Effort trials (β=-41.23, SE=2.53, t(186.74)=-16.30, p<.001) and on High Reward trials 
compared to Low Reward trials (β=-6.80, SE=2.53, t(185.84)=-2.69, p=.007). Participants 
were also found to squeeze the hand grip device harder when the execution of choice was 
delayed (β=-10.42, SE=4.71, t(74.89)=-2.21, p=.03).  
Mental Effort 
Analysis of response times during mental effort trials revealed main effects of Effort Level 
(χ2(3)=317.27, p<.001), Timing of Execution (χ2(2)=64.44, p<.001), as well as a significant 
interaction between Effort Level and Reward Level (χ2(1)=4.35, p=.04) and Timing of 
Execution and Effort Level (χ2(2)=29.91, p<.001). 
In general participants were found to be slower on High Effort trials compared to Low Effort 
trials (β=.72, SE=.03, z=23.57, p<.001). Participants in the Immediate Execution group were 
also found to respond slower than participants in the Delayed Execution group (β=.44, 
SE=.06, z=6.91, p<.001) 
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Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants in the Immediate 
Execution group were slower on High Effort trials (β=.29, SE=.07, z=4.06, p<.001) and Low 
Effort trials (β=.60, SE=.07, z=8.86, p<.001) compared to participants in the Delayed 
Execution group. Participants were also found to respond slower on High Effort trials 
compared to Low Effort trials in both Immediate (β=.57, SE=.04, z=13.56, p<.001) and 
Delayed (β=.88, SE=.04, z=22.22, p<.001) execution groups. No differences in response 
times to different rewards across effort levels were found. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
Participants were found to put in more effort when execution was delayed on the physical 
effort trials, and to put in more effort when execution was immediate on the mental effort 
trials. Furthermore, participants were found to modulate effort exertion in response to 
different reward values on physical effort trials, but not mental effort trials. Therefore, 
inspection of the pattern of behaviour observed during the physical and mental effort trials 
suggests that mental and physical effort might be processed differently during Action 
Execution. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 5 suggest that: 1) increasing relative reward values leads 
to increased effort expenditure, but only on physical effort trials 2) mental and physical effort 
seem to be processed differently, 3) effort exertion is driven by effort requirements, 4) 
feedback does not influence effort exertion, and 5) delayed execution affects mental and 
physical effort differently (it increases effort exertion on physical effort trials and decreases 
on mental effort trials). 
More specifically, Experiment 5 was designed to investigate five hypotheses derived from the 
V-E-D-M model: H1, H4, H5, H6, and H7. As far as H1 is concerned, which states that 
increasing incentives available in a task should lead to increased effort expenditure, results of 
Experiment 5 seem to provide partial support for this hypothesis. In this experiment 
participants were found to squeeze harder on high reward trials, however, this effect was 
limited to physical effort trials. No effect of increasing reward values on effort exertion 
during mental effort trials was observed. This difference in the pattern of results between 
mental and physical effort trials, along with the differences in mental and physical effort 
expenditure found when execution was immediate, suggests that mental and physical effort 
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might be processed differently during Action Execution, contrary to H4, which states that 
they should be processed in a similar way. 
As far as H5 is concerned, effort level was found to consistently determine the amount of 
effort exerted on each trial, suggesting that effort execution might be driven by effort 
requirements, rather than reward values. However, some indication that reward values might 
also be taken into account during Action Execution was provided by Experiment 5 as well, as 
participants were found to modulate their effort expenditure in response to reward values on 
the physical effort trials.  
Contrary to H6, which states that different types of feedback should affect effort exertion 
differently, no effects of feedback type on effort expenditure were observed in this 
experiment.  
Furthermore, results of Experiment 5 provide some evidence that delaying Action Execution 
does have an effect on effort exertion, in line with H7. This effect was found to depend on 
whether the effort required was mental or physical. On physical effort trials participants put 
in more effort (i.e. squeezed harder) when the experience of the outcome was delayed. On the 
mental effort trials, on the other hand, participants put in more effort (took longer to respond) 
when execution immediately followed choice. 
5.1.6 Experiment 6 (PD study) 
Experiment 6 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Group: PD vs. HC) design. The critical manipulation 
was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low reward on grip strength 
(physical effort) and response times (mental effort) in PD patients and HCs.  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
3) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution, 
4) H8, which concerns the effects of altered dopaminergic transmission on effort exertion. 
Participants’ performance on physical and mental effort trials is presented in Figure 17. 
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a) Response times on mental effort trials. b) Grip strength on physical effort trials.
Figure 17. Performance on mental (a) and physical (b) effort trials in Experiment 6. 
Physical Effort 
Analysis of grip strength during physical effort trials revealed a significant main effect of 
Effort Level (χ2(1)=108.58, p<0.001), with participants squeezing harder on High Effort trials 
compared to Low Effort trials (β=-56.17, SE=3.82, t(88.01)=-14.7, p<.001). 
Mental Effort  
Analysis of response times during mental effort trials revealed significant main effects of 
Effort Level (χ2(2)=262.08, p<.001) and Reward  Level (χ2(2)=11.45, p=.003). Interaction 
between Effort Level and Reward Level was found to be significant as well (χ2(1)=4.53, 
p=.03).  
In general participants were found to be slower on High Effort trials compared to Low Effort 
trials (β=.68, SE=.02, t(87.36)=40.31, p<.001) and High Reward trials compared to Low 
Reward trials (β=.04, SE=.02, t(87.36)=2.62, p=.01). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants were significantly 
slower on High Reward trials compared to Low Reward trials when effort was low (β=.08, 
SE=.02, t(87.11)=3.42, p=.005), but not when it was high (p=.99). Participants were also 
significantly slower when the effort was high on both High Reward (β=.65, SE=.02, 
t(87.11)=27.50, p<.001) and Low Reward trials (β=.72, SE=.02, t(87.60)=29.48, p<.001). 
 120 
 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
Participants on the mental effort trials were found to modulate their effort exertion in 
response to reward values. No such effect was found on the physical effort trials, suggesting 
that mental and physical effort might be processed differently during Action Execution. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 6 suggest that: 1) increasing relative reward values leads 
to increased effort expenditure, but only on mental effort trials 2) mental and physical effort 
seem to be processed differently during Action Execution, 3) effort exertion is driven by 
effort requirements, 4) dopamine might not be crucial for energizing effort exertion during 
Action Execution. 
More specifically, Experiment 6 was designed to investigate four hypotheses derived from 
the V-E-D-M model: H1, H4, H5, and H8. Results of Experiment 1 seem to support H1, 
which states that increasing reward values should lead to increased effort expenditure, as 
participants were found to put in more effort when rewards were higher on the mental effort 
trials. However, no such effects were observed on the physical effort trials, suggesting that 
effects of rewards are different depending on the type of effort required. Differences in 
behaviour on mental and physical effort trials in this experiment also suggest that these two 
types of effort might be processed differently during Action Execution, contrary to H4, which 
asserts that they should be processed in a similar way. 
As far as H5 is concerned, results of this experiment suggest that effort exertion is driven 
primarily by effort requirements of a task, as participants were consistently found to exert 
more effort on high effort trials. Even though rewards were also shown to energize effort in 
certain circumstances (i.e. when mental effort was required) in this experiment, their effect 
seemed to differ depending on whether the effort required is mental or physical. 
Furthermore, contrary to the hypothesis that effort exertion during Action Execution would 
be reduced in PD patients due to decreased levels of dopamine in this population (H8), no 
differences between PD patients and HCs on both mental and physical effort trials were 
found. This suggests that dopamine’s role during Action Execution is not as pronounced as 
assumed by the V-E-D-M model.  
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5.2 General discussion 
The V-E-D-M model assumes that manipulating effort, reward, and feedback characteristics 
during an effort-based decision-making task should lead to changes in the amount of effort 
people exert to obtain rewards. To investigate this assumption, the exact effects of these 
different manipulations on effort expenditure were examined in six experiments described in 
this chapter. Six areas of interest derived from the V-E-D-M model were investigated in these 
experiments: 1) Reward manipulations, 2) Effort manipulations, 3) Importance of 
effort/reward during Action Selection and Action Execution, 4) Outcome feedback, 5) 
Delayed Action Execution, 6) Neural underpinnings. 
The rest of this chapter will survey the general pattern of findings across the six experiments 
with respect to the six areas of interest listed above, describing the implications of these 
findings for the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model. 
1) Reward manipulations 
a) Effects of manipulating reward magnitude on effort exertion  
One of the assumptions that the V-E-D-M model makes is that increasing reward magnitude 
should have an impact on the amount of effort people put in during an effort-based decision-
making task. The results of the experiments described above provide limited support for this 
assumption. In three out of six experiments (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) no effects of increased 
relative reward values on effort exertion were observed. In the remaining three experiments 
the effects of increasing reward values differed depending on whether the effort required was 
mental or physical. Increasing absolute reward values was also found to have a limited effect 
on performance. Taken together, these results suggest that neither relative nor absolute 
reward values have a reliable effect on effort expenditure during Action Execution. Most of 
the time people seem not to take reward values into account when modulating effort exertion. 
When people do take them into account, the effect of reward values is mediated by specific 
task characteristics such as the type and the amount of effort required within a task. 
b) Effects of manipulating reward valence on effort exertion 
According to the V-E-D-M model exerting effort to avoid losing money should differ from 
exerting effort to obtain monetary rewards. More specifically, people facing losses should 
increase their effort exertion if they are risk averse and want to minimize the chances of 
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potential loss. This assumption was investigated in Experiment 2. In this experiment 
participants in the Loss group were found to be willing to put in additional mental effort to 
minimize the risk of incurring losses, in line with the assumption of the V-E-D-M model. No 
such effect was found on physical effort trials, however, which suggests that processing of 
physical effort might be less sensitive to losses than processing of mental effort, at least 
during Action Execution.  
c) Effects of manipulating reward reliability on effort exertion  
Another assumption that V-E-D-M model makes is that changing the reward reliability 
should have an influence on effort exerted during a task, with people exerting more effort 
when the probability of obtaining a reward is higher. No support for this hypothesis was 
found in the two experiments designed to test this assumption, as reward reliability was found 
not to have any effect on the amount of effort invested in the task. 
2) Effort manipulation 
The implicit assumption the V-E-D-M model makes is that mental and physical effort are 
processed in the same way throughout the stages of effort-based decision-making. This 
means that all the manipulations which affect one type of effort should affect the other type 
of effort in a similar way. This was not found to be the case across the experiments presented 
in this chapter. In general mental effort was found to be more sensitive than physical effort to 
reward manipulations such as increasing the absolute reward magnitude or changing the 
reward valence. Mental effort was also found to increase when execution immediately 
followed choice, as opposed to physical effort which was found to increase when execution 
was delayed. Taken together, this pattern of results suggests that mental effort and physical 
effort might be processed differently during Action Execution, contrary to the assumptions of 
the V-E-D-M model. 
3) Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection and Action Execution 
According to the V-E-D-M model, effort exerted during a task should be driven either by the 
reward values or by the effort requirements of this task. Experiments described in this chapter 
were designed to investigate which one of these two factors plays a bigger role during Action 
Execution. The results suggest that, even though reward often influences effort levels, during 
Action Execution effort exertion is driven predominantly by effort requirements. This result 
is in line with the theory of motivation by Brehm and Self (1989), which states that as long as 
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the rewards are deemed to be worth the effort required, effort exerted during a task should be 
proportional to task demands, not the reward values. 
4) Outcome feedback 
The V-E-D-M model assumes that different types of reward feedback should influence effort 
exertion during effort-based decision-making task differently. However, no effects of 
different types of feedback were found in the experiments that explored this hypothesis. This 
result suggests that effort exertion is not sensitive to the feedback manipulations described in 
this thesis. 
5) Delayed Action Execution 
According to the V-E-D-M model, Learning is an important stage of the decision-making 
process, as it allows for updating the representations of the options available in a particular 
decision-making scenario. For that reason, preventing learning can potentially have important 
consequences for the future decisions made in similar circumstances. It can also influence the 
amount of effort people put in during an effort-based decision-making task. This assumption 
has been supported by the results of Experiment 5, which found that preventing immediate 
execution of an action after a choice was made affected the amount of effort exerted during 
the task. Nevertheless, delaying Action Execution seemed to result in a different pattern of 
behaviour for mental and physical effort trials. Delaying effort exertion was found to increase 
effort produced on the physical effort trials, but decrease effort put in on the mental effort 
trials. Possible explanations of this phenomenon are discussed in the general discussion in 
Chapter 7. 
6) Neural underpinnings 
Previous studies on the role of dopamine during effort exertion have suggested that this 
neurotransmitter is crucial for invigorating behaviour when effort is required. For this reason, 
one of the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model is that depleting dopamine levels should lead 
to decreased effort exertion during Action Execution stage of effort-based decision-making. 
The investigation of PD patients’ performance on the effort-based decision-making task 
described in this chapter, however, does not support this hypothesis. PD patients were found 
to perform just as well as HCs on this task, putting in the same amount of effort. This result 
suggests that intact dopamine transmission might not be crucial for effort exertion. 
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Nevertheless, the fact that PD patients were tested on medication may potentially prevent any 
strong conclusions being drawn from this result. 
5.3 Summary 
Results of the studies presented above support some of the key hypotheses of the V-E-D-M 
model, for example regarding the effects of changing reward valence, or delaying action 
execution. They also help to clarify certain assumptions of the model, for example regarding 
the influence of reward values or different types of outcome feedback on effort exertion. 
Nevertheless, looking at grip strength and response times provides only partial information 
about effort expenditure during a task. To complete the picture of the effects of different 
manipulations on effort exertion, the accuracy of participants should be examined as well. 
Therefore, in the next chapter the effects of changing reward magnitude, valence, and 
reliability, as well as effort type and feedback on accuracy during Action Execution will be 
examined, to provide further information regarding the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model. 
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CHAPTER 6: Experimental Studies - Accuracy 
Investigations of the choices people make and effort they put in during effort-based decision-
making tasks provide an important source of information about the mechanisms of effort-
based decision-making and validity of the V-E-D-M model, as demonstrated in Chapters 4 
and 5. Another measure which has been commonly used to investigate effort exertion during 
effort-based decision-making tasks is participants’ accuracy. The rationale for employing this 
measure is as follows: during most effort-based decision-making tasks the goal of participants 
is to maximize rewards obtained from the task. To achieve this goal, participants should 
recruit more effort when rewards at stake are higher, to increase their chances of obtaining 
these rewards. Increased effort exertion during effort-based decision-making task should, in 
turn, translate into increased accuracy. This means that investigating participants’ accuracy 
can provide additional information about effort exerted during a task. For that reason 
participants’ accuracy in the six experiments described in the previous chapters was analysed. 
These investigations covered six specific areas: 1) Reward manipulations, 2) Effort 
manipulations, 3) Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection and Action 
Execution, 4) Outcome feedback, 5) Delayed Action Execution, 6) Neural 
underpinnings. 
As far as Reward manipulations are concerned, in this chapter the effects of a) increasing 
relative as well as absolute reward values, b) changing reward valence (from gain to loss), 
and c) changing reward reliability on participants’ accuracy were examined. Furthermore, 
participants’ accuracy on mental and physical effort trials was compared, to investigate 
Effort manipulations. Importance of effort/reward during Action Execution was also 
examined through investigating participants’ accuracy on trials associated with different 
levels of effort and reward. The effects of different types of Outcome feedback, as well as 
the effects of Delaying Action Execution on participants accuracy were explored as well. 
Finally, the role of dopamine during Action Execution stage was investigated, in an effort to 
explore the Neural underpinnings of effort-based decision-making.  
These topics were investigated in six studies which used the novel effort-based decision-
making task described in Chapter 3. This task consisted of three phases: Training phase, 
Choice phase, and Execution phase. This chapter focuses specifically on participants’ 
accuracy during the Execution phase. During this phase participants were asked squeeze a 
hand grip device (physical effort trials) or solve simple mathematical equations (mental effort 
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trials) to obtain small monetary rewards (see Figure 11). To successfully complete physical 
effort trials participants had to reach a specific grip strength threshold. On high effort trials it 
was equivalent to 75N (Experiments 1-5) or 60% of maximum grip strength (Experiment 6). 
On low effort trials it was equivalent to 15N (Experiments 1-5) or 15% of maximum grip 
strength (Experiment 6). Participants were considered to be accurate on the physical effort 
trials when they managed to maintain their grip strength above the threshold level for 4.5s 
(Experiments 1-5) or 6s (Experiment 6). To successfully complete mental effort trials, on the 
other hand, participants had to solve all of the mathematical equations appearing on the 
screen. On high effort trials participants had to solve three equations, whereas on low effort 
trials they had to solve one equation. Participants were considered to be accurate on the 
mental effort trials when they managed to solve correctly all of the equations on the screen 
within 4.5s (Experiments 1-5) or 6s (Experiment 6). Participants’ accuracy was analysed 
using GLMM assuming binomial distribution. The results of these analyses are presented in 
this chapter. The specific hypotheses investigated were: 
H1: Increasing incentives available in a task should increase participants’ accuracy on mental 
and physical effort trials. 
H2: Participants in the Loss group should be more accurate than participants in the Gain 
group. 
H3: Positive relationship between the probability of obtaining rewards and accuracy should 
be observed. 
H4: Participants equally accurate on mental and physical effort trials. 
H5: If behaviour during Action Execution is driven by reward values, accuracy levels should 
be proportional to the amount of reward available during a trial. If, however, it is driven by 
effort requirements, accuracy should mainly be determined by the amount of effort required. 
H6: Type of feedback present during a task should have an effect on accuracy, with 
participants being most accurate on cumulative feedback trials, followed by discreet and 
simple feedback trials. 
H7: Participants experiencing the outcome of their decisions immediately should achieve 
different levels of accuracy than participants executing their decisions after a delay.  
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H8: Depletion of dopamine levels in the brain associated with PD should lead to reduced 
accuracy on mental and physical effort trials. 
The next section of this chapter describes the results of studies examining these eight 
hypotheses and discusses their implications for the V-E-D-M model. 
Summary of the findings of different experiments is presented in Table 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 128 
 
E
xp
er
im
en
t
H
1
H
2
H
3
H
4
H
5
H
6
H
7
H
8
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
m
an
ip
ul
at
in
g 
re
w
ar
d 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
m
an
ip
ul
at
in
g 
re
w
ar
d 
va
le
nc
e
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
m
an
ip
ul
at
in
g 
re
w
ar
d 
re
li
ab
il
it
y
C
om
pa
ri
so
n 
of
 
m
en
ta
l/
ph
ys
ic
al
 
ef
fo
rt
R
ew
ar
d/
E
ff
or
t 
dr
iv
in
g 
be
ha
vi
ou
r
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
m
an
ip
ul
at
in
g 
re
w
ar
d 
fe
ed
ba
ck
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
im
m
ed
ia
te
/d
el
ay
e
d 
ex
ec
ut
io
n
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
do
pa
m
in
e 
de
pl
et
io
n
E
xp
er
im
en
t 
1 
(G
ai
ns
)
pa
rt
ia
l
 ?
ef
fo
rt
/r
ew
ar
d
 -
 
E
xp
er
im
en
t 
2 
(L
os
se
s)
pa
rt
ia
l
 p
ar
ti
al
 ?
ef
fo
rt
/r
ew
ar
d
E
xp
er
im
en
t 
3 
(R
el
ia
bi
li
ty
)
pa
rt
ia
l
 -
 ?
ef
fo
rt
/r
ew
ar
d
E
xp
er
im
en
t 
4 
(I
nc
re
as
ed
 
In
ce
nt
iv
es
)
re
la
ti
ve
: p
ar
ti
al
 
ab
so
lu
te
: +
 p
ar
ti
al
 ?
ef
fo
rt
/r
ew
ar
d
E
xp
er
im
en
t 
5 
(I
m
m
ed
ia
te
 
E
xe
cu
ti
on
)
 p
ar
ti
al
 ?
ef
fo
rt
/r
ew
ar
d
 -
 p
ar
ti
al
E
xp
er
im
en
t 
6 
(P
D
 s
tu
dy
)
 p
ar
ti
al
?
ef
fo
rt
/r
ew
ar
d
 -
H
yp
ot
he
se
s
Ta
bl
e 
7.
 R
es
ul
ts
 o
f t
he
 a
na
ly
se
s 
of
 a
cc
ur
ac
y 
du
ri
ng
 s
ix
 m
ai
n 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
ts
 w
ith
 r
eg
ar
d 
to
 th
e 
8 
hy
po
th
es
es
 in
ve
st
ig
at
ed
. 
“+
” 
re
pr
es
en
ts
 h
yp
ot
he
si
s 
su
pp
or
te
d 
by
 t
he
 r
es
ul
ts
 o
f t
he
 
ex
pe
ri
m
en
t, 
“-
“ 
re
pr
es
en
ts
 h
yp
ot
he
si
s 
fo
r w
hi
ch
 s
up
po
rt
 w
as
 n
ot
 f
ou
nd
, “
pa
rt
ia
l“
 r
ep
re
se
nt
s h
yp
ot
he
si
s 
fo
r w
hi
ch
 p
ar
tia
l 
su
pp
or
t
w
as
 f
ou
nd
, 
"?
" 
re
pr
es
en
ts
 in
co
nc
lu
si
ve
re
su
lt
s.
 
In
 c
ol
um
n 
H
5,
 t
he
 f
ac
to
r 
w
hi
ch
 w
as
 f
ou
nd
 t
o 
dr
iv
e 
be
ha
vi
ou
r 
du
ri
ng
 e
ff
or
t e
xe
rt
io
n
is
 s
pe
ci
fi
ed
.
 129 
 
6.1 Results 
In each of the following sections experimental design is described first, followed by the 
results from the physical effort trials, mental effort trials, and the comparison of the two types 
of trials. At the end of each section the findings are discussed in the context of the 
experimental hypotheses. 
Participants’ accuracy on different types of trials in the six experiments is presented in 
Appendix B. 
6.1.1 Experiment 1 (Gains) 
Experiment 1 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Physical vs. Mental) x 3 (Reward Feedback: Cumulative vs. Discreet vs. 
Simple) design. The critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort 
and high vs. low reward on participants’ accuracy during physical and mental effort trials. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three Reward Feedback groups: 
Cumulative (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular trial + reward accumulated 
so far), Discreet (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular trial), or Simple 
(accuracy feedback).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
3) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution,  
4) H6, which concerns the effects of different types of feedback on accuracy. 
Participants’ accuracy on physical and mental effort trials is presented in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Accuracy during mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 1. 
Physical Effort 
Analysis of accuracy during physical effort trials revealed significant main effects of Effort 
Level (χ2(1)=122.09, p<.001) and Reward Level (χ2(1)=18.21, p<.001).  
Participants were found to be more accurate on Low Effort compared to High Effort trials 
(β=6.20, SE=1.12, z=5.52, p<.001), and more accurate on High Reward compared to Low 
Reward trials (β=2.11, SE=.50, z=4.21, p<.001).  
Mental Effort 
Analysis of accuracy during mental effort trials revealed a significant main effect of Effort 
Level (χ2(1)=21.79, p<.001). Participants were found to be more accurate on Low Effort trials 
than on High Effort trials (β=.68, SE=.15, z=4.67, p<.001).  
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
Comparison of accuracy on mental and physical effort trials revealed a significant main effect 
of Effort Type (χ2(3)=311.74, p<.001), as well as significant interactions between Effort Type 
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and Effort Level (χ2(1)=59.20, p<.001), and Effort Type and Reward Level (χ2(1)=5.73, 
p=.02). 
In general, participants were found to be more accurate on physical effort trials than on 
mental effort trials (β=3.07, SE=.52, z=5.92, p<.001). 
Further post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants were more 
accurate on physical effort trials than on mental effort trials specifically when the effort 
required was low (β=5.37, SE=1.01, z=5.34, p<.001), but not high (p=.09). Furthermore, 
participants were found to be more accurate on Low Effort compared to High Effort trials 
when effort required was mental (β=.70, SE=.26, z=2.74, p=.03) as well as physical (β=5.31, 
SE=1.04, z=5.11, p<.001). Participants were as accurate on low mental effort trials as on high 
physical effort trials (p=.99). They were also less accurate on these two types of trials than on 
the low physical effort trials (low mental effort: β=5.42, SE=1.01, z=5.36, p<.001; high 
physical effort: β=5.48, SE=1.04, z=5.28, p<.001) 
As far as the interaction between Effort Type and Reward Level is concerned, further 
analyses revealed that participants were more accurate on High Reward than on Low Reward 
trials when effort required was physical (β=1.52, SE=.51, z=2.95, p=.02), but not mental 
(p=.99). Participants were also found to be more accurate on physical effort trials compared 
to mental effort trials when reward was high (β=3.85, SE=.56, z=6.87, p<.001), as well as low 
(β=2.29, SE=.65, z=3.50, p=.003). 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that: 1) increased reward values can translate 
into higher accuracy in certain circumstances (e.g. when effort required is physical), 2) 
mental and physical effort tasks differed in difficulty, which has implications for 
interpretation of any differences between these two types of effort found in this experiment, 
3) accuracy is sensitive to effort requirements and, in certain circumstances (e.g. when effort 
is physical) to reward values, and 4) feedback does not influence accuracy. 
More specifically, Experiment 1 was designed to investigate four hypotheses derived from 
the V-E-D-M model: H1, H4, H5 and H6. According to H1, increasing the incentive value 
should increase participants’ accuracy. This was indeed the case on the physical effort trials, 
where participants were found to be more accurate when high rewards were at stake. 
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However, no such effect was observed during mental effort trials. This suggests that the 
effects of rewards on accuracy are limited. 
Furthermore, the results of Experiment 1 indicated that mental effort trials were possibly 
more difficult than physical effort trials, contrary to H4, which states that accuracy on mental 
and physical effort trials should be similar. Participants were found to be more accurate on 
physical effort trials compared to mental effort trials. The implications of this finding are 
discussed in the general discussion in Chapter 7. 
Results of Experiment 1 also provide some indication that effort requirements drive accuracy 
during Action Execution (H5), as participants were consistently found to be significantly 
more accurate on low effort than high effort trials in this experiment. Furthermore, results 
suggest that reward values can impact accuracy as well, as participants were found to be more 
accurate on high reward than low reward trials when effort required was physical. 
Nevertheless, the effect of rewards was not reliable, as they seemed to have no effect on 
accuracy during the mental effort trials.  
Contrary to H6, which states that different types of feedback should affect accuracy 
differently, the type of feedback presented during the task was found not to have any effect 
on accuracy during the task, providing further evidence that the effects of feedback on effort-
based decision-making might be less pronounced than assumed by the V-E-D-M model. 
6.1.2 Experiment 2 (Losses) 
Experiment 2 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Stakes Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Reward Valence: Gain vs. Loss) x 3 (Reward 
Feedback: Cumulative vs. Discreet vs. Simple) design. The critical manipulation was 
comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low stakes on accuracy during 
mental and physical effort trials in two groups of participants: one trying to win monetary 
rewards (Gain group: participants from Experiment 1) and one trying to avoid losing them 
(Loss group). As described in section 5.1.2, in this experiment the effects of different stakes, 
rather than rewards, were examined. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
Reward Feedback groups: Cumulative (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular 
trial + reward accumulated so far), Discreet (accuracy feedback + reward received on a 
particular trial), or Simple (accuracy feedback).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
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1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H2, which concerns the effects of gains and losses,  
3) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
4) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution,  
5) H6, which concerns the effects of different types of feedback on accuracy.  
Since participants in the Cumulative feedback condition did not choose any options 
associated with high effort and a potential loss of 15p, feedback had to be removed from the 
analyses in this experiment, as otherwise the model would not converge due to zero cell 
counts for categorical predictors. 
Participants’ performance on physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 2 is presented in 
Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19. Accuracy during mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 2. 
Physical Effort 
Analysis of participants’ accuracy on physical effort trials revealed significant main effects of 
Effort Level (χ2(3)=244.19, p<.001), Stakes Level (χ2(3)=19.74, p<.001), and Reward 
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Valence (χ2(3)=13.67, p=.003), as well as a significant interaction between Reward Valence 
and Effort Level (χ2(1)=9.86, p=.002).  
In general, participants were found to be more accurate on Low Effort than High Effort trials 
(β=4.79, SE=.67, z=7.11, p<.001). Participants were also found to be more accurate on High 
Stakes trials than Low Stakes trials (β=1.40, SE=.42, z=3.37, p<.001). Participants in the Loss 
group were found to be as accurate as participants in the Gain group (p=.24). 
Further post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants were more 
accurate on Low Effort trials compared to High Effort trials  in both Gain (β=6.28, SE=1.16, 
z=5.44, p<.001) and Loss (β=3.30, SE=.52, z=6.35, p<.001) groups. Participants in the Loss 
group were as accurate as participants in the Gain group during both High Effort (p=.64) and 
Low Effort (p=.20) trials. 
Mental Effort 
Analysis of accuracy during mental effort trials revealed significant main effects of Effort 
Level (χ2(3)=93.08, p<.001) and Reward Valence (χ2(3)=29.1, p<.001). Interactions between 
Reward Valence and Effort Level (χ2(1)=4.60, p=.03) and Reward Valence and Stakes Level 
(χ2(1)=4.45, p=.03) were also found to be significant.  
In general, participants were found to be more accurate on Low Effort than High Effort trials 
(β=1.13, SE=.12, z=9.31, p<.001). Participants in the Loss group were also found to be more 
accurate than participants in the Gain group (β=.66, SE=.25, z=2.60, p=.009). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants in the Loss group 
were significantly more accurate on Low Effort trials (β=1.09, SE=.22, z=4.88, p<.001), but 
not High Effort trials (p=.94), compared to participants in the Gain group. Participants in both 
Gain (β=.70, SE=.22, z=3.18, p=.008) and Loss (β=1.56, SE=.25, z=6.33, p<.001) groups 
were significantly more accurate on Low Effort trials compared to High Effort trials.  
Furthermore, participants in the Loss experiment were found to be significantly more 
accurate on High Stakes trials than participants in the Gain group (β=.97, SE=.30, z=3.18, 
p=.008). 
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Physical vs. Mental Effort 
Comparison of accuracy during mental and physical effort trials revealed a significant main 
effect of Effort Type (χ2(10)=445.8, p<.001), as well as significant interactions between 
Effort Type and Effort Level (χ2(4)=82.30, p<.001), Effort Type and Stake Level 
(χ2(4)=14.22, p=.006), Effort Type and Reward Valence (χ2(6)=40.12, p<.001), Effort Type, 
Reward Valence and Effort Level (χ2(2)=12.19, p=.002), and Effort Type, Reward Valence 
and Stakes Level (χ2(2)=7.57, p=.02). 
In general, participants were found to be more accurate on the physical effort trials compared 
to the mental effort trials (β=2.35, SE=.29, z=8.12, p<.001). 
Further analyses revealed that participants in the Loss group were more accurate on the 
physical compared to mental effort trials when effort was high (β=.98, SE=.21, z=4.70, 
p<.001) as well as low (β=2.40, SE=.32, z=7.47, p<.001). Participants in the Gain group, on 
the other hand, were found to be more accurate on the physical compared to mental effort 
trials when effort was low (β=5.43, SE=1.01, z=5.36, p<.001), but not high (p=.25). 
Furthermore, participants in the Gain group were found to be more accurate on High Stakes 
trials compared to Low Stakes trials when effort required was physical (β=1.81, SE=.48, 
z=3.78, p<.001), but not mental (p=.93). 
Finally, participants in both Gain and Loss groups were found to be more accurate on high 
physical (β=.77, SE=.22, z=3.51, p=.002) and low mental effort trials (β=1.14, SE=.12, 
z=9.35, p<.001) than on high mental effort trials. At the same time they were found to be less 
accurate on these two types of trials than on the low physical effort trials (high physical 
effort: β=-4.30, SE=.60, z=-7.16, p<.001; low mental effort: β=-3.93, SE=.55, z=-7.11, 
p<.001). They were also found to achieve a similar level of accuracy on high physical and 
low mental effort trials (p=.29), as indicated by Figure 19. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that: 1) increasing the monetary stakes can 
lead to increased accuracy in certain circumstances (e.g. when physical effort is required), 2) 
when losses are a possibility accuracy can increase in certain circumstances (e.g. when 
mental effort is required), 3) mental and physical effort tasks differed in difficulty, 4) 
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accuracy is driven primarily by effort requirements, but reward values can affect it as well in 
certain circumstances (e.g. when effort required is physical). 
More specifically, Experiment 2 was set up to investigate five hypotheses derived from the 
V-E-D-M model: H1, H2, H4, H5, and H6. In line with H1, it was predicted that participants 
in this experiment would be more accurate on trials associated with high stakes (15p win or 
15p loss), than on trials associated with low stakes (5p win or 5p loss). This was, however, 
observed on the physical effort trials only. On the mental effort trials participants were just as 
accurate regardless of whether stakes were high or low. This suggests that rewards have a 
limited effect on accuracy. 
As far as H2 is concerned, which states that participants in the Loss group should be more 
accurate than participants in the Gain group, only partial support for this hypothesis was 
found, as no differences in accuracy between Loss and Gain groups were observed on the 
physical effort trials. On the mental effort trials, participants in the Loss group were found to 
be more accurate than participants in the Gain group when effort required was low and when 
the stakes were high. These results suggest that participants in the Loss group were trying 
harder to be accurate during mental effort trials, especially when trying to avoid high losses, 
which suggests that they were more risk averse than participants in the Gain group during 
these trials.  
In addition, results of Experiment 2 suggest that mental effort trials were more difficult to 
complete than physical effort trials, contrary to H4, as participants were found to be 
significantly less accurate on mental than on physical effort trials during this experiment.  
Furthermore, results of this experiment suggest that effort requirements are the main factor 
driving accuracy during effort-based decision-making tasks (H5), as participants were 
consistently found to be more accurate on low effort than high effort trials. In addition, 
reward values were also found to affect accuracy in certain circumstances, as participants 
were found to be more accurate on high stakes compared to low stakes trials, but only when 
the effort required was physical. 
6.1.3 Experiment 3 (Reliability) 
Experiment 3 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 3 (Reward Reliability: Deterministic vs. Probabilistic vs. 
Unreliable) design. The critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort 
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and high vs. low reward on accuracy during mental and physical effort trials in three groups: 
Deterministic (reward present on 100% of successful trials), Probabilistic (reward present on 
75% of successful trials and 25% of unsuccessful trials), or Unreliable (reward present on 
50% of the trials, regardless of whether they were successful or not).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H3, which concerns the effects of reward reliability,  
3) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
4) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution. 
Participants’ performance on physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 3 is presented in 
Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20. Accuracy during mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 3. 
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Physical Effort 
Preliminary analysis of accuracy during physical effort trials revealed that participants were 
100% correct on low effort trials (see Appendix B). Consequently there was too little 
variability in their responses to include low effort trials into further analysis. For that reason 
the results described below refer to high physical effort trials only. 
When investigating accuracy on high physical effort trials, main effect of Reward Level was 
found to be significant (χ2(1)=15.45, p<.001). Participants were found to be significantly 
more accurate when reward was high (β=1.44, SE=.37, z=3.85, p<.001). 
Mental Effort 
Analysis of accuracy during mental effort trials revealed a significant main effect of Effort 
Level (χ2(1)=27.61, p<.001). Participants were found to be significantly more accurate when 
effort was low (β=1.25, SE=.002, z=704.60, p<.001). 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
Comparisons of participants’ accuracy during mental and physical effort trials revealed a 
significant main effect of Effort Type (χ2(2)=357.19, p<.001), and an interaction between 
Effort Type and Effort Level (χ2(1)=51.76, p<.001).  
In general, participants were found to be significantly more accurate on the physical effort 
trials compared to the mental effort trials (β=2.33, SE=.15, z=15.02, p<.001). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test revealed that participants were more accurate on 
Low Effort than High Effort trials when the effort required was mental (β=1.44, SE=.18, 
z=7.90, p<.001).  The significance of the difference in accuracy between high and low 
physical effort trials could not be established, due to the lack of variability in the data from 
the low physical effort trials. However, visual inspection of Figure 20 suggests that 
participants were more accurate on Low Effort compared to High Effort trials when the effort 
required was physical. Participants were also significantly more accurate on high physical 
effort trials compared to high mental effort trials (β=1.72, SE=.17, z=9.88, p<.001). 
Participants’ accuracy was similar on low physical effort trials and high mental effort trials 
(p=.44). 
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 Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that: 1) increasing monetary rewards can lead 
to increased accuracy in certain circumstances (e.g. when physical effort is required), 2) 
reward reliability does not influence accuracy, 3) mental and physical effort tasks differed in 
difficulty, 4) accuracy is driven primarily by effort requirements, but reward values can play 
a role as well in certain circumstances (e.g. when physical effort is required). 
More specifically, Experiment 3 was designed to investigate four hypotheses derived from 
the V-E-D-M model: H1, H3, H4, and H5. As far as H1 is concerned, results of Experiment 
3, in partial support of this hypothesis, show that increasing the incentive value can lead to 
increased accuracy in certain circumstances. Participants were found to be more accurate on 
high reward than low reward trials when effort required was physical, but not mental.  
Furthermore, in Experiment 3 no relationship between reward reliability and accuracy was 
observed, contrary to H3, which states that accuracy should increase in line with reward 
reliability. This, in turn, suggests that that the probability of obtaining rewards does not affect 
participants’ accuracy during effort-based decision-making tasks. 
In addition, differences in accuracy on mental and physical effort trials were observed in this 
experiment, contrary to H4, which assumes that mental and physical effort are processed in 
the same way. In general, participants were found to be less accurate on mental effort trials 
than on physical effort trials. This suggests that mental effort trials were more difficult for 
participants than physical effort trials. This finding is in line with the results of the previous 
experiments described in this chapter. 
Finally, results of Experiment 3 suggest that effort requirements might be the main 
determinant of participants’ accuracy during effort-based decision making tasks (H5), as 
participants were consistently found to be more accurate on low effort trials compared to high 
effort trials in this experiment. Moreover, the findings from this experiment suggest that 
rewards might affect accuracy in certain circumstances as well. Participants were found to be 
more accurate when rewards were high compared to low on high physical effort trials. 
6.1.4 Experiment 4 (Increased Incentives) 
Experiment 4 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Magnitude: Large Rewards vs. Small Rewards) x 3 
 140 
 
(Reward Reliability: Deterministic vs. Probabilistic vs. Unreliable) design. The critical 
manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low reward on 
accuracy during mental and physical effort trials in two groups: one exerting effort for small 
rewards (15p and 5p) (Small Rewards group: participants from Experiment 1) and one 
exerting effort for large rewards (30p and 15p) (Large Rewards group). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three groups: Deterministic (reward present on 100% of 
successful trials), Probabilistic (reward present on 75% of successful trials and 25% of 
unsuccessful trials), or Unreliable (reward present on 50% of the trials, regardless of whether 
they were successful or not).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative as well as absolute reward values 
and effort,  
2) H3, which concerns the effects of reward reliability,  
3) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
4) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution. 
Participants’ performance on physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 4 is presented in 
Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Accuracy during mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 4. 
Physical Effort 
Preliminary analysis revealed that participants were almost 100% accurate on low physical 
effort trials (see Appendix B), and so there was too little variability in the results to include 
low effort trials into further analyses. For that reason the results below refer to high physical 
effort trials only. 
Analysis of participants’ accuracy on the high physical effort trials revealed significant main 
effects of Reward Level (χ2(1)=14.70, p<.001) and Reward Magnitude (χ2(1)=6.45, p=.001).  
Participants were found to be more accurate on High Reward trials than on Low Reward 
trials (β=.93, SE=.34, z=2.70, p=.007). Furthermore, participants in the Large Rewards group 
were found to be more accurate than participants in the Small Rewards group (β=1.10, 
SE=.43, z=2.58, p=.01). 
Mental Effort 
Investigations of accuracy on the mental effort trials revealed significant main effects of 
Effort Level (χ2(6)=195.02, p<.001), Reward Reliability (χ2(4)=19.20, p<.001) and Reward 
Magnitude (χ2(4)=35.63, p<.001). Interactions between Reward Magnitude and Effort Level 
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(χ2(2)=26.46, p<.001), as well as Reward Reliability and Effort Level (χ2(2)=13.54, p=.001) 
were also significant. 
In general, participants were found to be more accurate on Low Effort trials compared to 
High Effort trials (β=1.95, SE=.20, z=9.90, p<.001). In addition, participants in the Large 
Rewards group were found to be more accurate than participants in the Small Rewards group 
(β=.78, SE=.29, z=2.72, p=.007). No significant differences in accuracy between participants 
from Cumulative, Discreet, and Unreliable groups were observed (p>.05). 
Post hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD test indicated that participants in the Large Rewards 
group were more accurate than participants in the Small Rewards group when the effort 
required was low (β=1.41, SE=.31, z=4.52, p<.001), but not high (p=.97). Participants in both 
Large Rewards group (β=2.57, SE=.33, z=7.78, p<.001) and Small Rewards group (β=1.32, 
SE=.21, z=6.37, p<.001) were also found to be more accurate on Low Effort trials than High 
Effort trials. Furthermore, Participants in the Probabilistic condition were significantly less 
accurate on high effort trials than participants in the Deterministic condition (β=-1.15, 
SE=.34, z=3.38, p=.01). No other comparisons were significant. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
Comparison of participants’ accuracy during mental and physical effort trials revealed a 
significant main effect of Effort Type (χ2(8)=572.06, p<.001). Interactions between Effort 
Type and Effort Level (χ2(4)=70.18, p<.001), Effort Type and Reward Magnitude 
(χ2(2)=42.36, p<.001), as well as Effort Type, Reward Magnitude and Effort Level 
(χ2(2)=29.20, p<.001)  were also found to be significant.  
In general, participants were found to be more accurate on physical effort trials than on 
mental effort trials (β=3.29, SE=.53, z=6.22, p<.001). 
Further analyses revealed that participants in the Large Rewards group were more accurate 
on physical effort trials compared to mental effort trials (β=2.95, SE=.27, z=11.08, p<.001). 
Participants in the Small Rewards group were also found to be more accurate on physical 
effort trials than mental effort trials (β=1.73, SE=.18, z=9.87, p<.001), but only when the 
effort required was high. In this group accuracy on low physical effort trials could not be 
assessed, as all participants were found to be 100% accurate on these trials. Participants in 
both Large Rewards and Small Rewards groups were found to be more accurate on high 
physical (β=2.18, SE=.19, z=11.25, p<.001) and low mental effort trials (β=1.98, SE=.17, 
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z=11.45, p<.001) than on high mental effort trials. They were also found to achieve a similar 
level of accuracy on high physical and low mental effort trials (p=.70), as indicated by Figure 
21. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 4 suggest that: 1) increasing both relative and absolute 
reward values can influence accuracy in certain circumstances (e.g. when effort required is 
physical), 2) Increasing reward reliability can lead to increased accuracy in certain 
circumstances (e.g. when effort required is mental), 3) mental and physical effort tasks 
differed in difficulty, 4) accuracy is driven primarily by effort requirements, but reward 
values can play a role as well in certain circumstances (e.g. when physical effort is required). 
More specifically, Experiment 4 was designed to investigate four hypotheses derived from 
the V-E-D-M model: H1, H3, H4, and H5. As far as H1 is concerned, Experiment 4, in partial 
support of this hypothesis, showed that increasing relative values of rewards can affect 
accuracy in certain circumstances. Participants were found to be more accurate when rewards 
were high on high physical effort trials. No such effect was observed on mental effort trials. 
Increasing absolute reward values was also shown to impact accuracy in this experiment, as 
participants in the Large Rewards group were found to be more accurate than participants in 
the Small Rewards group on high physical effort trials and low mental effort trials. These 
results suggest that reward values have a potential to influence accuracy in certain 
circumstances. 
Experiment 4 also provided some evidence that reward reliability might have an impact on 
accuracy, in line with H3, as during high mental effort trials participants in the Probabilistic 
condition were significantly less accurate than participants in the Deterministic condition. 
Comparisons of accuracy during mental and physical effort trials were somewhat difficult 
due to the lack of variability in accuracy on low physical effort trials. In general, though, the 
results of Experiment 4 suggest that participants were more accurate on physical effort trials 
than on mental effort trials, contrary to H4, which predicted that there should be no 
differences between these two types of trials. This result implies that mental effort trials were 
more difficult for participants than physical effort trials. 
Furthermore, results of Experiment 4 suggest that accuracy on effort-based decision-making 
tasks is primarily driven by effort requirements (H5), as participants were consistently found 
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to be more accurate on trials which required less effort. Moreover, the findings from this 
experiment suggest that rewards might affect accuracy in certain circumstances as well. This 
is because participants were found to be more accurate when rewards were high compared to 
low on high physical effort trials. 
6.1.5 Experiment 5 (Immediate Execution) 
Experiment 5 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Timing of Execution: Immediate Execution vs. 
Delayed Execution) x 3 (Reward Feedback: Cumulative vs. Discreet vs. Simple) design. The 
critical manipulation was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low 
reward on accuracy during mental and physical effort trials in two groups of participants: one 
required to execute their choices immediately after they were made (Immediate Execution 
group), and one executing their choices after a delay (Delayed Execution group: participants 
from Experiment 1). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three Reward 
Feedback groups: Cumulative (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular trial + 
reward accumulated so far), Discreet (accuracy feedback + reward received on a particular 
trial), or Simple (accuracy feedback).  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
3) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution,  
4) H6, which concerns the effects of different types of feedback on effort exertion,  
5) H7, which concerns the effects of delaying Action Execution.  
Participants’ performance on the physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 5 is 
presented in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. Accuracy during mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 5. 
Physical Effort 
Analysis of participants’ accuracy during physical effort trials in Experiment 5 revealed 
significant main effects of Effort Level (χ2(1)=197.10, p<.001) and Reward Level 
(χ2(1)=20.44, p<.001).  
Participants were found to be more accurate when effort was low (β=6.21, SE=1.07, z=5.83, 
p<.001), and when reward was high (β=1.77, SE=.38, z=4.62, p<.001). 
Mental Effort 
As far as the analysis of the accuracy on the mental effort trials is concerned, significant main 
effects of Effort Level (χ2(3)=150.27, p<.001) and Timing of Execution (χ2(2)=50.71, 
p<.001) were found. Interaction between Effort Level and Timing of Execution was also 
found to be significant (χ2(1)=41.00, p<.001).  
In general, participants were found to be more accurate on Low Effort trials than on High 
Effort trials (β=1.64, SE=.20, z=8.15, p<.001). Participants in the Immediate Execution group 
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were also found to be more accurate than participants in the Delayed Execution group (β=.63, 
SE=.21, z=3.06, p=.002). 
Further analyses revealed that participants in the Immediate Execution group were more 
accurate than participants in the Delayed Execution group on Low Effort trials (β=1.42, 
SE=.27, z=5.21, p<.001), but not High Effort trials (p=.88). In addition, participants were 
significantly more accurate on Low Effort trials compared to High Effort trials in both 
Immediate (β=2.21, SE=.24, z=9.39, p<.001) and Delayed (β=.67, SE=.16, z=4.15, p<.001) 
execution groups. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
Comparison of accuracy during mental and physical effort trials revealed a significant main 
effect of Effort Type (χ2(8)=523.38, p<.001), as well as interactions between Effort Type and 
Effort Level (χ2(4)=102.50, p<.001), Effort Type and Reward Level (χ2(2)=9.96, p=.007), 
Effort Type and Timing of Execution (χ2(4)=51.82, p<.001), and Effort Type, Timing of 
Execution and Effort Level (χ2(2)=39.54, p<.001). 
In general, participants were found to be more accurate on the physical effort trials than on 
the mental effort trials (β=1.49, SE=.19, z=7.72, p<.001). 
Further analyses revealed that participants in the Immediate Execution group were 
significantly more accurate on physical effort trials than on mental effort trials when effort 
required was high (β=2.37, SE=.25, z=9.36, p<.001). Participants in this group were also 
found to be significantly more accurate on Low Effort than High Effort trials when effort 
required was mental (β=2.78, SE=.30, z=9.39, p<.001). Unfortunately participants’ accuracy 
on Low Effort physical trials in this group could not be investigated, as there was too little 
variability in performance on these trials (participants were almost 100% correct).  
As far as the Delayed Execution group is concerned, no differences in accuracy between 
mental and physical effort trials were found when the effort required was high (p=.18). 
However, participants in this group were found to be significantly more accurate on physical 
effort trials compared to mental effort trials when effort required was low (β=5.42, SE=1.01, 
z=5.36, p<.001). Participants in this group were also found to be more accurate on Low Effort 
than High Effort trials when effort was mental (β=.68, SE=.24, z=2.85, p=.02) as well as 
physical (β=5.49, SE=1.04, z=5.29, p<.001). Furthermore, participants in the Delayed 
Execution group were found to be significantly more accurate on physical effort trials 
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compared to mental effort trials when reward was high (β=3.94, SE=.56, z=6.99, p<.001) as 
well as low (β=2.08, SE=.62, z=3.36, p=.004). They were also more accurate on High Reward 
trials than Low Reward trials when effort required was physical (β=1.76, SE=.47, z=3.71, 
p=.001), but not mental (p=.98). 
Finally, participants in both Immediate and Delayed Execution groups were found to be more 
accurate on high physical (β=1.34, SE=.24, z=5.66, p<.001) and low mental effort trials 
(β=1.62, SE=.20, z=8.24, p<.001) than on high mental effort trials. They were also found to 
achieve a similar level of accuracy on high physical and low mental effort trials (p=.50), as 
indicated by Figure 22. 
Discussion 
In general, the results of Experiment 5 suggest that: 1) increasing relative reward values can 
lead to increased accuracy in certain circumstances (e.g. when effort required is physical), 2) 
mental and physical effort tasks differed in difficulty, 3) accuracy is driven primarily by 
effort requirements, but reward values can play a role as well in certain circumstances (e.g. 
when effort required is physical), 4) feedback does not influence accuracy, and 5) immediate 
execution improves accuracy on low mental effort trials. 
More specifically, Experiment 5 was designed to investigate five hypotheses derived from the 
V-E-D-M model: H1, H4, H5, H6, and H7. As far as H1 is concerned, the results of 
Experiment 5 indicate that increasing incentives available in a task can improve accuracy in 
certain circumstances, in partial support for this hypothesis, as participants were found to be 
more accurate when rewards were high on physical effort trials. However, no such effect was 
observed on mental effort trials.  
This difference in the effect of rewards on mental and physical effort trials, along with 
differences in the effects of immediate or delayed execution on accuracy during mental and 
physical effort trials, suggest that mental and physical effort might be processed differently 
during Action Execution, contrary to H4, which states that they should be processed in a 
similar way. Furthermore, participants were found to be more accurate on physical effort 
trials compared to mental effort trials, which suggests that these trials were easier than mental 
effort trials. 
The results of Experiment 5 also suggest that accuracy on effort-based decision-making tasks 
is primarily driven by effort requirements (H5), as participants were consistently found to be 
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more accurate on trials which required less effort. Moreover, the findings suggest that 
rewards might affect accuracy in certain circumstances as well, as participants were found to 
be more accurate when rewards were high compared to low on high physical effort trials. 
Contrary to H6, which asserts that different types of feedback should affect accuracy 
differently, no effects of feedback type on accuracy were observed in this experiment.  
In addition, results of Experiment 5 provide some evidence that delaying Action Execution 
can have an impact on accuracy in certain circumstances (H7). This is because participants in 
the Immediate Execution group were found to be more accurate on low mental effort trials 
than participants in the Delayed Execution group. 
6.1.6 Experiment 6 (PD study) 
Experiment 6 was a 2 (Effort Level: High vs. Low) x 2 (Reward Level: High vs. Low) x 2 
(Effort Type: Mental vs. Physical) x 2 (Group: PD vs. HC) design. The critical manipulation 
was comparing the effects of high vs. low effort and high vs. low reward on accuracy during 
mental and physical effort trials in PD patients and HCs.  
These manipulations served to address the following hypotheses:  
1) H1, which concerns the associations between relative reward values and effort,  
2) H4, which concerns the differences between mental and physical effort,  
3) H5, which concerns the factors (reward/effort) driving Action Execution,  
4) H8, which concerns the effects of altered dopaminergic transmission on effort exertion. 
Participants’ performance on the physical and mental effort trials in Experiment 6 is 
presented in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. Accuracy during mental and physical effort trials in Experiment 6. 
Physical Effort 
Analysis of participants’ accuracy on physical effort trials revealed significant main effects of 
Effort Level (χ2(2)=18.01, p<.001) and Reward Level (χ2(2)=16.01, p<.001).  
Participants were found to be more accurate on High Reward trials than on Low Reward 
trials (β=1.91, SE=.54, z=3.54, p<.001). No significant differences in accuracy between high 
and low effort trials (p=.30) were found. 
Mental Effort 
Analysis of accuracy on mental effort trials revealed a significant main effect of Effort Level 
(χ2(1)=174.79, p<.001), as participants were found to be more accurate when effort was low 
(β=2.65, SE=.24, z=11.14, p<.001). No other significant effects were found. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
Comparison of accuracy during mental and physical effort trials revealed a significant main 
effect of Effort Type (χ2(6)=189.15, p<.001). Interaction between Effort Type and Reward 
Level (χ2(2)=15.44, p<.001) was also found to be significant.  
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In general, participants were found to be more accurate on physical effort trials than on 
mental effort trials (β=2.21, SE=.28, z=8.04, p<.001). 
Further analyses showed that participants were more accurate on high (β=2.74, SE=.003, 
z=994.80, p<.001) and low (β=1.58, SE=.004, z=402.28, p<.001) reward trials when effort 
required was physical as compared to mental. They were also more accurate on High Reward 
trials compared to Low Reward trials when effort required was physical (β=1.19, SE=.004, 
z=300.67, p<.001) and when it was mental (β=.04, SE=.003, z=12.83, p<.001). 
Finally, both PD patients and HCs were found to be more accurate on high physical (β=2.75, 
SE=.29, z=9.43, p<.001) and low mental effort trials (β=2.54, SE=.23, z=10.95, p<.001) than 
on high mental effort trials. At the same time they were found to be less accurate on these 
two types of trials than on the low physical effort trials (high physical effort: β=-1.47, 
SE=.48, z=-3.03, p=.01; low mental effort: β=-1.68, SE=.46, z=-3.66, p=.002). They were 
also found to achieve a similar level of accuracy on high physical and low mental effort trials 
(p=.92), as indicated by Figure 23. 
Discussion 
In general, results of Experiment 6 suggest that: 1) increasing relative reward values can lead 
to increased accuracy in certain circumstances (e.g. when effort required is physical), 2) 
mental and physical effort tasks differed in difficulty, 4) dopamine depletion in PD does not 
have a strong influence on accuracy during effort-based decision-making task, at least when 
patients are assessed on dopaminergic medication. 
More specifically, Experiment 6 was designed to investigate four hypotheses derived from 
the V-E-D-M model: H1, H4, H5, and H8. As a far as H1 is concerned, results of this 
experiment indicated that increasing reward values can lead to increased accuracy in certain 
circumstances, in partial support of this hypothesis. Participants were found to be more 
accurate when rewards were high on physical effort trials. No such effect was observed on 
mental effort trials, however. 
Furthermore, participants in Experiment 6 were found to be more accurate on physical effort 
trials compared to mental effort trials (H4), which suggests that physical effort trials were 
easier for them. This result replicates the findings of the previous experiments described in 
this chapter. 
 151 
 
As far as H5 is concerned, results of this experiment suggest that both reward values and 
effort requirements can play a role when determining the accuracy of participants. More 
specifically, in this experiment reward values were found to be the factor driving accuracy 
during physical effort trials, whereas effort requirements drove accuracy during mental effort 
trials. 
In line with the previous studies investigating the effects of dopamine on effort-based 
decision-making it was assumed that decreased levels of dopamine in PD patients would lead 
to decreased accuracy in this group in Experiment 6 (H8). However, no such effect was 
found, suggesting that accuracy is not as reliant on the dopamine levels in the brain as 
previously thought.  
6.2 General discussion 
When assessing the validity of the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model, different behavioural 
measures related to effort processing need to be investigated. One of these measures is 
accuracy, assumed to reflect the amount of effort invested in a task. In the six experiments 
described above participants’ accuracy during the effort-based decision-making task was 
examined. Six areas of interest derived from the V-E-D-M model were investigated in these 
experiments: 1) Reward manipulations, 2) Effort manipulations, 3) Stages of decision-
making, 4) Outcome feedback, 5) Delayed and immediate feedback, 6) Neural underpinnings. 
The rest of this chapter will survey the general pattern of findings across the six experiments 
with respect to the six areas of interest listed above, describing the implications of these 
findings for the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model. 
1) Reward manipulations 
 a) Effects of manipulating reward magnitude on accuracy 
One of the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model is that increasing relative/absolute reward 
values in an effort-based decision-making task should translate into increased effort exertion 
and consequently increased accuracy. The investigations described above provide some 
support for this assumption. As far as the relative reward values are concerned, the results of 
the studies described in this chapter demonstrate that increasing relative values of rewards 
available in a task can lead to increased accuracy in certain circumstances, but that this effect 
is not consistent. More specifically, they show that increasing relative reward values leads to 
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increased accuracy on physical effort trials, so the trials that seem to be relatively easy for 
participants (accuracy is high on these trials). At the same time, relative reward values seem 
to have little effect on accuracy during mental effort trials, which seem to be rather difficult 
for participants (accuracy on these trials is low). This pattern of results suggests either that 
relative reward values influence accuracy only when the effort required is physical, but not 
mental (‘effort type’ hypothesis), or that relative reward values have an impact on accuracy 
only when the task at hand is relatively easy (‘difficulty’ hypothesis).  
The results of the investigations examining the effects of increasing absolute reward values 
on accuracy seem to support the latter hypothesis. In Experiment 4 participants were found to 
adjust their accuracy in line with absolute reward values on low mental effort trials and high 
physical effort trials, so trials of medium difficulty, judging by the accuracy achieved by 
participants on these two types of trials. No effects of absolute reward values were found on 
high mental effort trials, possibly because they were too difficult and participants could not 
increase their accuracy on them even if they wanted to. Furthermore, no effects of rewards 
were found on low physical effort trials, during which accuracy was almost 100%, so could 
not be improved further.  
Taken together, the results of these analyses suggest that increasing relative and absolute 
reward values will only lead to increased accuracy on tasks of medium difficulty. On difficult 
tasks rewards will have little effect on accuracy, as people do not have the skills or resources 
necessary to increase it. On easy tasks, on the other hand, accuracy will not increase either, as 
people are already very accurate. 
b) Effects of manipulating reward valence on accuracy 
According to the V-E-D-M model changing the valence of rewards available during a task 
should lead to changes in the amount of effort exerted, and consequently the accuracy 
achieved. More specifically, accuracy should be higher when participants face potential 
losses, as people seem to be more risk averse in such situations. The results of the 
experiments described above provide partial support for this hypothesis. In Experiment 3 
participants from the Loss group were found to be more accurate than participants from the 
Gain group on low mental effort trials, especially when these trials were associated with high 
losses. Nevertheless, the effects of reward valance were limited to mental effort trials only. 
Such result suggests that changing the reward valence in an effort-based decision-making 
task might affect accuracy on mental effort, but not physical effort tasks (‘effort type’ 
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hypothesis), or that changing reward valence might affect accuracy on tasks which are 
difficult (‘difficulty’ hypotheses). The second hypothesis fits well with the assumption that 
people are more risk averse when losses are at stake, as it suggests that in the face of losses 
participants increase their accuracy on tasks which are difficult and therefore associated with 
a high probability of failure, but not on the easy tasks during which probability of failure is 
small anyway. Therefore, results of the investigations described in this chapter suggest that 
reward valence has a potential to affect effort-based decision-making, but only on difficult 
tasks during which the probability of failure is high. 
c) Effects of manipulating reward reliability on accuracy  
According to the V-E-D-M model, along with reward magnitude and reward valence, reward 
reliability is an important factor affecting effort-based decision-making. The model assumes 
that increasing reward reliability should lead to increased accuracy on tasks which require 
effort exertion. Results of the experiments described in this chapter provide very little support 
for this hypothesis, however, as most investigations looking at the effects of reward reliability 
presented in previous sections did not find any differences in accuracy between groups 
obtaining rewards on 50%, 75%, or 100% of successful trials. There was some indication in 
Experiment 5 that participants on high mental effort trials might be more accurate when the 
reward was deterministic than when it was probabilistic, but this was an isolated finding, 
from which it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions. In general, the results of the 
investigations described in this chapter do not provide strong support for the hypothesis that 
reward reliability affects accuracy on effort-based decision-making tasks. 
2) Effort manipulations 
One of the implicit assumptions of the V-E-D-M model is that mental and physical effort are 
processed in the same way during effort based decision-making. To investigate this 
assumption accuracy on mental and physical effort trials was compared in the experiments 
described in this chapter. The main finding of these comparisons was that participants were 
much more accurate on physical effort trials compared to mental effort trials. This, in turn, 
suggests that physical effort trials were less difficult for participants than mental effort trials, 
which has important consequences for the interpretation of potential differences between 
mental and physical effort found in the six experiments described in this thesis. It means that 
these differences can either be due to genuine differences in processing of mental and 
physical effort or due to differences in task difficulty.  It also means that no strong 
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conclusions about the differences in processing of mental and physical effort can be drawn 
based on the results described in this thesis. 
3) Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection and Action Execution 
According to the V-E-D-M model Action Execution is driven by subjective values assigned 
to the available options during the valuation stage. These subjective values are based on the 
reward values and effort requirements associated with each option. However, which one of 
these factors plays a more important role in determining accuracy during Action Execution is 
less clear. The investigations described in this chapter suggest that effort requirements are the 
primary factor determining accuracy on effort-based tasks, with participants being more 
accurate when effort required is low. However, rewards also seem to play a role in certain 
circumstances because participants were found to be more accurate on high reward trials 
compared to low reward trials when physical effort was required. These findings can be taken 
to suggest that rewards drive accuracy when effort required is physical, but not mental 
(‘effort type’ hypothesis) or that rewards mainly play a role in determining accuracy during 
tasks of medium difficulty (‘difficulty’ hypothesis). The latter hypothesis is in line with what 
has been established in the section describing the effects of manipulating reward magnitude, 
making the ‘difficulty’ explanation more likely. 
4) Outcome feedback 
Considering that outcome feedback plays an important role during Outcome Evaluation, V-E-
D-M model assumes that changing the informative value of this feedback (e.g. changing the 
amount of information it provides about rewards) should have an effect on effort-based tasks. 
This hypothesis, however, has not been supported by the results of investigations described in 
this chapter, as no significant effects of feedback on accuracy were found. Overall, this 
suggests that cumulative, discreet, and simple feedback do not impact effort-based decision-
making differently. 
5) Delayed Action Execution  
According to the V-E-D-M model, learning plays a crucial role in updating representations 
based on which future decisions are made. Therefore, preventing learning through delaying 
Action Execution and Outcome Evaluation could potentially have a big impact on the effort-
based decision-making process, possibly by affecting the accuracy of performance. Results of 
Experiment 2 provide some support for this hypothesis because participants in the Delayed 
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Execution group were found to be less accurate on the low mental effort trials compared to 
participants who executed their actions directly after each choice. Nevertheless, no effects of 
delaying execution were found on physical effort trials, which suggest that the effects of 
delaying Action Execution on accuracy are rather limited. In line with the ‘effort type’ 
hypothesis, the results of this experiment suggest that delaying execution might impact 
accuracy when effort required is mental, but not when it is physical. Alternatively, ‘difficulty’ 
hypothesis suggests that delaying execution might impact accuracy on difficult tasks, but not 
on easy tasks. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
6) Neural underpinnings 
Neurobiological studies on which V-E-D-M model is based suggest that dopamine is crucial 
for invigorating action and increasing effort expenditure. Since increased effort expenditure is 
thought to translate into increased accuracy, it was hypothesised that impaired dopaminergic 
neurotransmission might have an impact on accuracy during effort-based decision-making 
task. However, no evidence of a relationship between dopamine and accuracy was found in 
Experiment 6, suggesting that dopamine might not play an important role in translating effort 
exertion into accuracy. At the same time the results of this study need to be treated with 
caution, as participants taking part in this study were on dopamine replacement therapy, 
which might have affected the results. 
6.3 Summary 
The results of the studies presented in this chapter point to the importance of investigating 
accuracy on effort-based decision-making tasks. It can prove very helpful in interpreting the 
results obtained through examining the choices people make and the amount of effort they 
exert during effort-based decision-making tasks. Taken together, the results from these three 
measures provide crucial information for establishing the validity of the assumptions of the 
V-E-D-M model proposed in this thesis. Therefore, in the next chapter participants’ choices, 
effort exertion and accuracy are examined together. Based on these examinations a revised 
version of the V-E-D-M model is proposed. 
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CHAPTER 7: General Discussion 
Effort-based decision-making is a process people engage in when they have to trade off the 
costs and benefits of putting in effort (conventionally, though not always, seen as a cost) to 
gain a reward. This type of situation is subsumed into a more general form of decision-
making, commonly referred to as value-based decision-making. Value-based decision-
making concerns any situation in which a decision maker has to offset the gains against the 
costs of selecting a particular option from alternatives. During effort-based decision-making 
the specific cost that needs to be taken into account is effort. 
People engage in effort-based decision-making on a daily basis, whenever they have to 
decide if it is worth putting in effort to obtain rewards. In spite of the fact that it is so 
widespread, the mechanisms driving this process are still relatively unknown and no formal 
models of effort-based decision-making exist. Therefore, in this thesis a novel model of 
effort-based decision-making, the V-E-D-M model, was introduced. Unlike previous models, 
on which it was based (by Assadi et al., 2009; Doya, 2008; Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Kable & 
Glimcher, 2009; Rangel et al., 2008; Rigoux & Guigon, 2012), the V-E-D-M model 
concentrated specifically on effort-based decision-making, rather than value-based decision-
making in general.  
The V-E-D-M model assumed that effort based decision-making consists of six stages: 1) 
Representation, 2) Valuation, 3) Action Selection, 4) Action Execution, 5) Outcome 
Evaluation, and 6) Learning (see Figure 1). During the Representation stage people encode 
the options available in a given decision-making scenario. This is followed by the Valuation 
stage, during which each option is assigned a subjective value, based on the benefits 
associated with this option and the effort required to obtain them. This subjective value 
constitutes the basis on which different options are then compared during the Action 
Selection stage, and the most beneficial option is chosen. Once an option has been selected, it 
is executed during the Action Execution stage. The feedback generated by this process is 
then evaluated during the Outcome Evaluation stage, and this serves as a basis for updating 
representations during the Learning stage.   
The V-E-D-M model makes certain assumptions regarding processing of effort, rewards, and 
feedback during the six stages described above. Some of these assumptions overlap with the 
assumptions made by the existing value-based decision-making models described in Chapter 
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1.  Many of them have never been investigated before, however, which means that there are 
core assumptions the V-E-D-M model makes for which there is either limited or no evidence. 
These assumptions relate to six specific areas: 1) Reward manipulations, 2) Effort 
manipulations, 3) Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection and Action Execution 
4) Outcome feedback, 5) Delayed Action Execution, and 6) Neural underpinnings. For 
example, based on results of previous studies, the model assumes that rewards play a crucial 
role in determining subjective values assigned to options. These values are thought to drive 
Action Selection and Action Execution, and so manipulating important reward characteristics 
such as reward magnitude, valence and reliability should influence behaviour during these 
two stages. In line with previous literature, the model also makes the assumption that mental 
and physical effort are processed in the same way throughout the stages of decision-making. 
In addition, it states that feedback from the decision-making process forms the basis for 
Outcome Evaluation, and so manipulating reward feedback or delaying Action Execution 
should have an impact on Outcome Evaluation and Learning. Finally, it predicts that altered 
dopaminergic neurotransmission should affect effort processing, due to an important role of 
this neurotransmitter during effort-based decision-making.   
To assess the validity of the assumptions described above, the effects of manipulating reward, 
effort, and feedback on effort-based decision-making were investigated in six experiments 
forming the empirical part of this thesis. More specifically, these six experiments examined 
the effects of manipulating 1) reward: a) magnitude, b) valence, c) reliability, 2) effort type, 
3) effort level, 4) feedback, 5) timing of execution, and 6) dopamine on behaviour during a 
novel effort-based decision-making task. The rest of this chapter will survey the key results 
from these experiments across three critical behavioural measures (i.e. choice of action, 
execution of actions, and accuracy of performed actions) and relate them back to the V-E-D-
M model. From this evaluation, a modified version of the V-E-D-M model will be proposed 
(see Figure 24). The discussion will end with some consideration of the type of experimental 
design used in the present project. 
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Figure 24. Modified Value-Effort Decision-Making model. Assumptions added to the model 
in response to the findings of this thesis are presented in circles. 
7.1 Reward manipulations 
7.1.1 Reward magnitude 
The V-E-D-M model assumes that rewards play a crucial role during effort-based decision-
making. They are supposed to affect subjective values assigned to options during the 
Valuation stage, determine which option gets chosen during the Action Selection stage, and 
influence how much effort is put in during the Action Execution stage. In general, the model 
assumes that increasing rewards should lead to an increase in the subjective values attached 
to the choice alternatives people face. This, in turn, should lead to an increased willingness to 
choose effortful actions, increased effort expenditure, and increased accuracy. Studies of 
effort-based decision-making conducted so far seem to generally support this assumption. 
They show a  strong influence of reward  on effort-based choices and execution (Bijleveld et 
al., 2012; Bijleveld et al., 2014; Bonnelle et al., 2014; Burke et al., 2013; Capa et al., 2011; 
Representation 
Valuation 
Action 
Selection 
Action 
Execution 
Outcome 
Evaluation 
Learning  Relative reward values 
play a bigger role  than 
absolute reward values 
during this stage 
 This stage is driven by 
reward values 
 Reward reliability has limited 
influence during this stage 
 This stage is driven by 
effort  requirements 
 Rewards affect behaviour 
only during tasks of 
medium  difficulty 
 Reward reliability does 
not influence behaviour 
during this stage 
 Reward feedback is not 
crucial during this stage 
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Chong et al., 2015; Croxson et al., 2009; Hartmann et al., 2013; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; 
Krebs et al., 2012; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Le Bouc & Pessiglione, 2013; Marien et al., 2014; 
Pas et al., 2014; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Treadway et al., 2009; Zedelius et al., 2011).  
Nevertheless, the results of some investigations suggest that the relationship between rewards 
and effort might not be as straightforward. For example, several experiments have found that 
rewards modulate effort exertion when the effort that is required is high, but not when it is 
low (e.g. Bijleveld et al., 2009; Bijleveld et al., 2012; Bijleveld et al., 2014; Marien et al., 
2014). Other experiments have observed that rewards influence how much effort is put in 
during tasks of medium difficulty, but not during very difficult tasks (Glucksberg, 1962; 
Pelham & Neter, 1995; W. F. Wright & Aboul-Ezz, 1988). Furthermore, most of the studies 
mentioned above have looked at relative, rather than absolute rewards. With the exception of 
the empirical investigations described in this thesis, there has been no work examining the 
effects of increasing absolute reward values on performance during effort-based decision-
making. For that reason, the effects of increasing relative and absolute reward values on 
participants’ behaviour during choice and execution were examined in the six experiments 
described in this thesis. 
In general, the findings from these experiments suggest that the effects of rewards differ 
depending on the stage of the decision-making process. During the Action Selection stage 
increasing relative, but not absolute, reward values was found to lead to an increased 
willingness to choose effortful options, in line with the V-E-D-M model assumptions and 
previous studies (Bonnelle et al., 2014; Chong et al., 2015; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Treadway 
et al., 2009). During the Action Execution stage, on the other hand, the effects of increasing 
relative and absolute reward values were found to be limited. In three out of six experiments 
(Experiment 1: Gains; Experiment 3: Reliability; Experiment 4: Increased rewards) no effects 
of increasing relative rewards on effort expenditure were observed, as participants exerted 
similar amounts of effort on trials associated with high and low rewards. Participants facing 
potential losses (Experiment 2: Losses) were found to put in more effort when rewards were 
high, but this effect was observed only on low mental effort trials and high physical effort 
trials. Participants required to execute their choices immediately after making them 
(Experiment 5: Immediate Execution) were also found to exert more effort for higher 
rewards, but only on physical effort trials. The general conclusion from these findings seems 
to be that even though rewards influence the choices people make, their effect on effort 
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expenditure is limited. More specifically, rewards seem to affect effort exertion only in 
certain circumstances. The investigations of participants’ accuracy during the effort-based 
decision-making task can shed a light as to what these circumstances might be. 
Analysis of the accuracy data suggests that the effect of rewards on effort exertion might be 
mediated by task difficulty. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, participants were found 
to increase their effort exertion in response to high rewards on low mental effort trials and 
high physical effort trials in Experiment 2, and on physical effort trials in Experiment 5. 
Analysis of participants’ accuracy on these trials suggests that they shared a common 
characteristic – they were of medium difficulty. Participants were found to be significantly 
more accurate on these trials than on high mental effort trials in Experiments 1, 2, 5 and 6 
(see Appendix B). At the same time, participants were found to be less accurate on these 
trials than on low physical effort trials. This pattern of findings suggests that low mental 
effort trials and high physical effort trials were of medium difficulty compared to the other 
types of trials available during the task.  Considering that participants were found to increase 
their effort exertion in response to high rewards on these two particular types of trials in 
Experiments 2 and 5, it implies that relative reward values influence effort exertion only on 
trials of medium difficulty. Results of several previous studies provide further support for this 
hypothesis. For example, Glucksberg (1962) manipulated task complexity in two experiments 
involving a problem solving task and a perceptual task. In each experiment, incentives were 
found to have a positive effect on performance in the easy version of the task but a negative 
effect on performance in the complex version. Similarly, Pelham and Neter (1995), using 
judgement tasks of different levels of difficulty, observed that subjects who received the easy 
version of the task performed better with incentives, while those subjects who received the 
complex version did not. Finally, W. F. Wright and Aboul-Ezz (1988) asked business school 
students to perform frequency assessments for monetary rewards, and they found that 
incentives had a greater positive effect in simple tasks than in more complex tasks. 
Nevertheless, the hypothesis that rewards influence effort exertion only on tasks of medium 
difficulty does not account for all the findings presented above. For example it does not 
explain why rewards should only affect performance when losses are at stake or the execution 
is immediate (Experiments 2 and 5), or why should they affect effort-based choice and 
execution differently. 
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All in all, the findings from the six studies described in this thesis suggest that the 
relationship between rewards and effort during effort-based decision-making is not as 
straightforward as assumed by the V-E-D-M model. First of all, it seems that the effects of 
rewards depend on the stage of decision-making people are involved in. During the Action 
Selection stage increasing relative (but not absolute) reward values increases people’s 
willingness to choose effortful options, which is consistent with the model and prior research. 
However, rewards per se have a limited effect on execution, and this appears to be mostly in 
specific contexts (e.g. when losses are at stake or execution of an action is immediate), and 
only on tasks of medium difficulty. Second, evidence presented in this thesis suggests that 
increasing absolute rewards does not impact on behaviour during effort-based decision-
making. It does not influence choices people make during Action Selection, and it has limited 
consequences for performance during Action Execution. 
Modified model  
In response to the results presented above, the V-E-D-M model was modified (see Figure 24). 
In the revised V-E-D-M model relative reward values are assumed to affect behaviour more 
than absolute reward values during effort-based decision-making. Furthermore, the effects of 
rewards on effort processing are assumed to depend on the stage of the decision-making 
process. Relative rewards are thought to affect the willingness to choose effortful options 
during the Action Selection stage. At the same time, they are assumed to have a limited 
impact on effort exertion during the Action Execution stage. During this latter stage, 
influence of rewards is assumed to be limited to tasks of medium difficulty. These 
modifications to the model raise three important questions: 1) Why should relative reward 
values matter more than absolute reward values when making effort-based decisions? 2) Why 
should rewards affect behaviour differently at different stages of decision-making? 3) Why 
should rewards influence behaviour on trials of medium difficulty, but not on easy or difficult 
trials? The following section suggests potential answers to these questions, providing a 
rationale for the modifications to the V-E-D-M model and explaining some of the findings 
presented in this thesis. 
The first assumption of the modified V-E-D-M model is that relative reward values matter 
more than absolute reward values when making effort-based decisions. The Decision by 
Sampling (DbS) model (Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006) provides a plausible explanation as 
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to why this might be the case. This model suggests that there is no such thing as an innate 
value weighting function or scale representing absolute reward values within the decision-
making process. Rather, the value of rewards experienced within a decision-making scenario 
is construed based on previous experiences stored in memory. Choice between different 
options is made based on a rank ordering system which compares the attributes of different 
options with similar items recalled from memory. Several neuroimaging studies provide 
support for the DbS model, showing context-dependent activations in response to different 
monetary values in ventral striatum, vmPFC and ACC (Elliott, Newman, Longe, & Deakin, 
2003; Mullett & Tunney, 2013). The implication of this model is that manipulating relative 
reward values within a task should have a bigger impact on performance than manipulating 
absolute reward values between tasks (especially when the differences between rewards 
available in these tasks are not big). This is because the relative reward values experienced at 
the beginning of a task provide a fresh trace in memory to which all the other values within a 
task can be compared. Nevertheless, this hypothesis requires further investigations. These 
investigations could introduce additional information into the task set-up, aimed at altering 
the recent memory traces associated with rewards. From the work in this thesis, the prediction 
that follows is that changing recent memory traces associated with rewards should affect the 
values attached to different options, leading to changes in behaviour during Action Selection 
and Action Execution. 
Another assumption the revised V-E-D-M model makes is that rewards should affect 
behaviour during the Action Selection stage, but not during the Action Execution stage. This 
might be because people shift their attention from rewards to effort requirements once they 
begin to exert effort. For example, Hutchinson and Tenenbaum (2007) monitored a group of 
participants during two effortful tasks: a hand grip task and a stationary cycling task. They 
asked participants to verbally report all the thoughts they had while exerting effort. 
Hutchinson and Tenenbaum (2007) found that as the effort requirement increased, so did the 
number of thoughts related to the physical sensation of effort reported by participants. 
Tenenbaum and Connolly (2008) observed similar effects in a group of university rowers 
asked to row at 30%, 50%, or 75% of their maximum capacity. They have found that rowers 
had a tendency to concentrate on the bodily sensations associated with effort exertion during 
the task, and even more so as the effort requirements increased. Overall, this set of findings 
suggests that during effort exertion people tend to focus on the effort component of the task, 
especially when the effort required is high. 
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In line with these findings, Boksem and Tops (2008) suggested that effort exerted during 
mental and physical effort tasks is constantly monitored during the Action Execution stage. 
The purpose of this monitoring is to determine if an effortful action should continue or should 
be abandoned. They claim that the effort already expended is taken into account in an 
‘online’ cost/benefit analysis that goes on during Action Execution. If the effort expended is 
perceived as exceeding the value of potential reward, then this results in decreased motivation 
and increased fatigue, or even cessation of effortful behaviour altogether. By extension, 
Meyniel et al. (2014) proposed the existence of a cost evidence signal which accumulates 
during Action Execution, which influences the level of motivation invested in carrying out an 
effortful task. 
Furthermore, Gilbert and Fiez (2004) and Pochon et al. (2002) demonstrated that activation in 
the ventral frontal cortex (VFC), responsible for reward processing, increased in response to 
rewards presented in preparation for a cognitively demanding task. At the same time, 
activation in this structure decreased substantially during the execution of the task. Pochon et 
al. (2002) concluded that VFC activity might be suppressed during cognitively demanding 
tasks in order to minimize interference by thoughts and emotional responses evoked by a 
reward.  
Taken together, the evidence presented above suggests that different effects of rewards 
during Action Selection and Action Execution might stem from the fact that the relative 
importance of these two factors changes from the former stage to the latter. It seems that 
during Action Selection rewards determine subjective values of options, and so are more 
likely to influence behaviour. During Action Execution, on the other hand, effort becomes 
more salient than reward, and so rewards do not affect behaviour as much. To lend further 
support to this interpretation, future studies could utilise other, more reliable techniques of 
investigating the focus of participants during Action Selection and Action Execution, for 
example eye tracking. Based on the results described in this thesis, the prediction would be 
that participants should focus their attention on cues associated with rewards during the 
Action Selection stage, and on cues associated with effort during the Action Execution stage. 
Finally, the revised V-E-D-M model assumes that during Action Execution rewards should 
mainly influence effort exertion on tasks of medium difficulty. The simplest explanation as to 
why this might be the case is that on such tasks increased effort exertion translates into 
increased chances of obtaining a reward. This is not always the case on the very easy or very 
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difficult tasks. On easy tasks, during which accuracy is very high anyway, additional effort 
exertion cannot improve performance due to the ceiling effect, and so there is no point 
putting in extra effort. On difficult trials, on the other hand, participants may not have the 
skills necessary for improving performance, and so additional effort exertion may not 
translate into higher chances of obtaining rewards. On tasks of medium difficulty, however, 
participants should have the skills necessary to improve performance and increase accuracy, 
and so it is worth for them to increase their effort exertion when rewards are high, to increase 
their chances of obtaining them. This explanation is in line with the findings of Camerer and 
Hogarth (1999), who conducted a review of 74 studies investigating the effects of monetary 
incentives on performance. From this review, they have concluded that monetary rewards are 
capable of improving task outcomes, but only when increasing effort expenditure improves 
performance. On tasks in which there is intrinsic motivation to perform well, or additional 
effort does not matter because the task is too difficult or has an upper payoff limit which can 
be easily reached, rewards do not affect behaviour. This conclusion has been supported by 
Bonner et al. (2000) reading of the finance and management literature. They also found that 
as task difficulty increased, the influence of rewards of performance decreased. Nevertheless, 
considering that investigating the effects of rewards on performance during tasks of different 
difficulty was not one of the explicit aims of this thesis, this area requires further 
investigations. Specifically, further studies looking at the effect reward magnitude on easy, 
medium, and difficult tasks are needed, to establish if the effect of reward on effort exertion 
is mediated by the task difficulty. From the empirical work in this thesis, the prediction 
would be that in such studies the effects of rewards should be observed solely on the task of 
medium difficulty. 
7.1.2 Reward valence 
Besides reward magnitude, another factor which is assumed by the V-E-D-M model to affect 
effort-based decision-making is reward valence. More specifically, the model assumes, in line 
with studies on risk-based decision-making by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), that people 
are risk averse in the face of losses. This risk aversion should translate into reduced 
preference for effortful options during Action Selection, as well as increased effort 
expenditure and increased accuracy during Action Execution. However, evidence exists to 
suggest that this might not always be the case. For example, Kurniawan et al. (2013), 
conducted an experiment which involved squeezing a hand grip to win or avoid losing 
money. In this experiment they observed shorter reaction times and faster speed to reach the 
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grip strength required when participants had a chance to win money as opposed to losing it. 
This means that participants were exerting more effort in the face of gains rather than losses, 
which suggests that they were not risk averse. Ambiguous results such as this from the 
limited work on the effect of reward valence on effort-based decision-making were a key 
reason for exploring this further in this thesis.  
The evidence from the studies presented in the previous chapters generally supports the 
assumption of the V-E-D-M model that people become risk-averse in the face of losses and 
that this affects effort-based decision-making. As far as the Action Selection stage is 
concerned, the present work showed that participants making effort-based decisions with the 
aim of avoiding losses were more likely to choose easy, low effort options compared to 
participants aiming to obtain gains. This suggests that participants in the Loss group had a 
preference for options associated with a lower risk of failure during this task, which fits with 
the assumption that people are risk averse when losses are at stake. 
Furthermore, during Action Execution participants facing losses were found to exert more 
effort than participants facing gains, although this effect was limited to mental effort trials. 
Considering that mental effort trials were more difficult for participants, and therefore 
associated with a higher risk of failure and incurring a loss, this result also fits with the 
assumption that people are risk averse. Moreover, it suggests that the increase in effort 
exertion in response to losses depends on how risky/difficult the task is, with participants 
increasing their effort expenditure on tasks which are risky/difficult, but not on tasks which 
are relatively risk-free/easy. 
The results of the investigations into the effects of gains and losses on accuracy also support 
this interpretation. They showed that, compared to participants facing gains, participants 
facing losses were more accurate on difficult, mental effort trials, but not on easy, physical 
effort trials. Participants were also found to be more accurate on mental effort trials 
associated with high potential losses compared to trials associated with low potential losses, 
further suggesting that participants were particularly risk averse when the consequences of 
failure were most severe. 
All in all, the results of the studies described in this thesis confirm the assumption of the V-E-
D-M model that people are risk averse in the face of losses and that they adjust effort-based 
decision making process to minimize the risk of failure when losses are at stake.  
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The results presented above are well explained by the principle of loss aversion, as proposed 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In  Prospect Theory (1979), they suggested that people 
assess potential outcomes of a decision-making scenario in relation to a reference state, and 
that during this assessment potential losses loom larger than gains (see also Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991), which leads to increased risk aversion in response to losses. Our findings 
demonstrate how this risk aversion plays out during effort based decision-making tasks, 
showing that it leads to avoidance of options associated with high effort during Action 
Selection and increased effort exertion during Action Execution.  
However, an alternative explanation of our findings is provided by the psychological law of 
inertia, as proposed by Gal (2006) and Kahneman (2011). Psychological law of inertia states 
that people have a propensity to remain at the status quo, which determines their behaviour 
when gains and losses are at stake. In the case of the Loss experiment described in this thesis, 
the law predicts that participants should behave in a manner that would reduce the chances of 
a change in the status quo, so a change in the initial endowment of £6.40. The findings of this 
thesis support this prediction, showing that people engaged in behaviours aimed at preventing 
change in the sum of money given to them at the beginning of experiment. They did it 
through choosing low effort options during Action Selection and exerting more effort during 
Action Execution.  
Considering that both loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and psychological law of 
inertia (Gal, 2006; Kahneman, 2011) explain the pattern of findings presented in this thesis, 
further investigations are needed to establish which one of these principles drives behaviour 
during effort-based decision-making tasks. If maintaining the status quo is important, it can 
be predicted that in future tasks people should not alter their behaviour in response to losses, 
providing that these losses do not affect the endowment guaranteed at the beginning of the 
task. If, however, people are loss averse, changes of behaviour in response to losses would be 
expected, regardless of whether the losses diminish the initial endowment or not. 
7.1.3 Reward reliability 
In addition to magnitude and valence, another important reward characteristic thought to 
affect effort-based decision-making according to the V-E-D-M model is reliability. More 
specifically, the model assumes that the willingness to choose and perform effortful actions 
should increase in line with the probability of obtaining rewards, and so people should be 
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most willing to invest effort when rewards are guaranteed. Results of the studies using 
probabilistic rewards as incentives during effort-based decision-making tasks provide some 
support for this hypothesis. They show that people are more willing to choose effortful 
options (Treadway et al., 2009), more willing to exert effort, and more accurate (Kurniawan 
et al., 2013) when probability of obtaining rewards is high. However, in the absence of a 
larger number of studies investigating the effects of reward reliability on effort based 
decision-making, it is impossible to assess the validity of the assumption made by the V-E-D-
M regarding the effects of probabilistic rewards. Therefore, one of the aims of this thesis was 
to investigate the effects of reward reliability on Action Selection and Action Execution, to 
provide evidence clarifying this issue. 
In general, results of the investigation conducted in this thesis suggest that the relationship 
between reward reliability and effort is not as straightforward as assumed by the V-E-D-M 
model. Contrary to the predictions of the model, no effects of changing the probability of 
obtaining rewards on effort exertion and accuracy during the Action Execution stage were 
observed. During the Action Selection stage, participants were found to behave in a similar 
way when rewards were deterministic and when they were unreliable. In both conditions 
participants showed a strong preference for low effort trials over high effort trials. In contrast, 
participants experiencing probabilistic rewards were found to be just as likely to choose high 
effort trials and low effort trials. They were also found to be more likely to choose high effort 
trials than participants experiencing deterministic rewards.  
The fact that participants in the probabilistic condition were found to be just as likely to 
choose high and low effort trials is somewhat surprising considering the assumptions of the 
V-E-D-M model and the results of the previous studies. One of the possible explanations of 
this finding is that participants in the probabilistic condition made an implicit association 
between effort exertion and acquisition of rewards, and consequently increased their choices 
of high effort trials in an attempt to maximize gains. Since in the probabilistic condition 
rewards could be obtained on 75% of successful trials, increased effort exertion did indeed 
maximize the probability of obtaining rewards in this condition. It seems likely that 
participants generalized from this observation made during the Training phase to the Choice 
phase, and assumed that increased willingness to exert effort should also translate into higher 
probability of obtaining rewards, which would explain their pattern of choices. However, 
further studies would be required to confirm if this was actually the case. These studies 
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should investigate if changing participants’ beliefs regarding the effects of increased effort 
expenditure on the probability of obtaining rewards would have an impact on behaviour 
during Action Selection. 
Taken together, the results described above indicate that the effects of reward reliability on 
effort-based decision-making depend on the stage of this process. During the Action 
Selection stage, altering reward reliability seems to have no effect on the choices people 
make, unless it leads people to believe that by increasing their effort expenditure they can 
increase their chances of obtaining rewards. During the Action Execution stage, reward 
reliability seems not to affect behaviour at all.  
Modified model  
In response to these findings, the V-E-D-M model was modified (see Figure 24). The revised 
version of the model assumes that the effects of reward reliability differ depending on the 
stage of effort based decision-making.  During Action Selection, reward reliability has a 
potential to influence behaviour, but only if a decision-maker believes that their choices can 
influence the likelihood of obtaining rewards. During Action Execution, reward reliability 
does not affect performance. These modifications to the model raise an important question: 
Why should reward probability affect Action Selection stage, but not Action Execution 
stage?  
A possible explanation is that rewards are more salient during Action Selection than during 
Action Execution. As described in section 7.1.1, evidence exists to suggest that during Action 
Execution people tend to concentrate on the effort requirements of a task, rather than on 
rewards (Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; Gilbert & Fiez, 2004; Hutchinson & 
Tenenbaum, 2007; Meyniel et al., 2013; Pochon et al., 2002; Tenenbaum & Connolly, 2008). 
It is, therefore, possible that during this stage people pay less attention to different reward 
characteristics, and this is why no effects of reward reliability on effort exertion were found 
in this thesis. One test of this would be to assess the focus of attention during Action 
Selection and Action Execution using methods such as eye tracking, as described in section 
7.1.1. This would help to establish which components of the decision-making scenario are 
attended to during effort-based choice and execution. 
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7.2 Effort manipulations 
In addition to the hypotheses regarding the effects of different reward characteristics on 
effort-based decision-making, V-E-D-M model also makes assumptions about the effects of 
effort type. More specifically, the model assumes that mental and physical effort are 
processed in a similar way and so their effects on effort-based decision-making should be 
comparable. This assumption is supported by the results of several studies investigating effort 
exertion during mental and physical tasks, showing similar pattern of results for these two 
types of effort (e.g. Ostaszewski et al., 2013; Pas et al., 2014). Nevertheless, direct 
comparisons of effort-based decision-making during mental and physical tasks are rare, and 
so one of the aims of this thesis was to investigate the potential similarities and differences in 
processing of mental and physical effort during effort-based decision-making. 
Contrary to the assumption of the V-E-D-M model that mental and physical effort are 
processed in the same way during effort-based decision-making, differences in behaviour on 
mental and physical effort trials were observed in this thesis. However, the interpretation of 
this finding is problematic, considering that mental effort trials were found to be more 
difficult for participants than physical effort trials, based on the accuracy achieved by 
participants across experiments. This, in turn, means that the differences between mental and 
physical effort identified in this thesis might either reflect 1) genuine differences in 
processing of mental and physical effort, or 2) differences in task difficulty.  
The latter of the two explanations seems particularly likely, considering that task difficulty 
has been found to affect behaviour in previous studies investigating the effects of monetary 
rewards on performance. For example, Bailey and Fessler (2011) asked participants to 
complete jigsaw puzzles of different levels of difficulty for an opportunity to win small 
monetary rewards. They found that monetary rewards improved participants’ performance on 
tasks of low difficulty, but had little effect on performance during difficult tasks. 
Furthermore, R. A. Wright, Contrada, and Patane (1986) examined cardiovascular reactivity 
(as a measure of effort exertion) in response to monetary incentives during memory tasks of 
different difficulty (low vs. medium vs. high). They observed that monetary incentives had an 
impact on cardiovascular responses, and therefore on effort exertion, during tasks of medium 
difficulty but not easy or very difficult tasks.  
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Bonner and Sprinkle (2002), based on a review of available literature, suggested that task 
difficulty can 1) decrease effort intensity and effort duration during a task, leading to 
decreased performance, and 2) attenuate the effects of effort on performance through 
increasing skill requirements. Decrease in effort intensity and duration is observed when 
rewards available are not deemed worth the increased effort expenditure necessary to 
complete the task. Attenuation of the effects of increased effort exertion, on the other hand, is 
observed when rewards are deemed worth the effort required, but participants lack the skills 
necessary for successful completion of the task. General conclusion from the review by 
Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) was that increased task difficulty is likely to attenuate positive 
effects incentives have on effort exertion. The results presented in this thesis seem to support 
this conclusion, as participants were found to modulate their performance in response to 
rewards on physical effort trials, which were relatively easy, but not on mental effort trials, 
which were difficult.  
Considering the results of the previous studies presented above, it is likely that the 
differences in behaviour between mental and physical effort trials observed in this thesis 
result from the differences in task difficulty, rather than genuine differences in processing of 
these two types of effort. For that reason, the investigations described in this work do not 
provide the necessary information needed to establish the validity of the assumption of the V-
E-D-M model that mental and physical effort are processed in a similar way. Therefore, 
further investigations are required. Development of mental and physical effort tasks of 
similar difficulty, as measured by participants’ accuracy, would be of paramount importance 
for these investigations. Furthermore, including trials of various difficulties (e.g. low vs. 
medium vs. high) would also be essential. In such a task set-up, participants should show no 
differences in behaviour on mental and physical effort tasks of similar difficulty, providing 
that mental and physical effort are processed in a similar way. Furthermore, if task 
complexity influences performance during mental and physical effort trials, as hypothesised 
above, differences in behaviour on tasks of different difficulty should be observed. 
7.3 Importance of effort/reward during Action Selection and Action Execution 
One of the main assumptions of the V-E-D-M model is that Action Selection and Action 
Execution are driven by subjective values assigned to available options during the valuation 
stage. These subjective values are thought to be based on the reward values associated with 
each option and the estimated effort required for obtaining them. However, which one of 
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these factors is more important in driving behaviour during effort-based decision-making is 
yet to be established. Many studies conducted so far suggest that rewards are the main 
determinant of choice and execution. They show that participants consistently select options 
associated with higher rewards and exert more effort on high reward trials during effort-based 
decision-making tasks (e.g. Bijleveld et al., 2009; Bijleveld et al., 2010, 2011, 2012; 
Bijleveld et al., 2014; Bonnelle et al., 2014; Hartmann et al., 2013; Kool et al., 2010; Krebs et 
al., 2012; Le Bouc & Pessiglione, 2013; Marien et al., 2014; Pas et al., 2014; Pessiglione et 
al., 2007; Treadway et al., 2009; Zedelius et al., 2011). However, other studies suggest that 
monetary rewards are not necessary for effort mobilization (e.g. Botvinick et al., 2009; 
Kroemer et al., 2014; Satterthwaite et al., 2012). In fact, Brehm and Self (1989) suggest that 
during Action Execution effort invested in a task depends not on the incentives present, but 
rather on the task difficulty. In their Theory of Motivation, Brehm and Self (1989) postulate 
that rewards determine potential motivation, defined as the maximum level of effort people 
are willing to exert to obtain these rewards. As long as effort required by the task falls within 
the limit set by potential motivation, the actual level of effort exerted during the task should 
depend on task difficulty rather than reward values. Therefore, two competing views exist as 
to what drives effort-based choice and execution: reward values or effort requirements. The 
validity of these competing views was examined in the six experiments forming the empirical 
part of this thesis. 
The main finding of these investigations is that that different factors seem to play a role 
during the Action Selection stage and the Action Execution stage. During Action Selection 
rewards seem to be the most important aspect taken into account when making choices, as 
participants were consistently found to select trials associated with high rewards throughout 
the six experiments described in this thesis. During Action Execution, on the other hand, the 
amount of effort required to obtain rewards was found to be a more consistent predictor of 
behaviour, with participants exerting more effort on high effort trials compared to low effort 
trials regardless of the rewards associated with them. Also, both effort requirements and 
reward values were found to influence accuracy, although the effect of rewards was only 
visible on tasks of medium difficulty.  
Taken together these results suggest that both effort requirements and reward values drive 
behaviour during effort-based decision-making, but their importance changes depending on 
the stage of the process. Choice seems to be primarily driven by reward values, whereas 
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effort exertion seems to be driven by effort requirements, in line with the Theory of 
Motivation by Brehm and Self (1989). Accuracy seems to be affected by both these factors.  
Results of several studies conducted so far seem to support these conclusions. As far as the 
Action Selection stage is concerned, studies looking at choices people make when effort is 
required have consistently found a strong preference for options associated with high 
rewards, regardless of the effort level associated with them (e.g. Kurniawan et al., 2010; 
Treadway et al., 2012; Treadway et al., 2009; Wardle et al., 2012; Wardle et al., 2011). For 
example, Treadway et al. (2009) used a novel Effort Expenditure for Rewards Task (EEfRT) 
to investigate effort-based decision-making in people with different levels of anhedonia trait. 
This task required participants to choose between options associated with different levels of 
physical effort (squeezing a joystick) and reward. They found that reward magnitude was a 
significant predictor of people’s choices, regardless of the anhedonia levels, and that 
participants were more willing to choose high effort trials when reward at stake was higher. 
Furthermore, in several other studies an increased willingness to choose effortful options was 
observed when rewards were increased (e.g. Bonnelle et al., 2014; Hartmann et al., 2013; 
Ostaszewski et al., 2013). Bonnelle et al. (2014) investigated people’s willingness to exert 
physical effort (squeeze a joystick) for monetary rewards using an adaptive algorithm in 
which a choice given to a participant on a given trial depended on their previous choices. 
They demonstrated that people’s willingness to choose effortful options in their task 
increased with increasing reward magnitude. Taken together, results of the studies described 
above suggest that choices people make during effort-based decision-making tasks are driven 
by reward values, in line with the findings of this thesis. 
At the same time, some brain imaging studies suggest that the role of rewards becomes much 
less pronounced during the Action Execution stage. For example, several studies showed 
increased activation in the VFC (involved in reward processing) at the time of reward 
presentation but not during effort exertion (Gilbert & Fiez, 2004; Pochon et al., 2002). This is 
in line with the findings of this thesis, which suggest that during Action Execution effort 
exertion is driven by task requirements, rather than reward values. 
Studies investigating Theory of Motivation by Brehm and Self (1989) provide further support 
for the claim that effort requirements drive Action Execution. For example, Eubanks et al. 
(2002) examined the effects of rewards on mental effort exertion during tasks of different 
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levels of difficulty. They observed that effort exerted during a task was proportional to task 
difficulty, rather than incentive value. They took these results to suggest that effort 
expenditure during a task is normally driven by task requirements, unless effort required is so 
high that it can only be justified by high rewards (see also Gendolla & Richter, 2006; Marien 
et al., 2014; Meyniel et al., 2014).  
Modified Model 
Based on the evidence presented in this thesis regarding the effects of effort and reward on 
Action Selection and Action Execution, the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model were 
modified (see Figure 24). The revised model assumes that during effort-based decision-
making Action Selection is driven primarily by reward values, whereas Action Execution is 
driven by effort requirements. At the same time, reward values can affect performance during 
Action Execution (particularly accuracy) providing that decision-maker has the skills 
necessary to complete the task (i.e. the task is not too difficult) and the amount of effort 
required by the task is justified by high, but not low rewards. 
7.4 Outcome feedback 
Another assumption that V-E-D-M model makes is that outcome feedback serves as a basis 
for Outcome Evaluation and Learning. For that reason altering the amount of information 
provided by outcome feedback can potentially have a strong impact on the effort-based 
decision-making process. However, this assumption has never been tested directly, despite 
the fact that evidence exists to suggest that cumulative, discreet and simple feedback might 
be processed differently during decision-making (e.g. Osman, 2011). Therefore, in this thesis 
the effects of these three types of feedback on effort-based decision-making were 
investigated. 
In general, results of the studies presented in this thesis suggest that changing the amount of 
reward information provided by the outcome feedback does not affect behaviour during 
effort-based decision-making. It seems that cumulative reward feedback, or indeed any 
reward feedback presented after the choices are made and effort is executed, has little effect 
on behaviour during effort-based decision making.  
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Modified model 
Based on the findings presented above, the V-E-D-M model was modified (see Figure 24). In 
the revised version of the model the amount of information about rewards that is available at 
the Outcome Evaluation stage is assumed not to affect effort-based decision-making to a 
great extent. Nevertheless, considering that V-E-D-M model stipulates that what happens 
during Outcome Evaluation and Learning can have important consequences for future 
decisions, the question remains: why no effect of different types of feedback was observed in 
this thesis?  
The answer might lay in the structure of the task used. As described in section 3.2, during the 
Execution phase of the task participants were presented with the value of the potential reward 
each time they saw the thermometer appearing on the screen. Reward value was presented at 
the top of the thermometer and remained there for the duration of the trial. Once the trial was 
finished, participants received feedback, which could inform them about the amount of 
reward they obtained during the previous trial (depending on the feedback condition they 
were in). Nevertheless, it is likely that participants did not need such a reminder, as the 
reward values were fresh in their memory anyway. If that was the case, then reward feedback 
would provide very little additional information for participants, and so would have no effect 
on performance, as observed in the experiments presented in this thesis.  Consequently, future 
investigations of the effects of reward feedback on effort-based decision-making are needed. 
In these future experiments reward information should be removed from individual trials, to 
increase the importance of feedback for outcome processing. 
7.5 Delayed Action Execution 
According to the V-E-D-M model, another factor that can affect Outcome Evaluation and 
Learning is the timing of the Action Execution stage, i.e. whether it takes place directly after 
the choice is made or whether it is delayed in time. Since Outcome Evaluation and Learning 
can only take place after action is executed, delaying Action Execution can potentially have a 
strong impact on effort-based decision-making. In fact, previous studies suggest that delayed 
execution might lead to underweighting of effort requirements at the time of choice and 
therefore increased preferences for effortful trials during Action Selection (e.g. Soman, 
1998). One of the aims of the present work was to investigate if this pattern of results could 
be replicated using the novel effort-based decision-making task developed for this thesis. 
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In contrast to what has been found in the previous studies (e.g. Soman, 1998), the results of 
the present investigations suggest that delaying Action Execution can affect behaviour during 
effort-based decision-making, but only during the Action Execution stage. The exact effects 
of delaying Action Execution on behaviour during this stage were found to differ depending 
on the type of effort required. On mental effort trials, participants were found to exert more 
effort when execution was immediate. On physical effort trials participants exerted more 
effort when execution was delayed.  
Because of the differences in difficulty between mental and physical effort trials, as described 
in section 7.2, interpretation of these results is difficult. It is possible that delaying Action 
Execution affects mental and physical effort differently. However, it is also possible that 
delaying Action Execution increases effort exertion during relatively easy physical tasks, but 
decreases it during difficult mental tasks. If the latter is the case, it would suggest that 
Outcome Evaluation and Learning play a more important role for effort processing when the 
task is difficult. It is possible that in such circumstances the opportunity to evaluate the 
outcome of decisions allows people to fine tune their effort exertion to the task requirements 
and improve their performance. During easy tasks, on the other hand, delaying effort exertion 
seems to be beneficial, possibly because it reduces the need to process information from trial 
to trial and allows people to concentrate on the task at hand. 
Taken together, results presented above suggest, in line with the assumptions of the V-E-D-M 
model, that delaying Action Execution does influence effort-based decision-making to some 
extent. However, in contrast to the previous studies, it seems that the effect of this 
manipulation is limited to the Action Execution stage. The findings of this thesis suggest that 
delayed execution can lead both to increased and decreased effort expenditure, depending on 
the type of task. More specifically, delayed execution seems to decrease effort exertion on 
difficult/mental effort tasks and increase effort exertion on easy/physical effort tasks. Due to 
methodological issues, establishing whether it is the task difficulty or the type of effort 
required that modulates the effects of delaying Action Execution is impossible. Nevertheless, 
it seems likely that delayed execution primarily affects performance on difficult tasks. During 
these tasks an opportunity to fine tune effort exertion to effort requirements through Outcome 
Evaluation and Learning can significantly improve performance. Since this is just a 
speculation, however, further investigations are needed to support this hypothesis. These 
investigations would require manipulating task complexity, as well as the timing of the 
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Execution phase, to obtain the full picture regarding the effects of task difficulty on 
performance when execution is delayed and when it is immediate. Based on the results of the 
studies presented in this thesis the prediction would be that participants should perform better 
on difficult tasks when effort execution is immediate.  
7.6 Neural underpinnings 
The final aspect of effort-based decision-making investigated in this thesis was the neural 
basis of the mechanisms involved in this process. Based on the results of the previous studies, 
the examinations in this thesis focused on the neurotransmitter dopamine. This is because this 
neurotransmitter has been found to modulate effort processing during 1) Representation (e.g. 
Brooks & Berns, 2013; Phillips et al., 2007; Salamone & Correa, 2012), 2) Valuation (e.g. 
Prevost et al., 2010), 3) Action Selection (e.g. Chong et al., 2015), 4) Action Execution (e.g. 
Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Kurniawan et al., 2013; Niv, 2007; Pasquereau & Turner, 2013; 
Salamone & Correa, 2002; Salamone et al., 2007), and 5) Outcome Evaluation and Learning 
(e.g. Kable & Glimcher, 2009; Schultz, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2010; Schultz et al., 
1993; Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). Among other things, dopamine has 
been found to be crucial for overcoming effort costs and selecting effortful actions (e.g. 
Chong et al., 2015), as well as invigorating movements leading to the acquisition of rewards 
(e.g. Negrotti et al., 2005; Porat et al., 2014). For this reason, it was hypothesised that 
decreased levels of dopamine associated with PD should lead to decreased willingness to 
choose effortful options during the Action Selection stage, and decreased effort expenditure 
during the Action Execution stage in that group. 
However, despite of the results of the previous studies suggesting that dopamine is crucial for 
effort-based decision-making, no differences between the dopamine-depleted PD group and 
HC group were observed in this thesis. PD patients were found to make similar choices, exert 
similar amounts of effort, and be as accurate as HCs, which suggests that dopamine might not 
be as important for effort processing as assumed by the V-E-D-M model. This finding is in 
line with the results of a previous study by MacDonald et al. (2014). In this study the role of 
dorsal striatum during mental effort exertion was investigated in a group of PD patients ON 
and OFF dopaminergic medication and HCs. To elicit mental effort exertion a symbolic 
distance task was used, during which participants had to make magnitude judgements 
regarding two numbers presented simultaneously. On effortful trials the distance in 
magnitude between these numbers was small, whereas on easy trials this distance was 
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relatively big. In general PD patients were found to perform just as well on this task as HCs, 
regardless of whether they were tested ON or OFF medication, and no significant differences 
in behaviour between the two groups were found.   
Furthermore, Schmidt et al. (2008) investigated physical effort exertion in PD patients and 
HCs. They observed that when effort requirements during a handgrip task were externally 
defined (i.e. given to participants at the beginning of each trial), PD patients squeezed as hard 
as HCs. A difference between the two groups was only observed when participants could 
choose how much effort to invest for monetary rewards. In such circumstances PD patients 
were found to exert less effort than HCs. Considering that during the effort-based decision-
making tasks used in this thesis effort-based choice and execution were separated, and so by 
the time it came to effort exertion the amount of effort required was set and could not be 
changed, this might explain why no differences in effort exertion between PDs and HCs were 
observed in this task. 
Nevertheless, overwhelming evidence from other studies investigating effort-based decision-
making in PD suggests that dopamine depletion does in fact alter behaviour on effort-based 
decision-making tasks (e.g. Chong et al., 2015; Gepshtein et al., 2014; Jokinen et al., 2013; 
Majsak et al., 1998; Mazzoni et al., 2007; Moisello et al., 2011; Schneider, 2007; 
Weingartner et al., 1984). In light of this evidence, it seems more likely that the lack of 
differences between PD patients and HCs observed in this thesis stemmed from the fact that 
PD patients were tested ON medication. This hypothesis is supported by the results of several 
studies showing that performance of PD patients during effort-based decision-making tasks 
differs depending on whether they are tested ON or OFF medication (e.g. Anzak et al., 2012; 
Chong et al., 2015; Kojovic et al., 2014; Montgomery & Nuessen, 1990; Negrotti et al., 2005; 
Porat et al., 2014). For example, Porat et al. (2014), in their experiment investigating 
willingness to exert effort (through repeated finger-tapping on a keyboard) in PD patients ON 
and OFF medication and HCs, observed reduced effort exertion when PD patients were tested 
OFF medication, but not when they were tested ON medication. Furthermore, when 
Montgomery and Nuessen (1990) tested PD patients ON and OFF medication on a motor task 
which required fast reaching hand movements, they found that PD patients OFF medication 
had longer movement times than HCs, but this deficit was alleviated when patients were 
tested ON medication.  
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Considering the findings described above, the lack of differences between PD patients and 
HCs observed in this thesis is difficult to interpret without additional examination of 
participants’ performance OFF medication. Therefore, to establish the role of dopamine 
during different stages of effort-based decision-making further investigations are needed. In 
these investigations performance of PD patients ON and OFF medication should be compared 
with performance of HCs, to gain a better understanding of the role dopaminergic medication 
plays in alleviating potential deficits in effort processing caused by PD. Furthermore, 
investigations of dopaminergic transmission in healthy younger adults using brain imaging 
techniques would also be beneficial for establishing the role of dopamine during effort-based 
decision-making. Such investigations could use experimental paradigm similar to the one 
developed for this thesis. 
7.7 Limitations  
As demonstrated above, studies described in this thesis provide important clarifications 
regarding processing of effort, rewards, and feedback during effort-based decision-making. 
Results of these studies have served as a basis for modifying the V-E-D-M model. They have 
also provided evidence that the novel task developed for this thesis can be successfully used 
to investigate different aspects of effort-based decision-making. Nevertheless, three 
methodological limitations of the task design need to be taken into account when interpreting 
the results.  
First of all, the methods used to elicit effort exertion in this thesis were chosen from a set of 
tasks commonly used to examine effort-based decision-making in previous studies. This was 
done to allow for a direct comparison between the results of studies presented in this work 
and previous experiments. It is not clear, however, whether performance on these tasks can 
predict the general pattern of effort expenditure in real life mental and physical tasks. So far 
no formal comparisons between performance during laboratory-based effortful tasks and real 
life tasks were conducted. This is mainly because it is difficult to find appropriate, real life 
equivalents of the tasks used in the laboratory settings. This problem affects particularly 
examinations of mental effort, which use very simple, although cognitively demanding tasks, 
such as mental arithmetic. These tasks are rarely experienced as standalone problems in 
everyday lives. More commonly, they form part of more complex scenarios (such as 
household budgeting for example), which in turn are rarely examined in a laboratory. 
Therefore, the ecological validity of the findings of this thesis, as well as the previous studies 
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requires further investigations. These investigations should focus on examining the link 
between lab-based task performance and effort exertion during everyday tasks which are 
commonly assumed to require effort. 
Secondly, in the studies described in this thesis, response times, grip strength and accuracy 
were chosen as measures of effort exertion. However, it is not clear if these methods 
accurately reflect effort put in during a task. This problem also affects other paradigms used 
to study effort-based decision-making. In most experiments, effort exerted during a task is 
usually examined using task performance measures (such as response times, grip strength, or 
accuracy), self-report measures (such as questionnaires), or physiological measures (such as 
cardiovascular reactivity). These measures are assumed to be associated with effort 
expenditure, however, little evidence that they actually are is available. Furthermore, even 
assuming that the methods currently used to measure effort reflect effort exertion, few 
attempts to cross-validate them have been made. Self-report measures of effort expenditure 
are rarely used to connect task performance with participants’ subjective experience of effort. 
The same can be said about cardiovascular measures. Even though the few studies that did 
combine different measures of effort exertion suggest that they are correlated to some extent 
(e.g. Haji, Rojas, Childs, Ribaupierre, & Dubrowski, 2015; Von Helversen, Gendolla, 
Winkielman, & Schmidt, 2008), further investigations of the validity of these measures are 
needed. The first step would be to combine different types of measurements (i.e. task 
performance, self-report, and cardiovascular reactivity), to explore potential relationships 
between them. 
The final limitation of the task design used in this thesis relates to the effort requirements 
presented to participants. It is generally assumed that perceptions of effort vary greatly 
between individuals – i.e. the same task might be considered effortful by some people but 
easy by other people (e.g. Cocker, Hosking, Benoit, & Winstanley, 2012; Kool et al., 2010; 
McGuire & Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook et al., 2013). For that reason, in most of the tasks 
examining physical effort exertion effort requirements are adjusted for each participant. This 
is done through establishing participants’ maximum performance level (e.g. maximum grip 
strength), and adjusting the effort requirements in accordance with this level (e.g. to 30%, 
50%, or 75% of the maximum grip strength). This could not be done in the experiments 
presented in this thesis due to equipment limitations. For that reason, it is possible that the 
effort requirements of the tasks used were perceived differently by different participants, 
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which could in turn affect their choices, effort exertion and accuracy. Nevertheless, this 
problem has been partially resolved by including participants ID as a random factor during 
the statistical modelling of the data, which should have reduced the impact of this limitation. 
To summarise, three limitations of the paradigm used in this thesis have been identified: 1) 
lack of information as to whether effort–based decision-making in the lab can be 
predictive/diagnostic of general patterns of effort expenditure in mental/physical task, 2) 
uncertainty as to whether methods of measurement used reflect actual effort exertion, and 3) 
lack of adjustment in the effort requirements of the task. Nevertheless, regardless of these 
limitations, the results of the studies presented in this thesis provide a strong support for 
utilising V-E-D-M framework during investigations of effort-based decision-making. 
7.8 Summary 
Effort-based decision-making is a process of deciding between options associated with 
different levels of rewards and effort. Considering the importance of this process for our 
everyday functioning, it has been relatively underinvestigated so far. Therefore, the main aim 
of this thesis was to explore the factors that determine behaviour during effort-based 
decision-making. To that end, a novel framework for investigating this process, the V-E-D-M 
model, was proposed. The model assumed that effort-based decision-making consists of six 
separate stages: Representation, Valuation, Action Selection, Action Execution, Outcome 
Evaluation, and Learning. Behaviour during these stages was thought to depend on the 
characteristics of the decision-making problem, particularly reward magnitude, valence, and 
reliability, effort type, feedback type, and timing of Action Execution, as well as the levels of 
dopamine in the brain of decision-maker. However, the exact effects of these factors on the 
effort-based decision-making process were unclear. For that reason, six experiments 
investigating the influence of reward, effort, and feedback on performance during effort-
based decision-making were designed and implemented. 
These experiments were conducted using a novel effort-based decision-making task 
consisting of three phases: Training phase, Choice phase, and Execution phase. During 
Training and Execution participants were required to put in physical effort (squeeze the hand 
grip device) or mental effort (solve simple mathematical equations) to obtain small monetary 
rewards. During Choice, participants had a chance to choose between options associated with 
different levels of effort and reward. Participants’ choices, effort exertion, and accuracy 
 181 
 
during the task were analysed to establish the impact of effort, reward, and feedback, as well 
as dopamine depletion on effort-based decision-making, with the aim of assessing the validity 
of the assumptions of the V-E-D-M model. 
The results of these investigations showed that: 1) the effects of reward magnitude on effort-
based decision-making depend on the stage of the process, as rewards seem to affect 
behaviour mainly during Action Selection, and less so during Action Execution; furthermore, 
relative reward values seem to matter more than absolute reward values, 2) changing reward 
valence affects effort-based decision-making, as people become more risk averse when losses 
are at stake, 3) reward reliability can potentially affect effort-based decision-making, but only 
when participants believe they can increase their chances of obtaining rewards through 
exerting effort, 4) reward values drive behaviour during Action Selection, whereas effort 
requirements determine behaviour during Action Execution, 5) increasing the informative 
value of outcome feedback does not affect effort-based decision making, 6) delaying Action 
Execution affects effort exertion during this stage. These findings have been incorporated 
into the revised V-E-D-M model. 
In conclusion, the investigations presented in this thesis clarify the effects of manipulating 
reward, effort and feedback on effort-based decision-making. They also point to the 
usefulness of the V-E-D-M model for investigating this process. At the same time, they 
suggest areas that still need to be investigated in order to increase the predictive power of this 
model, providing interesting avenues for future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
Description of the exact data analysis methods used in the six experiments forming an 
empirical part of this thesis. 
Choice 
Experiment 1 (Gains) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Feedback were included into the full model.  Additionally, interactions 
between Effort Level*Reward Level, Reward Feedback*Effort Level, Reward 
Feedback*Reward Level, and Reward Feedback*Effort Level*Reward Level were included. 
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included Effort Level, Reward Level, and Effort Level*Reward Level interaction as 
fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson residuals and 
the residual degrees of freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for each 
observation was included in the model as well. There was no indication of overdispertion in 
the resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Reward Feedback were included in the full model.  Additionally, 
interactions between Effort Level*Reward Level, Reward Feedback*Effort Level, Reward 
Feedback*Reward Level, Reward Feedback*Effort Level*Reward Level were included. 
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
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highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included Effort Level, Reward Level, and Effort Level*Reward Level interaction as 
fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson residuals and 
the residual degrees of freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for each 
observation was included in the model. There was no indication of overdispertion in the 
resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Effort Type and Reward Feedback, as well as all possible interactions were 
included in the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, 
to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create 
models of different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the 
model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model 
was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level, Effort Type, as well as Effort 
Level*Reward Level and Effort Type*Effort Level interactions as fixed factors. As the 
analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of 
freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was included in the 
model. There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum 
Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the 
model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Experiment 2 (Losses) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Attractiveness, and Reward Valence, as well as all possible interactions were included into 
the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account 
for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
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which included Effort Level, Attractiveness and Reward Valence, as well as Effort 
Level*Attractiveness, Reward Valence*Effort Level and Reward Valence*Attractiveness 
interactions as fixed effects. As the analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson 
residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for 
each observation was included in the model as well. There was no indication of 
overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to 
test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Attractiveness, and Reward Valence, as well as all possible interactions were included into 
the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account 
for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included Effort Level, Attractiveness and Reward Valence, as well as Effort 
Level*Attractiveness, Reward Valence*Effort Level and Reward Valence*Attractiveness 
interactions as fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson 
residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for 
each observation was included in the model. There was no indication of overdispertion in the 
resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Reward Valence and Effort Type as well as all the possible interactions 
between them, were included in the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the 
model as a random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable 
selection was used to create models of different complexity and information theoretic tool 
(AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on 
this criterion the final model was selected which included all factors except for Effort 
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Type*Reward Valence*Attractiveness and Effort Type*Reward Valence*Effort 
Level*Attractiveness interactions as fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between the 
sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated 
overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was included in the model. There was 
no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace 
Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio 
test was used to test fixed effects. 
Experiment 3 (Reliability) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Reward Reliability, as well as all possible interactions were included into 
the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account 
for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included Effort Level, Reward Level, Reward Reliability, as well as Effort 
Level*Reward Level, and Reward Reliability*Effort Level interactions as fixed effects. As 
the analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual 
degrees of freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was 
included in the model as well. There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting 
model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the 
parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Reward Reliability, as well as all possible interactions were included into 
the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account 
for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
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which included Effort Level, Reward Level, Reward Reliability, as well as Effort 
Level*Reward Level, and Reward Reliability*Effort Level interactions as fixed factors. As 
the analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual 
degrees of freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was 
included in the model. There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  
Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters 
of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Reward Reliability and Effort Type, as well as all possible interactions were 
included in the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, 
to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create 
models of different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the 
model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model 
was selected which included all factors except for Effort Type*Reward Reliability*Reward 
Level and Effort Type*Reward Reliability*Effort Level*Reward Level interactions. As the 
analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of 
freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was included in the 
model. There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum 
Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the 
model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Experiment 4 (Increased Incentives) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Reward Reliability and Reward Magnitude, as well as all possible interactions 
were included into the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a 
random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was 
used to create models of different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used 
to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the 
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final model was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level, Reward Reliability, as 
well as interactions between Effort Level*Reward Level, Reward Reliability*Effort Level, 
and Reward Reliability*Reward Level as fixed effects. As the analysis of the ratio between 
the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated 
overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was included in the model as well. 
There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood 
(Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. 
Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Reward Reliability and Reward Magnitude, as well as all possible interactions 
were included into the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a 
random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was 
used to create models of different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used 
to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the 
final model was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level, Reward Reliability, as 
well as Effort Level*Reward Level, Reward Reliability*Effort Level, and Reward 
Reliability*Reward Level interactions as fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between 
the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated 
overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was included in the model. There was 
no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace 
Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio 
test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Reward Magnitude and Effort Type, as well as all possible interactions were 
included in the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, 
to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create 
models of different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the 
model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model 
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was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level, and Effort Type, as well as and 
Effort Level*Reward Level and Effort Type*Effort Level interactions as fixed factors. As the 
analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of 
freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was included in the 
model. There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum 
Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the 
model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Experiment 5 (Immediate Execution) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Reward Feedback and Timing of Execution, as well as all possible 
interactions were included into the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the 
model as a random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable 
selection was used to create models of different complexity and information theoretic tool 
(AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on 
this criterion the final model was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level and 
Effort Level*Reward Level interaction as fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between 
the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated 
overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was included in the model as well. 
There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood 
(Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. 
Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Reward Feedback and Timing of Execution, as well as all possible 
interactions were included into the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the 
model as a random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable 
selection was used to create models of different complexity and information theoretic tool 
(AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on 
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this criterion the final model was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level and 
Effort Level*Reward Level interaction as fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between 
the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated 
overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was included in the model as well. 
There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood 
(Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. 
Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Timing of Execution and Effort Type, as well as all the possible interactions 
between them were included in the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the 
model as a random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable 
selection was used to create models of different complexity and information theoretic tool 
(AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on 
this criterion the final model was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level, and 
Effort Type, as well as and Effort Level*Reward Level and Effort Type*Effort Level 
interactions as fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson 
residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for 
each observation was included in the model. There was no indication of overdispertion in the 
resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Experiment 6 (PD study) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Group, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full 
model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for 
repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
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which included Effort Level, Reward Level, and Group, as well as interactions between 
Effort Level*Reward Level and Group*Effort Level as fixed factors. As the analysis of the 
ratio between the sum of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of freedom 
indicated overdispertion, a random factor for each observation was included in the model as 
well. There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood 
(Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. 
Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Group, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full 
model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for 
repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included Effort Level and Reward Level, as well as Effort Level*Reward Level 
interaction as fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared Pearson 
residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated overdispertion, a random factor for 
each observation was included in the model. There was no indication of overdispertion in the 
resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary (option chosen vs. option rejected), GLMM assuming 
binomial distribution was used to analyse the choice data. Fixed effects of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Group and Effort Type, as well as all the possible interactions between 
themwere included in the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a 
random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was 
used to create models of different complexity and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used 
to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the 
final model was selected which included Effort Level and Reward Level, as well as Effort 
Level*Reward Level interaction as fixed factors. As the analysis of the ratio between the sum 
of squared Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of freedom indicated overdispertion, a 
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random factor for each observation was included in the model. There was no indication of 
overdispertion in the resulting model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to 
test fixed effects. 
Effort Exertion 
Experiment 1 (Gains) 
Physical Effort 
LMM approach was used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Reward Feedback, as well as all possible interactions were included into 
the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account 
for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Visual inspection of residual plots suggested potential 
violation of normality assumption. Consequently, strength data was transformed using square 
root transformation of reversed scores. Residuals of subsequent models showed no indication 
of violating the assumption of homoscedasticity or normality. The final model, selected based 
on the AIC criterion, included Effort Level as the only fixed effect. Maximum Likelihood 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to 
test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
LMM approach was initially used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort 
Level, Reward Level, and Reward Feedback, as well as all possible interactions were 
included into the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random 
factor, to account for repeated measures.  However, visual inspection of residual plots of the 
full model indicated violation of assumption of homoscedasticity and normality, and the data 
could not be transformed to normality. For that reason GLMM assuming gamma distribution 
with inverse link function was employed instead of LMM. Backward method of variable 
selection was used to create models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool 
(AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on 
this criterion the final model was selected which included Effort Level as the only fixed 
factor. Model diagnostics gave no indication of non-constant variance or overdispertion. 
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Maximum Likelihood method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood 
ratio test was used to test the fixed effect. 
Experiment 2 (Losses) 
Physical Effort 
LMM approach was used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort Level, 
Stakes Level, and Reward Valence, as well as all possible interactions were included into the 
full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for 
repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Visual inspection of residual plots suggested potential 
violation of homoscedasticity assumption. Consequently, strength data was transformed using 
square root transformation of reversed scores. Residuals of subsequent models showed no 
indication of violating the assumption of homoscedasticity. Based on the AIC criterion the 
final model was selected which included Effort Level, Stakes Level and Effort Level*Stakes 
Level interaction as fixed factors. Maximum Likelihood method was used to estimate the 
parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
Since RT data had a significant positive skew, and could not be normalized using standard 
transformations, GLMM approach assuming gamma distribution with logarithmic link 
function was used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed effects of Effort Level, Stakes 
Level, and Reward Valence, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full 
model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for 
repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included all fixed factors except for Reward Valence*Effort Level*Stakes Level 
interaction. Model diagnostics gave no indication of overdispertion or non-constant variance. 
Maximum Likelihood method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood 
ratio test was used to test the fixed effect. 
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Experiment 3 (Reliability) 
Physical Effort 
LMM approach was used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Reward Reliability, as well as all possible interactions were included into 
the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account 
for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Visual inspection of residual plots suggested that 
homoscedasticity assumption was violated. Consequently, strength data was transformed 
using square root transformation of reverse scores. Residuals of subsequent models showed 
no indication of violating the assumption of homoscedasticity or normality. Based on the AIC 
criterion the final model was selected which included Effort Level as the only fixed factor.  
Maximum Likelihood method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood 
ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was not normally distributed, GLMM assuming gamma distribution 
family with inverse link was implemented to analyse the RT data. Fixed effects of Effort 
Level, Reward Level, and Reward Reliability, as well as all possible interactions were 
included into the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random 
factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to 
create models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select 
the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model 
was selected which included Effort Level as the only fixed factor. Model diagnostics did not 
reveal any indication of overdispertion or non-constant variance. Maximum Likelihood 
(Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. 
Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Experiment 4 (Increased Incentives) 
Physical Effort 
LMM approach was used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Reward Reliability and Reward Magnitude, as well as all possible interactions 
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were included into the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a 
random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was 
used to create models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used 
to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Visual inspection of residual 
plots suggested a potential violation of homoscedasticity assumption. Consequently, the 
strength data was transformed using the square root transformation of reversed scores. 
Residuals of subsequent models showed no indication of violating the assumption of 
homoscedasticity. Based on the AIC criterion the final model was selected which included 
Effort Level and Reward Level as fixed factors. Maximum Likelihood method was used to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
Since RT data had a significant positive skew, and could not be normalized using standard 
transformations, GLMM approach assuming gamma distribution with logarithmic link 
function was used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward 
Level, Reward Reliability and Reward Magnitude, as well as all possible interactions were 
included into the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random 
factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to 
create models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select 
the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model 
was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level and Reward Magnitude, as well as 
Effort Level*Reward Level, Reward Magnitude*Effort Level and Reward 
Magnitude*Reward Level interactions as fixed factors. Model diagnostics gave no indication 
of overdispertion or non-constant variance. Maximum Likelihood method was used to 
estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test the fixed effect. 
Experiment 5 (Immediate Execution) 
Physical Effort 
LMM approach was used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, Reward Feedback and Timing of Execution were included into the full model. 
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
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highest estimated predictive power. Visual inspection of residual plots suggested a potential 
violation of homoscedasticity assumption. Consequently, the strength data was transformed 
using the square root transformation of reversed scores. Residuals of subsequent models 
showed indication of violating the assumption of homoscedasticity. Based on the AIC 
criterion the final model was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level, and 
Timing of Execution  as well as Effort Level*Reward Level and Timing of Execution*Effort 
Level interactions as fixed factors. Maximum Likelihood method was used to estimate the 
parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
Since RT data had a significant positive skew, and could not be normalized using standard 
transformations, GLMM approach assuming Gamma distribution with logarithmic link was 
used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, Reward 
Feedback and Timing of Execution, as well as all possible interactions were included into the 
full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for 
repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included Effort Level, Reward Level and Timing of Execution, as well as Effort 
Level*Reward Level and Timing of Execution*Effort Level interactions as fixed factors. 
Model diagnostics gave no indication of overdispertion or non-constant variance. Maximum 
Likelihood method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test 
was used to test the fixed effect. 
Experiment 6 (PD study) 
Physical Effort 
LMM approach was used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Group, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full 
model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for 
repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of 
different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with 
the highest estimated predictive power. As the visual inspection of residual plots indicated the 
violation of homoscedasticity assumption, the strength data was transformed using square 
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root transformation of reversed scores. Visual inspection of residual plots of the subsequent 
models did not reveal any obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or normality. Based on 
the AIC criterion the final model was selected which included Effort Level as the only fixed 
factor. Maximum Likelihood method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. 
Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
LMM approach was used to deal with repeated measures. Fixed factors of Effort Level, 
Reward Level, and Group, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full 
model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for 
repeated measures. As the visual inspection of residual plots of the resulting model indicated 
violation of homoscedasticity assumption, RT data was transformed using logarithmic 
transformation. Visual inspection of residual plots of the subsequent models did not reveal 
any obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or normality. Backward method of variable 
selection was used to create models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool 
(AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on 
this criterion model which included Effort Level and Reward Level, as well as Effort 
Level*Reward Level interaction as fixed factors was chosen. Maximum Likelihood method 
was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed 
effects. 
Accuracy 
Experiment 1 (Gains) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to 
analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, and Reward 
Feedback, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full model.  Participant 
ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated measures. 
Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different complexity, 
and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated 
predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected which included Effort 
Level and Reward Level as fixed factors. There was no indication of overdispertion in the 
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model. Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the 
parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was 
implemented to analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, and 
Reward Feedback, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full model.  
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included Effort Level as the only fixed effect. There was no indication of 
overdispertion in the model. Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was 
used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed 
effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to 
analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, Effort Type and 
Reward Feedback, as well as all possible interactions were included in the full model. 
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included all fixed factors except for Effort Type*Reward Feedback*Effort 
Level*Reward Level interaction. There was no indication of overdispertion in the model.  
Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters 
of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Experiment 2 (Losses) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to 
analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Stakes Level and Reward Valence, 
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as well as all possible interactions were included into the full model. Participant ID was 
incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward 
method of variable selection was used to create models of different complexity, and 
information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated 
predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected which included all 
fixed factors except for Reward Valence*Effort Level*Stakes Level interaction. There was 
no indication of overdispertion in the model. Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to 
test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to 
analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Stakes Level and Reward Valence 
were included into the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a 
random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was 
used to create models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used 
to select the model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the 
final model was selected which included all fixed factors except for Reward Valence*Effort 
Level*Stakes Level interaction. There was no indication of overdispertion in the model. 
Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters 
of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to 
analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Stakes Level, Effort Type and 
Reward Feedback, as well as all possible interactions were included in the full model. 
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included all fixed factors. There was no indication of overdispertion in the model.  
Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters 
of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
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Experiment 3 (Reliability) 
Physical Effort 
As all participants were found to be 100% accurate on low effort trials, the estimation of 
predictor coefficients was not possible (The model would not converge).  Consequently, low 
effort trials were excluded from the analysis.  As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM 
assuming binomial distribution was used to analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of 
Reward Level and Reward Reliability, as well as an interaction between them were included 
into the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to 
account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create 
models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the 
model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model 
was selected which included Reward Level as the only fixed factor. There was no indication 
of overdispertion in the model. Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was 
used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed 
effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was 
implemented to analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, and 
Reward Reliability, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full model.  
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included Effort Level as the only fixed factor. There was some indication of 
overdispertion in the model, based on the analysis of the ratio between the sum of squared 
Pearson residuals and the residual degrees of freedom, so a random factor of Observation was 
included in the model as well.  There was no indication of overdispertion in the resulting 
model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the 
parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
 
 
 217 
 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to 
analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, Effort Type and 
Reward Reliability, as well as all possible interactions were included in the full model. 
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included all fixed factors except for Effort Type*Reward Level, Effort Type*Reward 
Reliability*Effort Level, Effort Type*Reward Reliability*Reward Level, and Effort 
Type*Reward Reliability*Effort Level*Reward Level interactions. There was no indication 
of overdispertion in the model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was 
used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed 
effects. 
Experiment 4 (Increased Incentives) 
Physical Effort 
As all but one participant were found to be 100% accurate on low effort trials, the estimation 
of predictor coefficients  was not possible (the model would not converge).  Consequently, 
low effort trials were excluded from the analysis.  As the outcome variable was binary, 
GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors 
of Reward Level, Reward Reliability and Reward Magnitude were included into the full 
model. Participant ID was included into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included Reward Level and Reward Magnitude as fixed factors. There was no 
indication of overdispertion in the model. Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to 
test fixed effects. 
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Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was 
implemented to analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, 
Reward Reliability and Reward Magnitude, as well as all possible interactions were included 
into the full model.  Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to 
account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create 
models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the 
model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model 
was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level, Reward Reliability and Reward 
Magnitude as well as interactions between Effort Level*Reward Level, Reward 
Magnitude*Effort Level, Reward Magnitude*Reward Level, and Reward Magnitude*Effort 
Level*Reward Level as fixed factors. There was no indication of overdispertion in the model. 
Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters 
of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to 
analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, Effort Type and 
Reward Magnitude, as well as all possible interactions were included in the full model. 
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included all fixed factors except for Effort Type*Reward Reliability*Reward Level 
and Effort Type*Reward Reliability*Effort Level*Reward Level interactions. There was no 
indication of overdispertion in the model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to 
test fixed effects. 
Experiment 5 (Immediate Execution) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was 
implemented to analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, 
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Reward Feedback and Timing of Execution, as well as all possible interactions were included 
into the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to 
account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create 
models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the 
model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model 
was selected which included Effort Level and Reward Level as fixed effects. There was no 
indication of overdispertion in the model. Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to 
test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was 
implemented to analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, 
Reward Feedback and Timing of Execution, as well as all possible interactions were included 
into the full model. Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to 
account for repeated measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create 
models of different complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the 
model with the highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model 
was selected which included Effort Level, Reward Level, Timing of Execution as well as 
interactions between Effort Level*Reward Level and Timing of Execution*Effort Level as 
the fixed factors. There was no indication of overdispertion in the model. Maximum 
Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters of the 
model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to 
analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, Effort Type and 
Timing of Execution, as well as all possible interactions were included in the full model. 
Participant ID was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated 
measures. Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different 
complexity, and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the 
highest estimated predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected 
which included all fixed factors. There was no indication of overdispertion in the model.  
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Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters 
of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Experiment 6 (PD study) 
Physical Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was 
implemented to analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, and 
Group, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full model.  Participant ID 
was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated measures. 
Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different complexity, 
and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated 
predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected which included Effort 
Level, Reward Level and Effort Level*Reward Level interaction as fixed effects. There was 
no indication of overdispertion in the model. Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to 
test fixed effects. 
Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was 
implemented to analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, and 
Group, as well as all possible interactions were included into the full model.  Participant ID 
was incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated measures. 
Backward method of variable selection was used to create models of different complexity, 
and information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated 
predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected which included Effort 
Level as the only fixed effect. There was no indication of overdispertion in the model. 
Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) method was used to estimate the parameters 
of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to test fixed effects. 
Physical vs. Mental Effort 
As the outcome variable was binary, GLMM assuming binomial distribution was used to 
analyse the accuracy data. Fixed factors of Effort Level, Reward Level, Effort Type and 
Group, as well as all possible interactions were included in the full model. Participant ID was 
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incorporated into the model as a random factor, to account for repeated measures. Backward 
method of variable selection was used to create models of different complexity, and 
information theoretic tool (AIC) was used to select the model with the highest estimated 
predictive power. Based on this criterion the final model was selected which included all 
fixed factors except for the interactions between Effort Type*Group*Effort Level, Effort 
Type*Group*Reward Level, and Effort Type*Group*Effort Level*Reward Level. There was 
no indication of overdispertion in the model.  Maximum Likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
method was used to estimate the parameters of the model. Likelihood ratio test was used to 
test fixed effects. 
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APPENDIX B 
Tables presenting descriptive statistics regarding choice, effort exertion and execution. 
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